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ABSTRACT 
The impetus for this study arose from a realisation that the post-structural concept of 
agency was relevant to disability studies. In locating this study as a contribution to 
the knowledge of disability and disablement, the initial chapters explore the 
theoretical genealogy of disability studies and the methodology for the study. In 
broad tenns this has been a discursive and nan'ative research project, which sought to 
explore how discourse constituted the lives of six people with impainnents and/or 
illness. Within this examination, specific attention was paid to those occasions in 
which the participants were able to take up altemative and preferred subject positions 
when they had been positioned in ways that removed or reduced their agency on 
account of their having an impainnent and/or illness. 
The six people who participated in the study are introduced at the end of Chapter 
Four and the next three chapters provide an account of their accounts. Overall, the 
participants' accounts of their experiences told how medical discourse positioned 
them in ways that removed their ageney but not exclusively so. In contrast to medical 
discourse, disability rights discourses offered altemative subject positions because 
disablement is not constructed as an inevitable consequence of having an impainnent 
and/or illness. In regard to the benefit of disability rights discourses for disabled 
people, two of the participants had been advantaged by the career opportunities 
available to them within the disability sector that arguably had been created by 
disability rights discourses. However, generally speaking, the participants' accounts 
of their experiences showed that disability rights discourses were not the only 
discursive option for them. On those occasions in which the participants took up 
subject positions that afforded them agency, they were often calling on more than one 
discursive idea or practice, typically beyond both medical or disability rights 
discourses. The participants' lives were more diverse and complex than the 
reproduction of any one singular discourse. Hence, even between just six people's 
accounts, there was significant difference between how each person called on and 
negotiated discourse so as to take up subject positions that offered them agency. 
In considering th.e participants' accounts, anum ber of generic storylines have been 
generated from the research process. In particular, these were: the negative impact of 
deficit discourse on disabled people's lives, the advantages and limitations of 
disability rights discourses, the complex and person-specific processes of taking up 
subject positions that afford agency for the person, and the experience of silenced, 
subjugated and contradictory subject positions. These quite specific understandings 
about the processes of disablement for people who have impainnents and/or illnesses, 
and their corresponding actions of agency, are discussed in more detail in the 
concluding chapter in regards to implications for future research, theory and 
professional practice. 
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[!] INTRODIICTION 
This study engaged with six people who identified as having 'a long-term illness or 
health problem', 'an impainnent' or 'a disability'. Of interest to this investigation 
were the meanings the participants took up about their lives. In regard to their 
meaning-making, I was curious to learn the extent to which the discursive subject 
positions offered to the participants constructed problematic realities for them. 
Furthermore, I wished to investigate when the participants were positioned in ways 
that were disadvantageous for them, were they able to take up alternative subject 
positions, thereby resisting disabling ideas and practices. 
Two assumptions about disablement 
A Foucauldian analysis of discourse has informed the study, in that "words and 
phrases have meanings that are organised into systems and institutions ... [and) 
discursive practices that position us in relations of power" (Parker, 1999, p. 6). On 
this basis, my first assumption has been that some discourses did not benefit but 
rather worked to the detriment of those who were viewed as having an illness or 
impainnent. For example, Western medical discourse not only creates the 
classifications of illness and impainnent but in addition any bodily occurrence judged 
as representing the absence of health is assumed to create disadvantage for that 
person. The argument for how medical discourse specifically produces disadvantage 
for people with illness or impainnent, from a disability rights discourse perspective, 
is discussed further in Chapters Two and Three. 
Problematic as it is to be positioned in telTIlS of the absence of health, Foucault (1980) 
did not believe that any experience was ever completely captured by the meanings 
held within anyone discursive framework. In other words, despite being positioned 
disadvantageously by one discourse, other discursive meaning-making would 
potentially be available, offering alternative understandings of experience. Foucault 
referred to these alternative understandings as subjugated knowledges for "the power 
implicit in one discourse is only apparent from the resistance implicit in another" 
(Burr, 2003, p.69). Hence, the second assumption I have held is that whilst the 
participants' lives would demonstrate disadvantage because of the presence ofiIlness 
and impairment, their lives would also illustrate resistance to such disadvantage: there 
would be times when the participants attempted to gain agency, "to push at the limits 
of what is socially constructed and actively construct something different" (Parker, 
1999, p.7). I was curious to hear about these stories of resistance; how these stories 
of exception to disablement were achieved; what discursive ideas and practices were 
taken up so as to enable the pmticipants to story themselves beyond the familiar tenus 
of deficit discourse. 
Narrative, discourse and the constitution of self 
Researching stories of disablement and stories of resistance to disablement reflects 
my interest in narrative, as well as my purpose in exmuining the discourses that have 
produced such narratives. It is prudent at this point to discuss my understanding and 
use of the terms 'narrative' and 'discourse' and their c01111ection to each other. This 
discussion will be continued in Chapter Three, where I review discursive applications 
2 
to the field of disability theory and research, and Chapter Four in which I discuss the 
specific purpose and methodology of this study. Both chapters explore in more detail 
the discursive concepts of positioning, subjectivity and agency. And while these 
concepts have occurred within the domain of discourse analysis, they are also 
implicit, and explicit, within the field of narrative therapy. One of Epston and 
White's earlier texts on narrative therapy, Narrative means to therapeutic ends 
(1990), draws on the work of anthropologists Bruner and Brooks. According to 
Bruner (2002), a story is not about producing a convincing logico-scientific argument 
but about being characterised as life-like, a subjective account of experience that is a 
perfonnance of meaning-making. Stories, therefore, are narrative mediums which are 
not descriptive but perforrnative. That is, they have real shaping effects on what is 
constructed as reality: 
Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories we 
tell and hear told, those we dream or imagine or would like to tell, all 
of which are reworked in the story of our lives, that we narrate to 
ourselves in an episodic, sometimes semi-conscious, but virtually 
uninterrupted monologue. We live immersed in narrative, recounting 
and reassessing the meaning of our past actions, anticipating the 
outcomes of our future projects, situating ourselves at the intersection 
of several stories not yet completed. (Brooks, 1984, p.3, cited in 
Epston & White, 1990, p. 80) 
Epston and White go on to make the point that narrative "locates a person as the 
protagonist or participant in his/her world ... a world in which persons participate 
with others in the 're-authoring', and thus the shaping of their lives and relationships" 
(p.82). BUlT (2003) also attests to this theme of co-production, saying "the narratives 
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we construct about ourselves are not simply a private matter. .. [for] we are heavily 
dependent upon the willingness of co-actors in the construction of our story" (p.145). 
People's narratives, therefore, are negotiated and re-negotiated within communities 
(White,2001). As such, narratives do not stand separate from discourse but embody 
discursive ideas and practices, those underpinning values and worldview that have 
constituted and shaped the meanings the person has of experience (Weingarten, 
1991). In this case, from a discourse perspective, who a person is, how they view 
themselves and how others see them, is not seen as fixed and independent from the 
social environment. Rather, the self, as constituted by various discourses in an on-
going manner, is viewed as multiple, fragmented and incoherent (Burr, 2003). The 
stories we tell about ourselves and others are discursive acts: 
One's being shifts with the various discourses through which one is 
spoken into existence. The individual or heroic "1" is understood as a 
discursive construction, not stemming from the particular 
characteristics of that person but from the subject position made 
available to himlher. (Davies, 1991, p.43) 
If the narrative stories of the self are constructed within and limited by the subject 
positions available within discourse, then it is impOliant to develop an understanding 
of the discourses that one is engaged with at anyone time. For people who live with 
illness and/or imp ailment, this means understanding how discourses construct 
disability. 
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Discourses construct disability 
Disability, as a construct of discourse, is an experience that I would argue is at the 
intersection of many discourses. Disability is a contested telm and considerable 
debate and argument has OCCUlTed relative to disability theory, research, policy and 
practice. Different ideas have been proposed for what disability is, what causes it and 
how it should be responded to. The dominant discourse about disability continues to 
be that of Western medicine. In response to the biomedical model and respective 
critique of it, a number of alternative theories about disability have been developed. 
The social model of disability, minority group and feminist approaches, normalisation 
and social role valorisation (SRV), critical realist and postmodern perspectives, all 
continue to make significant contributions to disability studies. 
As a person who has lived with spinal cord injury for twenty-three years, I can 
understand, and identify with the relevance of all these approaches to the field of 
disability. Without doubt, each of these paradigmatic agendas has, at different times, 
informed my thinking and shaped how I have engaged with health professionals, 
work colleagues, family and friendships. But in more recent years, my attention as a 
counselling educator and practitioner has turned more specifically to the postmodern 
concepts of narrative and discourse and related foci of positioning, subjectivity and 
agency. As my teaching and counselling practice have been informed by these 
nan'ative and discursive ideas, there has at the same time been a growing interest 
within disability studies to apply postmodern theory to the field of disability: 
The global experience of disabled people is too complex to be rendered 
within one unitary model or set of ideas. Considering the range of 
impainnents under the disability umbrella; considering the different 
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ways III which they impact on individuals and groups over their 
lifetime; considering the intersection of disability with other axes of 
inequality; and considering the challenge which impairment issues to 
notions of embodiment, we believe it could be argued that disability is 
the ultimate postmodern concept. 
(Corker & Shakespeare, 2002, p.IS) 
Relating the concepts of discourse, subjectivity and agency to disability 
Given my personal and professional background, this invitation by Corker and 
Shakespeare, to apply the pluralist scope of post modernism to the complex 
experience of disability, was in effect an encouragement for me to continue the 
project I was already engaged in. In 2005 I wrote the article 'Disability: Theorising 
experiences in the critical analysis of discourse' (Arkwright, 2005), in which I argued 
and illustrated the theoretical relevance of the concepts of discourse, subjectivity and 
agency to the lives of disabled people. What I especially liked about these concepts 
is that they avoided the either/or binary of one model versus another, instead 
providing a framework with which to understand the respective relevance and impact 
of all theorising about disability. I then published a chapter in which I discussed the 
binary of 'competent versus incompetent parent' and how it was difficult for me as a 
person with an impairment to take up a position within the descriptor of • competent 
parent'. I illustrated how it was possible to draw on nalTative therapy processes and 
disability rights ideas to refuse the discursive invitation of being a 'less-than' parent 
(Arkwright, 2008). Indeed, my understanding of discourse and agency is that it is 
possible to position oneself to "play with the different constitutive acts we might 
engage in" (Davies, 1998, p.135). The question then becomes less which discourse 
(medical model, social model, SRV, postmodem approaches and so forth) serves 
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disabled people best but more how each discourse "can be used in particular ways 
with powerful effects (one of which might be the constitution of 'me' as a particular 
kind of person)" (Davies, 1998, p.135). This means that all the efforts made by 
academics, health professionals and disability activists to theorise disability, alleviate 
impaim1ent and emancipate disabled people have been potentially helpful to disabled 
people in understanding and negotiating life. In addition, while all these models are 
relevant, they are still insufficient to explain all disablement because discourses such 
as gender, et1micity, class, age, education, work, sex, religion and so forth also 
intersect with and impact understandings of illness, impainnent and disability. For 
this reason, I would argue that discourse analysis is especially relevant to disability 
theory. As Davies (1998) has stated, in this instance referring to Kristeva's 
examination of feminist discourses, it is possible to see the value of all theories 
pertaining to people's understandings of experience, rather than accepting the 
discursive invitation to be loyal to one over another: 
Each of the competing [feminist] discourses have been generated over 
time, partly in reaction to the problems encountered in the one that 
went before. These discourses oppose and contradict each other in 
quite fundamental ways. Yet they are still necessary ... as they can each 
achieve quite different and important things. (Davies, 1998, p.135). 
If this is the case, that even quite different disability theories can achieve important 
things, then the question of what these competing discourses actually achieve for 
disabled people must be asked. And to what extent are the discursive concepts of 
positioning, subjectivity and agency useful for understanding the subject positions 
within discourse that disabled people occupy? These considerations have 
implications for future disability theory, research, policy and practice. They are the 
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central focus of this study. Indeed, the study suggests that at this point in time when 
the experience of disability is viewed as more complex than can be accounted for by 
anyone theory of disability (Corker & Shakespeare, 2002), it is especially relevant to 
understand how different discourses position disabled people. Furthermore, what 
these subject positions mean for how people with impainnents and/or illnesses can 
live and who they can be, but most importantly what ideas and practices disabled 
people call on as they resist those position calls which limit or remove their agency. 
In this first chapter, I have briefly introduced the topic of my study, overviewed the 
concepts of discourse and narrative, and shared something of my own background 
that has influenced me to undertake the study. Chapter Two maps the historical 
dominance of medical discourse and discusses two counter discourses: the social 
model of disability, and the theory of nonnalisation / SRV. Disability theory, 
research and practice which utilises postmodem theory has emerged in recent years 
and signifies a new development within disability studies. Chapter Three reviews 
such literature and locates the place of this particular study within this wider pursuit, 
namely the current trend within disability studies to use postmodem theory to go 
beyond the medical versus social model dichotomy. The particular methodology, 
ethics and research process of this study are discussed in Chapter Four. The 
participants are introduced and the research findings from the participant interviews 
are discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Chapter Eight concludes with a 
discussion about some of the overall storylines that have been generated by the study, 
and suggests possible implications from the study for future disability theory, 
research and professional practice. 
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2 DISABILITY: MODERNIST THEORIES, CRITIQUE AND RESEARCH 
Western medicine may seem an unusual place to start when reviewing disability 
literature, especially when much of disability theory has been established as a counter 
to the biomedical model. However, whilst disability rights, pioneered by the 
disability movement and furthered by the work of disability studies, has achieved 
much for disabled people, it remains on the margins of, and definitely a subversive 
alternative to medical science and medical practice (Bury, 2005). For this reason, I 
begin with the theory, practice and critique of biomedicine. 
The Biomedical Model 
Western medicine has a long history which can be traced back to Hellenistic times. 
Hippocrates, a physician in the fourth century BC, is most remembered for his oath of 
medical ethics. He stated, "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my 
ability and judgement, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them." (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 2009, p.l49). The Hippocratic Oath is still referred to and discussed in 
medical schools today which suggests that the underpinning philosophy of Western 
medical practice has remained similar for over two thousand years. However, 
diseases and medical practice have not remained the same. In the first part of this 
chapter, drawing initially on Foucault's (1963) critique of modem medicine, I detail 
how medical practice changed from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, and 
what these changes have meant for the construction of impainnent and illness. 
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The social movements of the Modernist period, namely Colonialism, the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the Enlightemnent and the World Wars, 
created notable changes in both the types of illness and injury that afflicted people 
and the respective medical practices used to treat them. The European explorations to 
the New World and colonisation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
spread diseases from one continent to another. For example, up to ninety percent of 
native AmeIicans are thought to have died due to European diseases following 
European settlement into North AmeIica. Smallpox killed millions in the Caribbean, 
Mexican highlands and South Americas during the early sixteenth century. In the 
Pacific Islands, smallpox, syphilis and other illnesses decimated the indigenous 
peoples. Europe also witnessed sweeping epidemics of plague, smallpox, typhus and 
syphilis, whilst scarlet fever, syphilis and diphtheria entered China with devastating 
consequences and India was ravaged by cholera. During the Imperial peliod, disease 
killed people the world over with alarming speed, but in addition to the spread of 
diseases created by Colonialism, the French Revolution (1789-1999) and the 
Napoleonic wars resulted in injUlies and casualties on an unprecedented scale. 
Moreover, the Industrial Revolution's urban drift served to create even more health 
problems because cities became a breeding ground for infectious diseases (Porter, 
2004). 
During the eighteenth century, medical practitioners were facing the challenge of 
trying to treat illnesses that killed people but they still had very little knowledge about 
what caused disease. Bloodletting and purging remained the dominant treatment for 
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infection, only years later revealed as an ineffective and problematic practice. By the 
nineteenth century, hospitals and medical laboratories had become widespread. 
Medicine began to shift from a focus on holistic health practices in local settings to 
the diagnosis and treatment of pathology within hospitals and clinics, what Porter 
(1999,2004) has referred to as the shift from 'dis-ease' to 'diseases'. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, knowledge about illness and its treatment had increased 
substantially. In the Age of Science, medicine became more like a science. Training 
from a university became necessary in order to hold a medical license. Laboratories 
produced aspirin, a safer pain relief than opium', and nitrous oxide and chlorofonn 
were used for anesthesia during surgery and childbirth. The stethoscope had been 
invented and even more significantly, Pasteur had proposed his ideas about genns 
carrying diseases, resulting in a focus on hygiene, which did reduce the rate of 
infection. The development of vaccines began, as did the use of sulphur drugs during 
the 1930s; then penicillin and its purified fonns led to the first effective anti-
microbial drugs. The tide began to tum in medical care: doctors were no longer the 
listening ear of the 1800s with no real cure for the diseases that killed. Biochemical 
and phmmacological research expanded exponentially following World War Two, 
enabling doctors to effectively treat a wide range of both traditional illnesses, such as 
polio, as well as more modem illnesses such as heart disease and high blood pressure, 
including the development and use of intensive care units, laser and keyhole surgery 
(Porter, 2004). 
However, modem medical practice still faces many challenges, not least of which are 
new infectious diseases such as avian influenza, and the continual decimation of 
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populations in developing countl1es by Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). The 
new frontiers in medical research, stem cell research and gene based therapy are 
hoped to offer solutions to such illnesses and some injuries such as spinal cord and 
neurological problems. 
However, as Watts has noted "two things that have not changed over the past decade 
are medicine's capacity to devise new and more costly remedies and the uncertainty 
with which so many of us view the entire enterprise" (Watts, 2006, p. 332). 
Uncertainty about the enterprise of medicine is not a new phenomenon. For example, 
by the mid twentieth century antibiotics had transfonned the possibilities of recovery 
from many infectious diseases but it was during this very period that despite the rise 
of medical efficacy, or perhaps because of it, Foucault was critical of the institution 
of medicine. In Birth a/the clinic (1963) he began his critique of the development, 
ideology and impact of modem medicine by tracking the changes in medical practice 
from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century: 
Generally speaking, it might be said that up to the end of the eighteenth 
century medicine related much more to health than to normality; it did 
not begin by analysing a 'regular' flillctioning of the organism and go 
on to seek where it had deviated, what it was disturbed by, and how it 
conld be brought back into working order; it referred, rather, to 
qualities of vigour, suppleness, and fluidity, which were lost in illness 
and which it was the task of medicine to restore; to this extent, medical 
practice would accord an important place to regimen and diet, in short 
to a whole rule of life and nutlition that the subject imposed upon 
himself. This privileged relation between medicine and health involved 
the possibility of being one's own physician. Nineteenth century 
medicine, on the other hand, was regulated more in accordance with 
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normality than health; it fonned its concepts and prescribed its 
interventions in relation to a standard of functioning and organic 
structure, and physiological knowledge - once marginal and purely 
theoretical knowledge for the doctor - was to become established 
(Claude Bernard bears witness to this) at the very centre of all medical 
reflexion. (Foucault, 1963, p.35, my emphasis) 
The shift from 'a rule oflife for all' that people 'imposed upon themselves' to an 
analysis by the physician of what was deviant or not nonnal, was significant. The 
patient was more pathologised in the latter. At the same time the status ofthe doctor 
had become more elevated because Ie regard (the medical gaze) of the doctor became 
a privileged and exclusive knowledge: 
Description, in clinical medicine, does not mean placing the hidden or 
the invisible within reach of those who have no direct access to them; 
what it means is to give speech to that which everyone sees without 
seeing - a speech that can be understood only by those initiated into 
true speech. 'Whatever precepts are given about so delicate a matter, it 
will always remain beyond the reach of the multitude'. (Foucault, 
1963, p. 115) 
As the knowledges infOlming medical practice became less visible and accessible to 
'the multitude', people's dependence on the expertise of the doctor inevitably grew. 
In the industrial age of the nineteenth century, illness detrimentally impacted the 
economics of local and national bodies, since a healthy population made for a 
productive labour force. Hence, it was in the interest of both the economy and the 
medical establishment for people to be well because a healthy person could sustain 
employment and afford medical care for both themselves and family members. Not 
surprisingly, health evolved into "the duty of each and the objective of all" (Foucault, 
13 
1980, p. 170) and it became a state policy priority, whereas previously only the 
concerns of war and peace, order and lawlessness had been state concerns. Foucault 
(1980) termed this evolving "the great medical edifice" and his critique was that 
whilst medicine was "explicitly moral and scientific" it was also "secretly economic" 
(p.166). He argued that due to a number of texts in the nineteenth century on the care 
of children, families were positioned by "new and highly detailed rules ... [and] the 
health of children [became] one of the family'S most demanding objectives" 
(Foucault, 1980, p.I72-3). Unchecked as a means of social control, by the twentieth 
century medicine had become "a world power" (Starr, 1982): 
From a relatively weak, traditional profession of minor eCOnOlTIlC 
significance, medicine has become a sprawling system of hospitals, 
clinics, health plans, insurance companies, and myriad other 
organisations employing a vast labour force. This transfonnation has 
not been propelled solely by the advance of science and the satisfaction 
of human need ... the profession has managed to turn its authority into 
social privilege, economic power, and political influence ... the pattern 
has been one of professional sovereignty. (StatT 1982, p.4-5) 
The rise of medicine to hold such power within society occurred because medical 
practice becatne the legitimate body for defining what disease, illness and impainnent 
were, while at the same time it was also the profession that was engaged in curing 
and/or reducing disease, illness and impainnent. Medical practice by definition then, 
created the distinction between those who were the consumers of medical practice, 
people who had diseases and problems with their bodies, and those whose work 
involved them treating such persons (Nettleton, 1998). The distinction meant people 
with impainnents and illness were constructed as having conditions which were 
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undesirable, whereas those involved in medical research and practice were positioned 
to be respected for the knowledge, skills, social status and influence they had. The 
power of discourse, like medicine, to privilege one group of people but disadvantage 
another was what Foucault (1963, 1973, 1980) took exception to when he referred to 
"the tyranny of globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a 
theoretical avante-garde" (Foucault, 1980, p.83). As a counter to such dominant 
knowledge/power, Foucault advocated the emergence of alternative knowledges: 
It is through the re-emergence of these low ranking knowledges, these 
unqualified, even directly disqualified knowledges (such as that of the 
psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of the nurse, of the doctor -
parallel and marginal as they are to the knowledge of medicine - that 
of the delinquent etc.)... it is through the re-appearance of ... these 
disqualified knowledges, that criticism perfonns its work. (Foucault 
1980, p.82) 
Sociological critique ofthe biomedical model 
Subsequent to Foucault's theorising the insurrection of subjugated knowledges, 
Medical Sociology and Sociology of Health and Illness emerged as separate academic 
disciplines from either medicine or sociology, each focused on providing a response 
to and a critique of medicine. It is not my intent to explore comprehensively the 
history and work of these disciplines but to briefly scope key aspects of their critique 
of medicine. Sociologists within these disciplines continued Foucault's lead of 
deconstructing the ideas and practices of medicine: 
The [biomedical] model is based on five assumptions. First, that the 
mind and the body can be treated separately; this is referred to as 
medicine's mind-body dualism. Second, that the body can be repaired 
like a machine; thus medicine adopts a mechanical metaphor 
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presuming that doctors can act like engineers to mend that which is 
dysfunctioning. Third, and consequently, the merits of technological 
interventions are sometimes overplayed, which results in medicine 
adopting a technological imperative. Fourth, biomedicine is 
reductionist in that explanations of disease focus on biological changes 
to the relative neglect of social and psychological factors. Finally, such 
reductionism was accentuated by the development of the 'germ theory' 
in the nineteenth century, which assumed that every disease is caused 
by a specific, identifiable agent, namely a 'disease entity' (such as a 
parasite, virus or bacterium). This is referred to as the doctrine of 
specific aetiology. (Nettleton, 1998, p.3) 
These five assumptions of medicine, underpinned by the positivist paradigm, gave 
authority to medical practitioners, so that "the story told by the physician becomes the 
one by which others are ultimately judged true or false, useful or not" (Frank, 2002, 
p. 16). 
A clitical analysis of medicine began to erode the unequivocal dominance and ideal 
of the modernist medicine project. Frank (1995; 2004c), a sociologist who had 
personal experience with cancer and a heart attack, advocated that people had 
accounts of illness which were beyond the confines of that which the medical story 
could tell. He stressed the importance of hearing the story of the person living with 
the illness (or impainnent) separate from medical analyses and agendas. He 
illustrated his point with a poignant illustration: 
I met a man who had cancer of the mouth that required extensive 
reconstructive surgery to his jaw and face. His treatment had been 
sufficiently extraordinary for his surgeon to have published a medical 
journal article about it, complete with pictures showing the stages of 
the reconstructive process. When he told me about the article and 
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offered to show it to me, I imagined that article might actually be about 
him: his suffering throughout this mutilating, if life-saving, ordeal. As 
I looked at the article I realised his name was not mentioned. Probably 
the surgeon and the journal would have considered it unethical to name 
him, even though pictures of the man were shown. Thus in "his" atiicle 
he was systematically ignored as anyone - actually anything - other 
than a body. But for medical purposes it was not his article at all; it 
was his surgeon's article. This is exactly the colonisation that Spivak 
speaks of: the master text of the medical journal micle needs the 
suffering person, but the individuality of that suffering cannot be 
acknowledged. (Frank 1995, p., 11-12). 
It is stories like this one, where the person, whose body is ill, injured or impaired, is 
irrelevant in the treatment of that body, which have become less acceptable. No 
longer is illness viewed as the sole product of disease but mediated by "the role 
played by the mind, emotions and social processes [and] always created at the 
crossroads of biology and culture" (Morris, 2000, p.8). 
Under the strongly pluralist poshnodern landscape of the twenty first century, the 
determinist, dualistic, reductive and mechanistic practice of modernist biomedicine 
has been both challenged and complemented by other understandings about health, 
illness and disability. Space has been created for the validity of other stories and 
discursive practices, such as the patient's experience and alternative therapies. 
Frank's exmnple of how the surgeon's micle omitted the experience of the man 
whom the article's treatment documents, is testimony to the growing demand for the 
patient to be respected, infonned and empowered in the treatment of his or her body. 
In regard to the rise of alternative therapies (their colloquial name depicting their 
position as counter to traditional medical practice), Morris (2000) mentioned how 
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people are showing their loss of faith in biomedicine by their "huge out-of-pocket 
investment in so called non-traditional or complementary therapies" CP.S). And 
whilst medicine, not alternative therapies to medicine, might still be the dominant 
discourse in understandings about health, illness and disability, how that model is 
enacted within the doctor-patient relationship has changed considerably in recent 
years. Rich, Simmons, Adams, Thorp and Mink (200S) made the point that 
"physicians are expected to behave according to a postmodern ethic ... recognizing 
patient autonomy, sharing authority with various third parties, and managing their 
practices using a business model" (p. 235). Without question, post industrial 
consumerist culture has changed power relations within health services as "patients 
qua consumers are urged to refuse to accept paternalism or 'medical dominance' on 
the part of the doctor, to 'shop around', to actively evaluate doctors' services and to 
go elsewhere should the 'commodity' be found unsatisfactory" (Lupton, 2004. 
p.198). 
The shift to viewing medical services as a commodity in the market place, with 
medical practitioners competing with one another, supplying medical services to the 
paying and rights-orientated customer, has arguably ushered in some new health 
ideologies and practices. Rose (2007) and others have suggested that the normative 
agenda of biomedicine, as in medical practice aiming to return the deviant organism 
to biological nonnality, has been superseded by 'customisation' (Clarke, 2003; Rose, 
2007). That is, the customer drives the technological advances of medicine so as to 
improve upon biology, creating a new era in which medical necessity is no longer the 
only reason why people receive medical treatment. Cosmetic surgery, gender 
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reassignment, facial remodeling, extending sexual capacities of aging men, and post 
menopausal women having babies, are current trends within the age of medical 
customisation (Rose, 2007, p.21). The question then shifts from 'can the doctor help 
me' and 'will I still be able to do what I used to do' when sick or injured to 'how 
would I like to be' and 'can I afford this' when neither sick nor injured. In this case, 
the dilemma for the medical profession centres on the ethics of such choices being 
made available to people, simply because first, they want it and can afford it and 
second, medicine can apply its technological research and advances to such agendas. 
Not surprisingly, neuroethics and bioethics have become sub-disciplines within 
medicine because the agenda and practice of medical treatment is less clear than it 
used to be. Rose (2007) says the border between life and death has become open to 
negotiation and dispute, as has distinguishing the difference between addressing 
illness or impairment versus improving biological capacity. Certainly, the potential 
of applied bioengineering to intervene with and even improve human biology has 
captured people's imagination. For example, in 2000, the English Prime Minister 
Tony Blair said "biotechnology is the next wave of the knowledge economy and I 
want Britain to become its European hub" (cited in Rose, 2007, p.35). The 2003 
United States (US) President's Council on Bioethics Report, suggested that 
enthusiasm for biotechnology rested on people's desire for better children, superior 
performance in sport and ageless bodies (as cited in Rose, 2007, p. 77). Given these 
ideals, it is interesting to speculate about what biotechnology represents, who will 
benefit and who will be disadvantaged by it. Some ethical dilemmas have been 
raised, such as "why should the' dignity' of the person at the end of life be a 
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bioethical issue, but not the massive' letting die' of millions of children under five 
years of age each year from preventable cases" (Rose, 2007, p.31). Hence, despite 
the rush to invest human resources and funds into biotechnology, some are cautious, 
even critical. 
Disability rights and the disability movement 
Disability rights campaigners have been especially critical of biotechnology 
becoming the means to improve or eradicate congenital impairment. Given that many 
disabled people might have been telminated prior to being bom if the technology to 
detect the impaired foetus had been available while they were embryos, it is hardly 
surprising that disabled people have been strongly opposed to such technology. For 
example, Rock (1996) stated: "Disabled people know only too well they are not 
welcome in society, but the active promotion of abortion on the grounds of disability 
and determining that euthanasia is a viable proposition for the disabled foetus/child-
is fascism" (p.124). 
Hence, quite separate from Medical Sociology and Sociology of Health and Illness, 
disability rights activists have also been active in critiquing the biomedical model. 
The disability rights movement is often associated with having its roots in the United 
Kingdom (UK) during the 1960-70s. For example, the Disablement Income Group 
(DIG) worked toward improving benefits for disabled people, and the Union for 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) focused on independent living, 
participation, inclusive education and productive paid work for disabled people. The 
members of these groups (during the I 960-1970s) were typically disabled people who 
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lived in segregated institutions and were unemployed. In comparison to academic 
critique of medical discourse, the spoken and written protests fi'om DIG and UPIAS 
represented those who had little power within society. In Foucauldian (1980) tenns, 
the knowledge they held about disability was "low ranking and unqualified". The 
work of the disability movement has very much been an illustration of what Foucault 
(1980) refelTed to as the "insurrection of disqualified knowledges". 
UPIAS spoke of the segregation that disabled people experienced on a daily basis and 
stated, "We find ourselves isolated and excluded from such things as flights of stairs, 
inadequate public and personal transport, unsuitable housing, rigid work routines in 
factories and offices, and a lack of up to date aids and equipment" (UPIAS Aims para 
1, cited in Shakespeare 2006, p. 11). The fundamental principle of UP lAS was that 
disability was not caused by impainnent, but by social conditions that disadvantaged 
and discriminated against disabled people. This principle was, and still is, a radical 
reframe from the biomedical model. From UPIAS' perspective, 
Disability is a situation, caused by social conditions, which requires for 
its elimination, (a) that no one aspect such as incomes, mobility or 
institutions is treated in isolation, (b) that disabled people should, with 
the advice and help of others, assume control over their lives, and ( c) 
that professionals, experts and others who seek to help must be 
committed to promoting such control by disabled people ... In our 
view, it is society which disables physically impaired people. 
Disability is something imposed on top of our impainnents, by the way 
we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in 
society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society 
(UPIAS, 1976, p.3, cited in Shakespeare, 2006, p.12). 
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Renaming disability as a social oppression caused by social barriers, not illness or 
impairment, was indeed a complete paradigm shift but it did not in itself explain how 
it was that medicine was responsible for the exclusion of disabled people. For this to 
occur, a deconstruction of medical discourse was needed, extending from Foucault's 
(1963) Birth of the clinic and specific to disability. Zola, a disability rights' activist 
and medical sociologist, wrote about the medically created apartheid between healthy 
and ill people that had become a familiar cultural practice in the West. Zola noted 
that illness was rarely contextualised but always located within the individual: 
My concern is what happens when a problem and its bearers become 
tainted with the label 'illness' ... as a disease is by definition not social 
and at the same time the expected level of intervention is also not 
social. If it has to be handled anywhere or if anyone is to blame it is 
individuals - usually the carriers of the problem - and certainly not the 
rest of us, or society at large. (Zola, 1977, p.62-63) 
Hence, Zola made the link more overtly than UPIAS, that medicine marginalises 
people with impairment and illness, views the problem and solution resting with the 
treatment of the individual, and absolves the social enviromnent for any 
accountability in either creating or fixing the problem of disability. 
Zola was one of a number of disabled activists and academics (Barnes, 1990, 1991; 
Finklestein, 1980; Oliver, 1990; Shakespeare, 1993, 1994) who began to critique and 
look for an alternative to the medical model. Oliver's first text, The politics of 
disablement (1990), stands as the academic entry point for Disability Studies. As a 
paraplegic and sociologist, Oliver was concemed that there was no social theory of 
disability that was in the best interest of disabled people and he began theorising the 
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experience of disability. His starting point was the impainnentldisability distinction 
already established by UPIAS (1976). Drawing on the work ofBrisenden (1986) and 
Finklestein (1980), Oliver noted that medical definitions of disability were not helpful 
for disabled people because the underpinning meaning of disability was that it was a 
personal tragedy. As evidence of this, he noted how the OPCS (British Office of 
Population Censuses and Surveys) 1986 survey of disabled people created disability 
as a personal problem thereby re-enforcing the identification with individual deficit. 
He prepared an altemative survey that positioned disability as caused by a disabling 
environment, as in a problem of social oppression (see Table 1): 
Table 1 
OPCS Survey of Disabled Adults Oliver's Alternative Questions 
• Can you tell me what is wrong • Can you tell me what is wrong with 
with you? society? 
• What complaint causes you • What defects in the design of everyday 
difficulty in holding, gripping or equipment like jars, bottles and tins cause 
tuming things? you difficulty in holding, gripping or 
tuming them? 
• Are your difficulties in 
understanding people mainly due • Are your difficulties in understanding 
to a heming problem? people mainly due to their inability to 
communicate with you? 
• How difficult is it for you to get 
about your neigbourhood? • What are the environmental constraints 
which make it difficult for you to get 
about in your immediate neighbourhood? 
Cont .... Cont ... 
(Oliver, 1990, p.7-8) 
Oliver then linked the way disability is produced as a medical and individual problem 
to the structural, ideological and cultural features of capitalism. In this materialist 
explanation for disability, Oliver discussed Foucault's critique of psychiatry (1965) 
and criminology (1977), especially how the category of pathology was a social 
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concept produced by the discursive knowledge of psychiatry. Oliver focused 
especially on the economic structures and conditions that made possible the rise of 
institutions after the industrial revolution, such as prisons, asylums, workhouses, 
hospitals, factories and schools. He argued that disability as individual pathology 
only arose as distinct from individual ablebodiedness because of the development of 
wage labour (Oliver, 1990, p.47). Disability, therefore, was socially created, 
produced in the context of capitalism through the rise of medicine. The medical 
model was the problem, whilst the answer was full inclusion and non-discrimination 
of disabled people. Shakespeare (2006) noted that this conceptual move gave the 
disability movement a political focus, namely the removal of disabling balTiers. It 
also had the secondary effect of liberating disabled people from negative identity 
conclusions: 
Suddenly people were able to understand that it was society which was 
at fault, not themselves. They didn't need to change: society needed to 
ehange. They didn't have to be sorry for themselves: rather, they could 
be angry. Just as with feminist consciousness raising in the 1970s, or 
with lesbians and gays' coming out', so disabled people began to think 
of themselves in a totally new way, and to become empowered to 
mobilise for equal citizenship. Rather than a demeaning reliance on 
charity, disabled activists could now demand their rights. 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p.30) 
The combination of disabled people not having to feel SOlTY for themselves and being 
legitimately angry about disablist discrimination meant the social model became a 
powerful force within disability politics. By the 1990s, the disability movement was 
challenging the observation made by Hunt (1966) twenty five years earlier, that 
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disabled people are "unfortunate, useless, different, oppressed, and sick" (Hunt, 1966, 
pp.6 & 155, as cited in Barnes, 1996a, p.46). The movement also disputed disablist 
assumptions about the experience ofliving with impairment, as in: 
Disabled people feel ugly, inadequate and are ashamed of their 
disability; their lives are a burden, barely worth living; they crave to be 
'normal' and 'whole'; are asexual or at best sexually inadequate; able-
bodied partners are doing them a favour and the disabled person brings 
nothing to the relationship; if they were particularly gifted, successful 
or attractive before the onset of disability their fate is infinitely more 
'tragic' than if they were none of these things; their nced and right to 
plivacy isn't as important as able-bodied people's needs and rights; 
their lives need to be monitored in a way that deplives them of privacy 
and choice. (Morris, 1991, p.19-20) 
lnfonned by the social model of disability, disability activists argued that impairment 
was not the problem, but that what caused disablement was social restrictions and 
oppression of people who had impairments. This argument that disability was caused 
by societal oppression of people with impainnents, quickly became an ideology in 
itself, which has strongly influenced policy, practice and research, especially in the 
western world. For example, eleven years after Oliver wrote Politics of disablement, 
New Zealand's national policy on disability was based on a social model philosophy 
and agenda. The introduction of The New Zealand disability strategy, published by 
the Ministry of Health in 2001 , stated: 
Disability is not something individuals have. What individuals have are 
impairments. Disability is the process which happens when one group 
of people create barriers by designing a world only for their way of 
living, taking no account of the impainnents other people have. (The 
New Zealand disability strategy, 2001, p.63) 
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TIle faet that New Zealand (NZ) even has a national disability strategy and one which 
is so clearly based on the social model, stands as testimony to the success of 
Disability Studies and disability activist groups such as NZ's Assembly of People 
with Disabilities (DPA) who have politicised and promoted the social model. Civil 
rights for disabled people, primarily through anti-discrimination legislation and 
barrier removal, became the essential goals of disability rights. Political battles for 
disability rights legislation have been fought and won, as evidenced by the United 
States of America's (USA's) Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, the disability 
amendment to NZ's Human Right's Act, 1993, and the UK's Disability 
Discrimination Act, 1995. 
In conjunction with campaigns for anti-disclimination legislation, social model 
advocates have been critical of medical model infonned research that has reduced 
disability to individual pathology, caused by an organic problem which requires a 
cure (Llewellyn & Hogan, 2000). Social model advocates have argued that research 
which focused on reducing or curing impainnent was directly related to a vested 
interest in rehabilitation outcomes, meaning non-disabled professionals set the 
agendas for the research projects (Bury, 1996a, 1996b; Oliver, 1990, 1992; Scotch, 
2002). Such an emphasis means the disabled subject is always viewed as a patient, 
precluding any understanding of disabled people beyond the role of dependence on 
otllers' support and treatment (Scotch, 2002). In contrast, social model research has 
investigated disabling social and cultural conditions and promoted the ideal that 
disabled people should control, not merely pmiicipate in, the research process 
(Walmsley, 2001). For example, early research of disabled children, infonned by 
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medical discourse, positioned disabled children as vulnerable, passive, and isolated 
(Priestly, 1998) whereas more recent research has emphasized disabled children's 
ability to resist social stigma and oppressive social practices (Davis & Watson, 2002). 
Such research was emancipatory in design because it intentionally sought to construct 
disabled people as having value, rights and expertise and be deserving of full 
inclusion within society (Barnes, 1996; Barton, 1998; Fine & Asch, 1993; Oliver, 
1992,1993). Such research, which identified and campaigned against oppressive 
societal structures, produced positive outcomes for disabled people. In particular, 
personal accounts of disablement, once told and heard, furthered the cause for 
inclusive living arrangements and inclusive education: 
The telling of their experiences by people who lived for years in the 
large, segregated institutions has been one of the most powerful 
arguments for deinstitutionalization during the past 20 years ... 
Parents' descriptions of their experiences and perspectives about 
raising their children with severe disabilities in the community, in the 
local school, and with other children have been one of the primary 
forces toward integrated, inclusive education. (Ferguson, Ferguson & 
Taylor, 1992, p.300). 
Researching social baniers for disabled people became the primary focus of 
Disability Studies and the disability movement. For example, Harris (2003) explored 
the experiences of disabled refugees and asylum seekers in the UK, from the 
perspective ofbaniers to health, baniers to safety, barriers to social services, barriers 
to the benefit system, and barriers to social contact. 
Through the disability rights' movement, disabled people began to have opportunities 
to tell their stories and promote their views (Ferguson, Ferguson & Taylor, 1992; 
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Oliver, 1996; Moore, Beazley & Maelzer, 1999). Discussing and researching the 
experiences of disabled people in regard to schooling (Fergusson, 1992; Higgins, 
1992; Swain, 1993), media and film (Davidson, 1994; Shakespeare, 1994; Zola, 
1992), community integration (Briggs, 1993; Morris, 1993,2004; Reynolds & 
Walmsley, 1998; Si1buffi, 1993), intellectual disability (Booth & Booth, 1996), 
sexuality (Brown, 1994; Earl, 1999; Hahn, 1993; Shakespeare, Gillepie-Sells & 
Davies,1996), parenting (Kaluanes & Rubenfeld, 1997; Keith & Morris, 1995; 
Reinelt & Fried, 1993), employment (Barnes, 2000; Drake, 2000; French, 1995) and 
aging (Todis, 1992; Zarb, 1993) became grist to the mill for disability rights 
promotion and research during the 1990s. It was essentially a minority group action, 
fighting to end "disab1ism - unfair discrimination against disabled people" 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p.65). 
Diversity and conceptual differences within the disability movement 
As the social model was being used as a platfonn to campaign for the removal of 
social barriers, through protest action, academic writing and research, there was a 
growing awareness within the disability movement during the 1990s that not all 
disabled people were discriminated against equally. Nor would disablement end if 
discrimination of disabled people ended because there were further minority groups 
within the minority group of disability, such as disabled women, non-white disabled 
people, and gay disabled people. Furthermore, due to the presence and impact of 
impairment, disabled people were not a minority group in the same sense as other 
minorities were on the basis of gender, ethnicity and sexuality. That is, while 
"disability discrimination [does] parallel racism, sexism, and other social 
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exclusions ... in most cases, disabled people are experiencing both the intrinsic 
limitation of impairment, and the externally imposed social discrimination" 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p.4I). Women became the first minority group within the 
disability movement to speak and write about the distinguishing features of their 
experiences and views. They had realised that they had unique experiences as 
disabled women and that impainnent did contribute to their experiences of disability 
(Corker & French, 1999; Morris, 1991, 1996; Thomas, 1999). Moreover, the social 
model was accounting for neither reality. 
Morris' (1996) edited text Encounters with strangers: Feminism and disability, was a 
significant volume for its elucidation of women's experience of disability. In the 
introduction, Morris highlighted the need and desire of disabled women to no longer 
be victims of social oppression. A key aspect of disabled women's experience was 
that impainnent did disable. Monis (1991,1996) and others (Crow, 1996; Corker & 
French, 1999) challenged the impairment/disability distinction established by UPIAS 
and later promoted by Finklestein (1980), Barnes (1991) and Oliver (1990, 1996): 
While environmental barriers and social attitudes are a clUcial part of 
our experience of disability - and do indeed disable us - to suggest that 
this is all there is to it is to deny the personal experiences of physical 
and intellectual restrictions, of illness, of the fear of dying. 
(Morris, 1991, p.lO) 
French (1993) similarly argued that the removal of social barriers would not eliminate 
all her disablement. She described how her visual impainnent did in and of itself 
cause problems, including an "inability to recognise people, being nearly blinded 
when the sun comes out, and not being able to read non-verbal cues or emit them 
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correctly" (1993, p.17). Crow's (1996) critique of the social model's simplistic 
exclusion of impairment as a causal factor of disablement has perhaps been the most 
remembered. She declared: 
The experience of impairment was not always irrelevant, neutral or 
positive ... As individuals, many of us simply cannot pretend with any 
conviction that our impairments are irrelevant because they influence 
so much of our lives. External disabling barriers may create social and 
economic disadvantage but our subjective experience of our bodies is 
an integral part of our everyday reality. What we need is to find a way 
to integrate impairment into our whole experience and sense of 
ourselves for the sake of our own physieal and emotional well-being, 
and, subsequently, for our individual and eollective capacity to work 
against disability. As a movement, we need to be infOlmed about 
disability and impairment in all their diversity if our campaigns are to 
be open to all disabled people. (Crow, 1996, pp.209-21O). 
Crow's challenge and invitation was met with resistance by pioneers and staunch 
stalwarts of the social model. Authors such as Barnes, Finldestein and Oliver (1996) 
remained convinced that any deviation from the impairment/disability distinction 
would ultimately weaken the efficacy of the social model to reduce disablist 
discrimination. Oliver (1996), for example, did not deny the reality of impairment for 
some disabled people but did not think that the social model needed to be altered so 
as to include the experience of impairment: 
The social model is not an attempt to deal with the personal restrictions 
of impainnent but the social barriers of disability ... [It is a J pragmatic 
attempt to identify and address issues that can be changed through 
collective action rather than medical or professional treatment. 
(Oliver, 1996, p.38) 
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Finklestein's argument was similar, although a little more caustic, when he described 
criticism of the social model as "juvenile ... aris[ing] because it [social model] is 
frequently used as ifit explains our situation rather than as a tool for gaining insight 
into the way that society disables us" (2001, p. 10). What then emerged in the UK 
was a defensive position taken by social model advocates, critical of any theorising 
that ran counter to social model ideals. 
Two versions of disability rights 
A difference of approach began to develop between Disability Studies and the 
disability movement in the UK and the USA. Significant USA texts, such as Rioux 
and Bach's (1994) Disability is not measles: New research paradigms in disability 
(1994) and Wendell's (1996) The rejected body (1996), received criticism from 
Barnes (1995). In his reviews of both texts, Barnes found fault with any foci which 
contradicted or did not promote the views which were dominant within UK Disability 
Studies at that time. He was positive about the non-medical orientation of Rioux and 
Bach's research emphasis but saw limitations in the book's Eurocentrist worIdview, 
lack of reference to multiple oppression experienced by minority group disabled 
people, inaccessible academic language for non-academics within the disability 
movement, and blurring of the impairment/disability distinction (1995, p.380). 
Barnes (1998) was especially scathing of Wendell's book, citing a lack of reference 
to UK Disability Studies writers and ignorance of the crucial distinction between 
impainnent (biology) and disability (social balTiers) (p.145-146). Yet Shakespeare 
(2006) and others have accorded value to Wendell's book and given it a place within 
their discussions of Disability Studies' literature. Wendell's discussion of the cultural 
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construction of the 'rejected body', the body in pain and transcendence from it, are 
arguably very relevant to disabled people but of course much less so, or even not at 
all, if impairment is not seen as a disability issue. 
In comparison to the proponents of the UK social model, the disability movement 
with the USA has been more open to seeing beyond an antagonism for anything that 
resembles a medical model orientation. For example, rehabilitation has received 
considerable research by USA disability rights researchers, who wished to highlight 
and improve the experience of rehabilitation for people with disabilities (Albrecht, 
1992). In addition, the preferred tem1 by dominant USA disability rights researchers 
and authors has been 'people with disabilities' (Halm, 1988; 1993; Rioux & Bach, 
1994; Zola 1994) compared with the UK description of 'disabled people'. 'People 
with disabilities' recognises that both impairment and society are disabling (Bury, 
2005), in the experience of disability, whereas 'disabled people' or 'disabled person' 
is an identity descriptor, positioning people with impainnents as a minority group 
alongside other minority groups. Moreover, Nirje's (1969) normalisation theory and 
Wolfensberger's (1985) social role valorisation (SRV) approach have been significant 
and influential within the USA disability rights' movement, but ignored and critiqued 
as an extension of medical model ideology by many UK social model advocates 
(Bames, 1999; Stalker, Baron, Riddell & Wilkenson, 1999). Having said this, 
Shakespeare noted that "despite early criticism from social modellists, more recently 
there have been signs of a growing interest between social model and normalisation 
approaches" (Shakespeare, 2006, p.22). 
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Normalisation as a concept evolved in Scandanavia during the 1960s and was 
developed hy Nirje during the 1970-80s. He defined normalisation as "making 
available to all mentally retarded people patterns of life and conditions of everyday 
living which are as close as possible to the regular circumstances and ways of the life 
of society" (Nirje, 1976, cited in Perrin & Nirje, 1989, p. 220). Initially 
nonnalization was a theory that focused on people with intellectual disabilities but 
later it became broader in its application, being used as an underlying principle for 
people with all types of impainnents. It focuses on ending segregation on the basis of 
impainnent and creating opportunities for community-integrated independent living 
for disabled people. As the following table depicts, nonnalisation has always had a 
rights based agenda: 
Table 1 
Item Rehabilitation Paradigm Independent Living Paradigm 
Definition of Physical impairment; lack of Dependence on professionals, 
the problem vocational skill; psychological relatives, and others; inadequate 
maladjustment; lack of support services; architectural I motivation and co-operation barriers; economic barriers 
Locus of In individual In environment; in the 
problem rehabilitation process 
Social Role Patient/client Consumer 
Solution to Professional intervention by Peer counseling; advocacy; self-
problem physician, physical therapist, help; consumer control; removal 
occupational therapist, of barriers and disincentives 
vocational counselor, and 
others 
Who controls Professional Consumer 
Desired Maximum ADL; gainful Self-direction; least restrictive 
outcomes employment; psychological environment; social and 
adjustment; improved economic productivity 
motivation; completed 
treatment 
(Dejong, 1983, p.23) 
Hence, nOlmalisation and its practical outworking of independent living, does not 
follow the 'individual tragedy' association ofthe medical model but focuses on 
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disabled people being able to have more control, opportunity and autonomy in their 
lives. Wolfensberger (1985) developed nonnalisation further by introducing the 
concept of social role valorisation (SRV), which is "the use of culturally valued 
means in order to enable, establish and/or maintain valued social roles for people" 
(Wolfensberger & Tullman, 1989, p.211). In practice this development meant 
disabled people were to be given 'nonnal' or 'ordinary' (as opposed to special or 
segregated) roles and skills thereby enabling them to be integrated into the everyday 
run of education, employment, community and family activities. 
Integration and independent living, the nonnalisation agenda, have been very 
influential in the Western world. For example, New Zealand's education, welfare 
systems and workplace accommodations of people with impainnents are a testimony 
to the principles of nonnalisation, as legislation and social policies have facilitated 
mainstream integration for disabled people. Examples include the 1972 Accident 
Compensation Act (ACC); the 1975 Disabled Persons' Community Welfare Act; the 
1989 Education Act establishing mainstreaming in schools for students with 
disabilities; the restructUling of the Rehabilitation League into Workbridge in 1990, 
and the 1992 'New Deal (support for independence for people with disabilities' 
regulation) which replaced institutional residential care with community living. The 
impact of such restructuring has been very significant in tenns of the service 
provision options and opportunities for disabled people in New Zealand. For 
example, numerous policies have been written and studies undertaken which reflect a 
commitment to disabled people's participation as respondents, evaluating disability 
services' quality and outcomes, comparing policies and practices against 
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normalisation ideas, and advocating for positive images of disabled people 
(Walmsley, 2001). In addition, there has also been research upholding and 
investigating the concept of 'partnerships' between consumers and providers of 
special education, rehabilitation and disability respite services (Appleton & 
Minchom, 1991). 
However, while normalisation and SRV theories have been influential in the shaping 
of education and community living policies and practice, especially in the USA but 
also in other Western countries like New Zealand, social model advocates in the UK 
were critical of this development. Barnes (1996) and Oliver (1995; Campbell & 
Oliver, 1996) in particular, argued that nonualisation and SRV theories were 
exclusionary and paternalistic due to their overarching accent on achieving able-
bodied nonus and the philosophy being driven by non-disabled people acting on 
behalf of disabled people (Barnes, 1996; Campbell & Oliver, 1996; Oliver, 1996). 
As a result, what has emerged has been a degree of difference between the parameters 
and focus of disability rights in the UK and US: 
One distinct version of the Social Model is the crypto Marxist version 
found primarily in the United Kingdom, but used in other countries. It 
states that the organization of society produces discrimination 
experienced by people with disabilities... This social organization, it 
says, must be changed in order to end discrimination based upon 
disability. The other version of the Social Model is found chiefly in the 
United States, but it is also used in other countries. It states that 
fulfilling the "normal" role models in society helps constitute a 
person's identity, at least as seen by others ... Researchers using the UK 
Social Model will analyze social structures and their impact on people 
with disabilities. Researchers using the US Social Model will analyze 
35 
social roles and attitudes toward failure to fulfill them. (Pfeiffer, 1992, 
p.234) 
New Zealand has benefited from both versions of disability rights. However notably, 
in regard to the UK social model and the USA normalisation/minority group rights 
model combination, both have been found to be limited in regard to accurately 
representing and making an impact for all disabled people. A number of social 
model orientated studies have findings which are inconsistent with the model itself. 
For example, Lock's (2005) study of stroke survivors, found the participants were 
significantly disabled by their impainnent but also experienced social disadvantage 
or discrimination. Similarly, Humphrey (2000) argued that the separatising 
dichotomous nature of the social model served to privilege some impainnent 
minorities over others and excluded non-disabled from being allies of disabled 
people in their fight for their rights. 
The modern - postmodern divide within Disability Studies 
Oliver's response to those who considered the experience of impairment needed to be 
accommodated within the social model was to suggest a social model of impainnent 
be created to complement the social model of disability (Oliver, 1996). For Oliver, 
impairment was simply not a disability issue as "it is not individual limitations, of 
whatever kind, which are the cause of the problem, but society'S failure to provide 
appropIiate services and adequately ensure the needs of disabled people are fully 
taken into account in its social organisation" (Oliver, 1996, p.32). Such a stand only 
served to fuel the detennination of a growing number of people within the disability 
movement and Disability Studies to explore other ways of understanding disability 
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than the classic UPIAS impainnentldisability distinction. Shakespeare and Watson, 
for example, began to shift allegiances, from 1997 when they co-authored a paper 
entitled 'Defending the social model', to 2001 when they wrote a chapter titled 'The 
social model of disability: An ontdated ideology?" By then a number of people had 
begun to turn away from materialist acconnts and explanations of disability, to 
relating some postmodern concepts, such as discourse, to disability. Disability 
discourse (1999), edited by Corker and French, became a text which began to spark a 
new direction within Disability Studies. In their introduction, Corker and French 
stated: 
Social model theory rests on the distinction between disability, which 
is socially created, and impainnent, which is referred to as a physical 
attribute of the body. In this sense it establishes a paradigm for 
disabled people which is equivalent to those of sex/gender and 
race/ethnicity. However, though it is a groundbreaking concept, and 
one which has provided tremendous political impetus for disabled 
people, we feel that because the distinction between disability and 
impainnent is presented as a dualism or dichotomy - one part of which 
(disability) tends to be valorized and the other part (impainnent) 
marginalised or silenced - social model theory, itself, produces and 
embodies distinctions of value and power. .. In saying that 'people with 
impairments' and 'disabled people' are 'quite distinct things', the 
conceptual link between impainnent and disability oppression is 
broken because it could be construed that disability and impainnent are 
not related. To paraphrase Ingham (1996; 183), this 'reinforces the 
nature/culture binary', opening the study of impairment to the domain 
of science and closing off consideration of how 'biology is linked to 
culture.' Impainnent as a biological category escapes the realm of 
construction or achieved status, even though it is, itself, 'defined' or 
'constructed.' (1999, p.2) 
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The idea emerged that the social model had relegated impaim1ent to biology and 
therefore the meanings found within medicine about impairment, rather than 
impairment being a social category which is constructed and therefore value laden 
(Corker & French, 1999; Hughes & Paterson, 1997; Paterson & Hughes, 1999; 
Tremain, 2002). This idea gained momentum as a new genre within Disability 
Studies; that is, that the "disabled body is a site of discursive production and 
consumption" (Corker & French, 1999, p.2). More detail of particular writing and 
research about the body as a site of discursive production will be discussed in the 
next chapter. Needless to say, the critique of the social model was clear: disability 
and impairment are both socially created, not just the fonner, and as constructed 
categories they both interface and influence each another; they simply cannot be 
separated as distinct or unrelated from one another (Corker, 1999; Corker & French, 
1999; Shakespeare, 2006). Again, social model enthusiasts were not receptive and 
so the division within Disability Studies grew. Bames, for example, wamed against 
and attacked the cultural tum ofliberal arts and cultural studies within Disability 
Studies, as opposed to upholding the social model of disability: 
The bulk of the work corning out of these disciplines, certainly over 
the last few years, seems to be written by a particular breed of 
academic luvvie who write mainly for themselves and other academics 
rather than for a wider audience: consequently, it is replete with 
obscure and esoteric jargon, viliually inaccessible to all but the most 
dedicated of readers and, most importantly, politically benign and 
pragmatically irrelevant. (Bames, 1999, p.580) 
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Despite Barnes' protest, postmodern analyses of disability continued, such as Corker 
and Shakespeare's (2002) edited text Disability/Postmodernity: Embodying 
disability theory. In the foreword to this book, Young (2002) noted that "the social 
model of disability seems necessary for activists to maintain in their arguments with 
employers, educators, legislators and judges [and] that a postmodern approach to 
Disability Studies [should] not be concerned as a displacement of the social model of 
disability" (p.xiv). In other words, as a political tool for campaigning against 
discrimination, the social model was still relevant. However, within a few years 
Shakespeare (2006) had decided otherwise, stating that "the social model is wrong" 
(p.53). His basis for this conclusion undoubtedly drew on the discursive literature 
and scholarship within Disability Studies during the previous half-decade or so, as 
well as his recent work in the bioethics field. He concluded that the social model's 
reductionist persuasion was too problematic, as it homogcnises the experience of 
disability and disability identity and separates impainnent from disability. In short, 
the disability experience was not universal but varied, nor was people's sense of 
identity ultimately captured in the disability movement's 'different but proud' 
mantra of disability identity politics, and that impainnent, as well as social 
arrangements, disabled people. 
Just as postmodern critique highlighted problems with the UK social model, the 
same can be said for nonnalisationlSRV theories. Several studies found the ideas 
inherent within normalisation and SRV too complex for professionals in the 
disability field to either understand and/or implement successfully (Wilson & 
Baliak, 1997). FurthelIDore, it has been m·gued that normalisation theory has had 
39 
little positive impact on the sexual options open to people with intellectual 
disabilities because professionals deny and limit their understanding and expression 
of their sexuality (Brown, 1994; Williams & Nind, 1999). 
Searching beyond modernist theories of disability 
From a postmodem perspective it is not surprising that neither the social model or 
nonnalisationlSRV theories have been able to adequately capture and reflect the 
complexity of the disability experience or consistently advance the disability rights' 
agenda for all people who experience disablement. Hence, while social model and 
nonnalisationlSRV theories have made extremely significant contributions to the 
theory and practice of disability rights, there has continued to be a call by people 
within Disability Stndies to keep searching for further conceptual frameworks. For 
example, Shakespeare (2006) said: 
Disability stndies should work to provide rich empirical studies, both 
quantitative and qualitative, of how disabled people experience 
ban'iers, and how they experience their impainnents. In particular, the 
differences between disabled people are as important as the 
similarities: for example, examination of the role of class is 
paradoxically absent, even from materialist disability studies. Rather 
than being restrieted by social model Olihodoxy, disability stndies 
should be pluralist, valuing analytical rigour and debate. Disability 
researchers should look outwards and engage with medical sociology, 
bioethics and other areas of academia. (Shakespeare, 2006, p.198). 
In this chapter, having offered an overview of the biomedical model and critique of it 
by Medical Sociology and Sociology of Health and Illness, the disability movement 
and Disability Studies, I now go on to discuss how critical realist and social 
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constructionist perspectives of disability have added to the theoretical pluralism 
within Disability Studies. 
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CRITICAL REALIST AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST 3 PERSPECTIVES WITHIN DISABILITY STUDIES: THEORIES, 
CRITIQUE AND RESEARCH 
In considering how Disability Studies became broader than the social model of 
disability, relating social constructionist and critical realist perspectives to the 
expeIience of disablement, it is relevant to briefly discuss Shakespeare's joumey 
within the disability movement and Disability Studies. The purpose here is not to 
focus specifically on Shakespeare or his life's work; rather, his philosophical shifts in 
regard to Disability Studies do embody something of the changes that have occurred 
within the discipline. Shalcespeare has always been at the leading edge of new 
developments within the disability rights campaign. When the social model of 
disability was new and represented freedom for disabled people, Shakespeare (1993, 
1994) was a staunch advocate but, as mentioned earlier, toward the end ofthe 1990s 
this position began to change. He and others were questioning the 
impairment/disability split forged by the social model. Postmodern philosophy was 
considered to hold possibilities for disability theory and Shakespeare was one of a 
number who contributed to Corker and French's edited text, Disability Discourse, 
published in 1999. The volume was separated into three sections: personal narratives, 
the social creation of disability identity, and cultural discourses. The poignancy of 
subjective accounts and the value of discursive analysis for Disability Studies are 
heralded in the book. In 2002 Shakespeare positioned himself strongly with those 
who were looking for alternatives to the social model, when he joined with Corker 
and together they edited the book disabilitylpostmodernity. The areas of debate 
within Disability Studies, such as the impainnent/disability divide, the experience of 
42 
body and sexuality for disabled people, the relationship between ethnic culture and 
disability, and disability sub-groups such as intellectual and psychiatric disability, 
were examined in light of a range of social constructionist conceptualisations. 
Disability/postmodernity, more than any previous text, expanded eonsiderably the 
soeial constructionist and feminist analysis of disability by relating critical 
postmodem source texts, sueh as the work of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Lacan, 
Butler, Merleau-Ponty, Kristeva, Haraway, Giddens, Price and Shildrick - to name a 
few, to the subject of disability. Then in a further development, in 2006 Shakespeare 
published his text Disability Rights and Wrongs, which takes an even more strongly 
oppositional stance to the social model than disability/postmodernity, but from a 
critical realist, not a social constructionist viewpoint. For several years Shakespeare 
had been working as a bio-ethicist and was, among other things, critiquing the 
debates concerning the early detection and choice about termination of embryos that 
were diagnosed as having some sort of pathology. Such debates have been especially 
topical in recent years, as medical advancements have increased the chance of 
identifying problems with embryos prior to birth. Responding to bio-ethical 
dilemmas, it would seem, led Shakespeare to take up a critical realist position. This 
stance, while being broader than anyone ideology such as the social model, involves 
a more materialist ontology than the poshnodern philosophy contained within 
disability/postmodernity. Shakespeare's theoretical continuum to date, from the 
Marxist-inspired social model, to a postmodern analysis considering nalTatives and 
discourse, to his more recent critical realist approach, shows the shifting search 
within Disability Studies for ways to represent and theorise disablement. The social 
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model became the inaugural theoretical tool for fighting against oppression of 
disabled people. Relating postmodem philosophy to the experience of disablement 
meant the introduction of nan'ative accounts and discursive analysis for resisting the 
narrow strictures of the social model that denied the problematic realities of 
impairment and marginalised the experiences of a number of groups within the 
disability population. The critical realist position, which still embraces an emphasis 
on diversity and complexity of experience, is arguably more user-friendly and 
relevant to policy and practice than the social constructionist-influenced discussions 
within disabilitylpostmodernity and other texts. 
In this chapter I suggest that critical realism, whilst appearing eminently pragmatic, 
runs the risk of retuming to and relying upon positivist analysis, discounting disabled 
people's subjective accounts of living with illness or impairment. I also review the 
discursive tum in Disability Studies, considering a number of discursive and narrative 
studies pertaining to the experience of impairment andlor illness. I then go on to 
discuss how discourse positions people in power relations, constructing what subject 
positions are available for them to take up. The concept of agency is further detailed, 
with a fictitious example given of a person respectively accepting and then refusing a 
subject position call constructed by medical discourse. This chapter finishes with a 
question about disabled people's experience of agency that guided the purpose and 
process of this research project. I now retum to Shakespeare's work in which he has 
related critical realism to Disability Studies (2006). 
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Theeritical realist contribution to Disability Studies 
Shakespeare explains the critical realist position in relation to disability: 
Critical realism attends to the independent existence of bodies 
which sometimes hurt, regardless of what we may think or say 
about those bodies. Critical realists distinguish between ontology 
(what exists) and epistemology (our ideas about what exists). They 
believe that there are objects independent of lmowledge: labels 
describe, rather than constitute, disease. In other words, while 
different cultures have different views or beliefs or attitudes to 
disability, impairment has always existed and has its own 
experiential reality. Within disability research ... [critical realists] 
seek to avoid arguments over medical model versus social model 
perspectives by demanding an approach that gives weight to 
different causal levels in the complex disability experience ... 
which combines the best aspects of both the traditional [medical 
model] and the radical [social model] accounts. (Shakespeare, 
2006, p.54-55) 
Shakespeare draws on a number of writers and researchers to suppOli the 
relevance of critical realism for Disability Studies, offering a multidisciplinary 
approach. For example, Williams (1999) stated: 
Disability is neither the sole product of the impaired body or a socially 
oppressive society. Rather, it is, as we have seen, an emergent 
property, one involving the interplay of physiological impainnent, 
structural enablements/constraints and socio-cultural elaboration over 
time. Moreover, within such a model, the conflationary traps of 
structuration theory are avoided, yet a critical view of agency is still 
retained, including the transformatory potential of embodied social 
praxis. 'Personal tragedy' and 'social oppression' therefore, on this 
reading, become extreme models and overly drawn contrasts between 
what is, in fact, best seen as a dynamic, dialectically unfolding process 
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between body and society, located within a temporal frame of 
reference (both historical and biographical). (p. 813) 
Gable and Peters' (2004) application of resistance theory to disability paradigms 
takes a similar multidisciplinary approach, in that the paradigms are involved in a 
dynamic with one another thereby creating a mediating interplay of any extreme. 
Danennark and Gellerstedt (2004) map their critical realist perspective in tenns of 
"injustices to disabled people [that] can be understood neither as generated by solely 
cultnral mechanisms (cultural reductionism) nor by socio-economical mechanisms 
(economic reductionism) or by biological mechanisms (biological reductionism)" 
(2004, p. 348). Their table replicated below, demonstrates the use of different 
disciplines in the analysis of the multi-causal nature of disablement: 
Table 2 
Analytical levels in disability research 
Examples from 
Examples of Examples of a particular Examples of 
context: a negative Levels mechanisms contexts 
specific work outcomes 
site 
Negative Employment Denigration, Culture evaluation of a Law procedures exclusion 
eharacteristic 
~ocio- Profit, Organization of Unemployment, Labour market slimmed 
economic exploitation work tasks 
organizations 
IPsychosocial Relation-to-self Social Relations in .Lack of self-interaction work team esteem 
Ipsychological Feelings of Communication Conversation Withdrawal pride and shame dUling breaks 
l;Jiological Genetic factors Noisy Shop floor Sensorioneural 
surroundings hearing loss 
(Danerrnark & Gellerstedt, 1994, p.349) 
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Shakespeare (2006) refers to this approach as an "interactional model", studying 
disability on a number of different analytical levels and understanding disability as a 
combination of disadvantages within cultural, socio-economic, psychosocial, 
psychological and biological domains (Shakespeare, 2006; Gustavsson, 2004; Ven 
den Ven, Post, de Witte, & Van den Heuvel, 2005). 
The interactional model does address the exclusionary aspects of both the medical 
and social models, allowing for both impairment and disability (as defined by the 
social model) to be causal of disability. The interactional approach places 
responsibility on both the individual and society in regard to taking actions that 
reduce disablement. Therapy to improve self-esteem and/or anti-discrimination 
legislation (Shakespeare, 2006, p.62), is an example of this. The pragmatism and 
pluralism of the interactional model is a welcome relief from the ideological battles 
of social versus medical model, or the UK social model/disability rights versus the 
USA nonnalisaton/disability rights theory/practices. In this sense, it could be argued 
that critical realism is less modernist, with its emphasis on multiplicity and 
fragmentation (Burr, 2003), but the critical realist preference for ontological 
objectivity, and the desire to describe and establish what is 'real', gives it a stance of 
certainty which is less postmodern. This is not to suggest that the interactional model 
is not relevant or useful to Disability Studies; it is arguably the most balanced and 
encompassing model to date. But as a model that defines and takes a position of 
authority from a largely static epistemological body of knowledge, the interactional 
model runs the risk, like all of the disability paradi1,,'ms to date, of becoming rigid and 
inflexible. There is also the concern that the causal nature of the critical realist 
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approach will ultimately produce another detenninistic and reductionist analysis of 
disability. On this point, one of Hughes (2007) concerns about the recent shift to 
utilize critical realist approaches within Disability Studies, is there tendency to 
"universalize ontological lack and attribute deficit to us all" (p.682). In other words, 
the particularity of subject positions that people with impainnents and/or illness take 
up in respect of their bodies / selves and others, disappears and is lost as a resource 
for countering disablement, when the universalist interactional model proposed by 
Shakespeare and others (Shakespeare, 2006; Shakespeare & Watson, 2002, 2002; 
;Turner, 2003) is applied to disability. If this is the case, the question arises who will 
be most privileged by the assumptions that govern the critical realist interactional 
model, and how well will it serve those most likely made subjects of and objectified 
by such analyses? It is on the basis of this question, that I now turn to discursive 
approaches in which discourse is understood to constmct subjects and constitute their 
meaning-making. 
The discursive turn in Disability Studies 
Interest in and concerns about how discourse produces identity for disabled people 
became part of new focus in Disability Studies beginning, in the main, during the 
1990s. Danforth and Rhodes (1997) advocated diseourse analysis for Disability 
Studies, describing deconstmction as "an aggressive, political mode of critical 
analysis that snips conventional and assumed tmths down to their logically 
insubstantial bare bones [so that] the constructed reality of [disability] would no 
longer continue in its present fonn" (pp. 358-359). Winslade (1994), for example, 
deconstmcted the ways in which lay, medical, charity and disability ri ghts' 
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discourses impacted on identity conclusions for disabled people and how an 
understanding of this might be utilised to construct specific ways of providing 
professional support to disabled people. In regard to the impact of medical discourse 
on disabled people's identity, Tremain (2002) concluded that medicine, 
rehabilitation, and psychology have "produced subjects who have impairments 
because this identity meets certain requirements of contemporary political 
arrangements" (p. 42). Paterson and Hughes (2000) argued that by not considering 
the historical, social and cultural constlUctions of impairment, disability rights (social 
model) discourse had effectively relinquished impairment to medicalisation, thereby 
leaving "the body deficit, stripped of agency and confiated with sickness and 
invalidity" (p. 4 I -42). Watson's (2002) study of disabled people's sense of self-
identity furthered criticism of the social model because in its conclusion he stated that 
"there appears to be little support for an identity politics built on the notion of a 
common group of identity of disabled people" (p.527). Watson concluded that 
Disability Studies acts as "a regulatory regime that inadvertently constlUcts a 
'normal' body and in endorsing the existence of such an identity, Disability Studies 
perpetuates the notion of difference between disabled and non-disabled people, 
reinforcing the dichotomy" (p. 524). Islam's (2008) study was also interested in the 
constlUction of disabled subjectivity, when he explored the lives of thirteen young 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi disabled people, who were invited into different discursive 
constlUctions according to ethnicity, disability and gender. Bowkin and Tufter 
(2002), in taking into consideration the impact of the internet in regard to subject 
positions made available to disabled people, explored how on-line conversations 
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became a discursive context which created non-disabled identity possibilities for 
disabled people. 
In addition to studies and discussion which explored the discursive positioning and 
construction of identity for disabled people, a number of studies have related the 
work of discourse theorists, especially Foucault, to disablement. Priestly (1999) 
studied the discursive norms for disabled high school students, finding that "the 
language of 'special need', and the discursive practices used to police it, continued to 
construct disabled children as other" (p.l 02). Heaton (1999) analysed the discursive 
construction and expectations inherent in informal care of people with dementia. 
Goodley and Rapley's (2002) research on discourse pertaining to intellectual 
disability pointed out that assumptions of intellectual disability being acontextual, as 
in a "naturalized, individualized and embodied pathology" (p.138) was damaging for 
those labelled with intellectual disability, and moreover that the social model 
contributed to these damaging effects by "ignore[ing] the socially contexted nature of 
impairment" (p.138). Speed (2006) explored how the practice of mental health in 
Northem Ireland conceptualised mental illness as an individual dysfunction that did 
not take into account the contribution culture and the social environment make to the 
construction of disability. Galvin (2005) explored the stories of ninety two people 
from four countries who had an illness or disabling condition. She found that major 
areas ofa person's identity, such as independence, work and appearance/sexuality, 
were heavily influenced by the negative attitudes of others in response toward the 
person with impairment and/or illness not having a normative identity. Galvin (2005) 
drew on "Foucault's (1980) understanding of power and resistance" when she 
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concluded that people with illness and/or disabling conditions "ultimately wield more 
power to disturb the status quo ... because ... the oppressed occupy a location which 
lends itselfto the disturbing of these boundaries" (p.410). 
In respect of disabled people challenging the nonnative assumptions that marginalise 
people with impainnents and/or illness, Wilson and Beresford (2002) in their 
deconstruction of psychiatry, stated: 
The challenge we now face as mental health service users/survivors 
is to make it possible for our own clitiques and discussions to 
develop and counter the dominance of existing medicalized and 
ritualized individual discourses. Until we achieve this, the 
likelihood is that, ironically, modernist explanations of madness and 
distress will continue to flOUlish in an age of postmodemity. 
(Wilson & Beresford, 2002, p.156) 
However, while discursive studies have often portrayed how discursive nonns 
constitute the disabled subject and been interested in how disabled people resist the 
nonnative processes that disable them, few studies have researched effective 
resistances of such positioning. Davis and Watson's (2002) study is noteworthy in 
that they found disabled children did resist social stigma and oppressive social 
practices, and had complex identities, as opposed to a singular negative perception of 
themselves as a disabled self. 
The rise and relevance of narrative studies to Disability Studies 
In contrast to a social model agenda, the discursive turn in Disability Studies was 
further demonstrating that the feminist mantra, 'the personal is political', had much to 
offer. Disabled women within the disability movement began to illustrate how 
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disabled people's stories, especially those of women and ethnic minority groups, 
were relevant to disability rights and Disability Studies (Monis, 1991; Corker & 
French, 1999). However, Barnes and social model exponents were critical. Barnes 
referred to those who wrote personal nan-atives as "the true confessions brigade; 
those intent on writing about themselves rather than engaging in serious political 
analysis of a society that is inherently disabling" (Barnes, 1998, p.l46). Barnes' 
comment makes sense if self-disclosure is viewed as apolitical and not embedded 
within broader social processes. However, nan-ative, when considered from a social 
constructionist perspective, is a "cultural creation ... [for] the stOlies within which we 
live our lives always draw from the cultural stories of the world around us ... [and 
contain] cultural imperatives" (Winslade & Monk, 2000, p. 53). As we hear disabled 
people's stories we are engaging with the politics that detennine their lives, revealing 
the very assumptions and social conditions that create disablement. Indeed, one of 
the main arguments for listening to people's narratives is to learn what they tell US 
about socio-culturallife (Frank, 1995,2005; Nelson, 2001; Reissman, 1993,2003; 
Smith & Sparkes, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). Goodley, Lawthom, Clough, Moore (2004) 
have even suggested that "narratives may be our best hope of capturing structures that 
continue to shape, divide and separate human beings (2004, viiii-ix, my italics). 
Corker and French (1999) in believing there was much to be gained from hearing 
accounts of illness and impail1"11ent, provided space for five personal nan-atives, each 
a separate chapter, in their edited text Disability Discourse (1999). Their purpose 
was to "giv[e] 'voice' to many of the silenced, 'borderline' or unfamiliar stories of 
Disability Studies, for example, the voices of disabled children, disabled women, 
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non-Westem perspectives on disability, acquired disability, and congenital, 
intellectual, sensory and social disabilities" (p.II). Almost every type of impairment 
grouping, other than white males with physical disability, are depicted by Corker and 
French as having narratives which are silent, borderline or unfamiliar. At the time of 
their wliting of Disability discourse, many of the historically dominant voices within 
Disability Studies advocating the social model were white males with physical 
disability. This dominance might suggest that not all narrative accounts are accorded 
equal value, and Corker and French, both disabled women with sensory impairments, 
were endeavoring to address the imbalance through their edited text Disability 
discourse. In this text, Corker and French were engaging in the postmodem shift 
within sociology and research, where people's narratives are viewed as cultural 
reproductions. As Frank (2005) has said: 
The most consequential work we do, every hour if not every moment, 
is to decide which stories we will allow into our lives and which we 
will refuse. We choose which stories will compel us and which we will 
dismiss as not compelling. We choose among stories, but the principles 
of our choosing are not themselves chosen. Stories attract us, or they 
strike us as unimportant to our lives, or they actively repel us. We 
humans take up and reject stories, but the stories too, are active as they 
affect our choices. These choices make crucial differences to the lives 
we lead ... Our affiliations with other people - the basis of our social 
lives - are chosen according to principles that are unchosen. (Frank, 
2005, p.l) 
Frank's use ofthe word "choice" here is similar to the way in which Davies views 
"choice ... [as] more akin to 'forced choices' .... because one has been subjectively 
constituted through one's placement within that discourse to want that line of action" 
(1991, p.46). Ifwe relate this to Barnes' criticism of personal narratives, we could 
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say that Barnes had "taken up" a "position", to use Davies' (1991) tenninology, or 
was "caught up", to use Frank's (2005) term, within the social model story. This 
cultural story or discourse constituted him to like stories that targeted societal barriers 
as the cause of disablement but dislike stories that suggested disability could also be 
an individual experience related to the problems associated with having an 
impainnent or illness. On the other hand, Frank's experiences of cancer and a heart 
attack led him to get "caught up" in challenging the way medical discourse positions 
patients, situating himself within the alternative account of the embodied subject who 
is living, as opposed to treating the illness or impainnent. He said, 
The stories that ill people tell come out of their bodies. The body sets 
in motion the need for new stories when disease dismpts the old 
stories. The body, whether still diseased or recovered, is 
simultaneously cause, topic, and instrument of whatever new stories 
are told. These embodied stories have two sides, one personal and the 
other social. (Frank, 1995, p.2) 
For Frank (1995), the personal story of illness is always in relation to the broader 
cultural, societal stories about illness or impainnent. He highlighted the dominance 
of medical discourse when he said "the story told by the physician becomes the one 
against which others are ultimately judged true or false, useful or not" (p.S). 
Frank's (1991,1995, 2004b, 2004c, 2008) narrative approach, in which he has often 
been eritical of medical practice, while relevant to and sometimes drawn on by people 
researching disability (Smith & Sparkes, 2008a; Whitehead, 2005), should not be 
conflated with social model-informed criticism of the medical model. Frank's 
emphasis on people's accounts being both personal and social highlights how a 
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narrative approach to research is more than generating personal accounts of disabling 
experiences, it is also about making visible those ideas and practices which have 
become subjugated and less heard due to the power of dominant discourse. Many 
illness and impairment narratives that have been reproduced in the literature have 
been an attempt to research how discourses, such as medicine but also the social 
model, play out in disabled people's lives. For example, Kinavay (2006) explored 
narrative self-understandings for three adolescents born with spina bifida. She 
discovered that each made meaning of their impairment in different ways. One 
person had taken up an understanding that it was important to overcome the adversity 
of the impairment/disability, becoming a courageous person with spina bifida. 
Another separated himself from the impairment, as if that wasn't a problem in itself 
and focused on other problems he experienced, such as depression. The first person 
was performing medical discourse in storying spina bifida as an adversity to be 
overcome. The second person also took up medical discourse but only in relation to 
depression, not his impairment. The third person's approach was to integrate 
disability within a sense of self-identity, such as being disabled and proud, which is a 
more social model interpretation of what it means to have an impairment. In another 
study, Phillips (2007) interviewed twenty two older woman with intellectual 
disability and found that "women labelled as having 'learning difficulties' 
[intellectual disability] are also assumed to have a bodily impainnent; a bodily 
impairment which was sometimes considered dangerous or promiscuous but also 
vulnerable, child-like, asexual and in need of care and control" (2007, pp. 518-519). 
These findings are significant for they illustrate how the participants actively resisted 
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deficit ideas about their bodies by finding ways to choose what they liked, concerning 
how they dressed and looked. 
Mcdonald, Keys and BaIcazar (2007) explored the narratives of non-white men and 
women who had learning disabilities, finding that the participants could pass for non-
disabled but when named as having a learning disability were perceived as not having 
a legitimate impainnent, being of lower intellect and not having positive gender 
expeliences. The participants were constructed in deficit tenns by medical and White 
ethnicity discourses but they demonstrated resistance to the racism and disablism they 
experienced by either withdrawing from those enviromnents where the discrimination 
was prevalent or by reframing the negative messages and assumptions about learning 
disability. French and Swain (2006) undertook a oral history project, in which sixty 
people with visual impainnent were interviewed about their experiences as children 
when they lived in residential facilities for blind children. The study uncovered how 
the participants suffered abuse when they were lived in the residential facilities. The 
research highlighted the very strong friendships the children developed with one 
another while living in the residential facility. French and Swain (2006) emphasised 
how personally transforming the interview process had been for the participants, in 
having the opportunity to tell their stories of what it was like for them as children 
living in the residential facility. Several themes emerged from the study: the abusive 
environment of the residential facility for blind children, the helpfulness of strong 
friendships for blind children when surviving an abusive environment, and the value 
for the participants in being invited to discuss past experiences and having someone 
act as a witness to those stories. 
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In considering his own and listening to other people's illness and impainnent stories, 
Frank (1995) suggested that people's accounts could be categorised according to 
three types of narrative: restitution, chaos or quest. The restitution narrative involves 
the idea that wellness will return because due to treatment, primarily medical, 
sickness is not lasting. The chaos narrative is something of the antithesis because 
there is no order to the narrative, nor is there any sense of life getting better, the 
person is suffering and wounded and their story provokes anxiety both for themselves 
as others who witness it. The quest narrative is different from both the restitution and 
chaos nan'atives; the person may not get better but neither are they forever 
overwhelmed in suffering and loss. Through their illness the person finds some kind 
of gain, whether it be personal transfonnation, a career change, or advocating for 
others, or some other type of ascendancy; a quest narrative offers the person a voice. 
Whitehead (2005) called on Frank's narrative typologies in her analysis of her 
interviews with seventeen British people who had chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) or 
myalgic encephalopathy (ME). She said that it was common for the participants of 
her study to start with a restitution naITative, move to a chaos narrative and, for the 
most, shift back to a restitution narrative and then on to a quest narrative. She 
proposed this was a different narrative trajectory fi'om people who were HIV positive 
or had been treated for breast cancer, where the restitution nan'ative was more 
dominant. 
Smith and Sparkes (2008a) drew on Frank's (1995) narrative typologies and 
Norrick's (2005) theory of tell ability, when they interviewed laInie, a man who had a 
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spinal cord injury at the level of the second cervical vertebrae, leaving him paralysed 
beneath his neck-line and requiring a ventilator to help him breathe. By surviving the 
injnry and believing for a full recovery, Jamie initially engaged in a restitution 
nan'ative, but when it became harder for him to hold onto the hope of becoming 
"able-bodied again" [he experienced a] "rapid descent into ... the chaos narrative" 
(p.223). In this narrative Jamie had no control over his body or his life. He said "his 
life had ended" and he "may as well be dead" (p.224). The more Jamie engaged in a 
chaos narrative, the less tell-able his story became. His chaos narrative created 
anxiety and fear for others because he never experienced any physical recovery, nor 
did his responses to his spinal cord injury lead him to experience any kind of personal 
transformation. Chaos narratives are difficult to tell or speak of because the plot 
"lacks any coherent sequence" (p.232). They are "told on the edges of speech, in the 
silences that speech camlot penetrate" (Frank, 1995, p.IOI, as cited in Smith & 
Sparkes, 2008, p.231). Chaos narratives, because they are hard to speak and hard to 
hear, produce lives of an increased isolation, as was Jamie's testimony: "It's a 
different world now. The accident has changed everything. I'm a stranger. It's 
horrible living like this. I mostly stay inside" (Jamie, as cited in Smith & Sparkes, 
2008, p.226). 
The environmental barriers experienced by Jamie when he was unable to visit his 
children because of physical access problems, and the impact ofa C21evel complete 
spinal cord injury on his biological body, were the concrete factors that led to Jamie 
not being able to take up a quest narrative. The article concluded that in time "Jamie 
may have to tell a range of body stories, need people to listen to them, be offered 
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consolation ... be left alone ... [so as 1 to help alter the trajectory of his life and infuse 
his history with new meaning" (p.234). However, infusing history with new meaning 
is not an easy project for people to engage in. As well portrayed in this example, 
Jamie's disablement was produced by significant social balTiers and consequential 
impairment-based limitations, including the absence of biological function of his 
body, limbs and hands, and the daily experience of extreme pain and tiredness. But 
in addition to these material conditions, Jamie was a man who prior to his spinal cord 
injury had lived his life through his body. He had played sport all his life and had 
always worked physical jobs. His strong and active body was inseparable from his 
subjectivity of who he knew himselfto be. As he said, without his body he was dead. 
At least the Jamie who he had always known was no longer available to him. Unless 
there was some kind of reconstruction of self, Jamie's life had metaphorically ended 
when he became paraJysed. The meanings Jamie engaged with about his spinal cord 
injury constituted his responses to having a spinal cord injury. 
Prior to this account of Jamie's life, Smith and Sparkes (2005) had previously 
discussed Jamie's 'chaos narrative' in an earlier article that featured him alongside 
the stories of thirteen other men with spinal cord injury. In this research, the 
interviews explored the meanings of hope in the men's lives. Eleven of the men had 
remained engaged with a 'restitution narrative', believing in physicaJ recovery being 
possible on the basis of advances occurring in "medical technology" and the nature of 
"the restorable body/self" (p.1096). Smith and Sparkes (2005) referred to this kind of 
hope as a "concrete hope" (p.l 097). Two of the participants had taken up a quest 
narrative. One of the men said, "1 don't view disability as a crisis. I'm on a different 
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path" (Doug, as cited in Smith & Sparkes, 2005, p.l 099). The other man stated, "I 
don't have much of my able-bodied selfleft because I've changed so much as a 
person ... and become a better person" (David, as cited in Smith & SpaTkes, 2005, 
p.1099). The quest narrative in the lives of these men, according to Smith and 
Sparkes (2005), embodied "a transcendent hope" (p.1099). Jamie, as discussed, was 
engaged in the chaos narrative, where there was a loss of hope. He said, "I'm no onc. 
[7s silence] 1 have no future ... My life, it's, it's, not here. It's over. I have nothing left 
to live. I have no hope of a life. I have nothing. There is no hope for me" (Jamie, as 
cited in Smith & Sparkes, 2005, p.llOl). 
Previously I have explored how the meanings people hold about their spinal cord 
injury produces how they respond to their injury: 
For some people, spinal cord injury meant intense shame that 
precluded rehabilitation because being sick and bed-ridden was 
preferable to being visibly disabled. For others, paralysis was a heart 
wrenching continnation about wrong choices that they had made in 
life; for others it was a tragedy that they were undeserving of; or 
alternatively it may have simply represented another one of life's 
challenges or even symbolised an 0ppOliunity for a new chance at 
living better. These ways of viewing disability are cultural stories: one 
discourse positions paralysed people as less than human, another as 
tragic but courageous, while another views them as possibly fortunate. 
(Arkwright, 2005, p.35) 
In another narrative study on a person with spinal cord injury, Bergen (2004) tells the 
story of Melvin, a Chicago gang member turned world-class wheelchair athlete. 
Wheelchair basketball and disabled sport became an avenue in which Melvin was 
able to succeed in after his spinal cord injury, both as an athlete and in becoming a 
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role model to others. Melvin's journey from gang member to disabled sport athlete, 
on the categories of Frank's narrative typologies, could be storied as him moving 
from a chaos narrative when he first became paralysed to a quest narrative when he 
became accomplished in disabled sport. Such a story is much more tell-able than 
Jamie's chaos narrative because it provides hope and inspiration, it does not create 
despair. Melvin, being young at the time of his spinal cord injury, being active and 
independently mobile through using a lightweight wheelchair, and presumably having 
already been produced by his involvement in a gang to be resilient and competitive, 
was well placed to take up and succeed in wheelchair sports after having a spinal cord 
injmy. Melvin's involvement in wheelchair sports became a narrative story that was 
very tellable, perhaps being storied as something like: gangster survives, succeeds 
and refonns. Melvin's "paraphrase of Goethe - 'It's not doing what you like to do 
but liking what you have to do that makes a world of difference'" (Melvin, as cited in 
Berger, 2004, p.805) - invites admiration. 
Many narrative studies have explored the meanings that disabled people have 
engaged with concerning their experience of having an impainnent and/or illness. 
Ohman, Soderberg and Lundman (2003) interviewed five women and five men with 
different kinds of serious chronic illnesses and eoncluded that living with a serious 
chronic illness meant shifting between enduring and suffering but in that process the 
self was refonnulated. Driedger, Crooks and Bennett (2004) studied the narratives of 
fifteen men and women who had multiple sclerosis (MS), addressing the questions of 
how the participants had coped with their disease, and how they engaged with 
disablement over space (environment) and time (past, present, future) as a result of 
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changing social and spatial relationships. From the study, they recommended that 
more attention be paid to the role of time and space so people with MS can re-
negotiate time and space and develop a process of adaptation. Shuttleworth (2002) 
explored the search for sexual intimacy by fourteen men with cerebral palsy. This 
study revealed the pre-requisite of cultural stories of support and acceptance for the 
men if they were to engage in sexual relationships with others, finding that "several 
aspects of self and society helped facilitate their establislnnent of sexual relationships 
with others, including cultivating supportive and communal contexts, expanding the 
masculine repertoire and defusing the adverse structural and symbolic context of 
disability and desirability" (2002, p.112). 
A number of nan'ative studies have researched the impact of environmental and social 
barriers on disabled people's lives. For example, Roesta, Kristiansenb, Van Hovea 
and Vanderplasschena (2007) explored the stories of people with' 'mental health 
problems" who were looking for employment on the open labour market and 
concluded that "psychiatric discourses, what we tenn toxic psychiatric orthodoxies, 
silence, disable and construct [mental health] survivors as unemployable" (p.267). 
Nelson, Clarke, Febbraro and Hatzipantelis' (2005) exploration of nine women and 
eleven men with mental illness was that supportive housing, when previously they 
were homeless, made a significant difference to their lives. 
Tbe power relation of discourse and tbe construction of subjectivity 
Discursive and narrative studies of people's experiences of disability have often 
explored how the truth claims of medical discourse, and sometimes the social model, 
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are dominant in people's meaning making about their experiences. However, the 
studies have also given voice to those accounts that have been constructed by 
discourses beyond the medical or social model of disability. 
Disabled people are positioned in relations of power by multiple discourses. Jamie, 
for example, in Smith and Sparkes' (2008a) research, as a consequence of his spinal 
cord injury was positioned as failing within medical, social model, sports, 
employment, masculine, parenting, and maniage discourses. He gained no biological 
recovery from his spinal cord injury, he experienced siguificant social and 
envirorunental barriers as a person with a spinal cord injury, and he was unable to 
return to the practices he had assumed as a man, husband and father plioI' to having a 
spinal cord injury. It is not surprising he described his life in such disparaging tenns. 
From a discursive perspective, his hope lies in him being able to take up a subject 
position in which he could succeed on the tenns of discourse he is being subjected by. 
Smith and Sparkes (2008a) imply that such a process may occur in time for him. 
In other studies discussed, a number of them described people with impainnents 
and/or illness showing resistance when they had been marginalised and discriminated 
against. For example, Phillips' (2007) study in which twenty two older people with 
intellectual disability were found to resist deficit ideas about their body. However, 
few of the discursive and nalTative studies explored in detail what enabled people to 
refuse those discursive practices that positioned them in ways they did not like, what 
discourses they were calling on in their dislike of how they had been positioned. It is 
this analysis which is a key focus in this study, understanding how discourse 
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positions and constitutes subjectivity, and the con'esponding processes of agency 
people negotiate in responses to such positioning. 
In an earlier article (Arkwright, 2005), I explained how discourse constructs truth and 
enacts power relations, often creating multiple but contradictory subject positions for 
disabled people. I detailed a personal story of how I was often late to a work meeting 
and initially an individual behaviourist discourse invited me to think I needed to 
improve my time management and organisational skills. However, as I re-examined 
my being late to this particular meeting iiom a discursive viewpoint, I was able to see 
that my late attendance was a product of a number of competing discourses: 
I ran over time with my students because I valued the interactive nature 
of the discussions and the chance to have input into their lives. These 
are products of trying to do well within relationship and teaching 
discourses. I prioritised going to the toilet because I was afraid of 
having a bladder accident and getting a urinary tract infection if I 
didn't; hence, the outworkings of appearances and health discourses. I 
usually walked to the toilet using my walking sticks as this was good 
for my body: rehabilitation discourse. However, I used my wheelchair 
to get to the meeting as walking would be too tiring and time 
consuming; I didn't want my impairment to disadvantage: social model 
discourse. Sometimes on the way to the meeting I would get caught 
briefly having to chat with someone, as well, but I viewed being late to 
administrative meetings as the lesser of many evils because people are 
more important than administration; a view that is no doubt sustained 
within many counselling and people helping discourses. However, out 
of respect to my colleagues I did wish to attend the meeting on time, 
meaning I was also endeavouring to comply to relationship discourses 
but this time in relation to my peers not my students. And even when at 
the meeting, I was usually concerned that I had not managed to have 
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had a drink; evidence again of health discourse. Clearly, I was unable 
to simultaneously occupy the multiple subject positions on offer. It was 
impossible for me to act on all the subjectivities produced by those 
discursive contexts, such as being a relational person, committed and 
genuine teacher, responsible rehabilitated person, empowered disabled 
person, and an acceptably presented professional. (Arkwright, 2005, 
p.45-46). 
Once I could clearly see the discursive position calls I was being invited into then I 
was able to choose which ones I would engage with and which ones I would refuse 
and the respective merits of making these choices. 
The above example demonstrates how "discursive practices ... position us in relations 
of power" (Parker, 1999, p.6). Discursive ideas and practices, whether medicine, 
disability rights, feminism, ethnicity and so forth, become the basis by which we 
language and interpret experience, make sense of ourselves, other people and think 
about the world. Our languaged statements, involving meanings, metaphors, 
representations, images, stories, emotions and actions (Burr, 2005), therefore belong 
within discourse; they are never outside of discourse, and as such we are subjects of 
discourse, positioned according to the discursive ideas and practices by which we 
have become subjected. It is for this reason that Foucault (1980) reasoned that 
knowledge and power were inseparable, preferring to write them as 
"lmowledge/power". The unique point about this notion of know ledgel power is that 
power is not relative to hierarchical authority in the traditional sense of holding a 
certain role or being in charge of a line of command: 
This fOD11 of power is thought of as "capillary", that is, it is not held in 
some social nerve centre, but is everywhere around us and is 
65 
constituted, reproduced in every action or utterance. It exists most 
subtly in our sense of self-discipline, whereby we take messages given 
to us from the social enviromnent and monitor our own behaviour in 
accordance with these messages, or act as if we are constantly under 
surveillance. We are all both subjects to it and subject of it (in the 
grammatical sense of being active in its production). 
(Winslade, 1994, p.4S-46) 
However, because people are subjected to more than one discourse at anyone 
moment in time (although one discourse is likely to be much more dominant than 
others), then altemative subject positions within other discourses are potentially 
available. When these alternative subject positions are taken up, they become the 
means of resisting the positioning power of the dominant discourse. It is on this 
basis, that Foucault (1980) believed that within a given power relation, power is 
never completely dominant" (Winslade, 1994), and that where there is power, there is 
always resistance to that power relation. 
The social model illusttates how this concept of power/knowledge relation works in 
practice. It was started by a group of people with impairments who did not work and 
lived in institutional care. They redefined what disability is and in time that 
description became "a structuring principle in society which gave form to institutions, 
patterns of social interaction, knowledge and ideas and individual subjectivity" 
(Winslade, 1994, p.4S). As a result, the disability rights' movement began, law and 
social policy were influenced, disabled people viewed themselves as a minority group 
entitled to equal citizenship and the same rights as all other people, and began 
insisting non-disabled people saw them similarly. In New Zealand today, our 
parliamentary disability strategy is a reproduction of the social model, when it 
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describes disability as "not something individuals have ... [but] a process which 
happens when one group of people create barriers by designing a world only for their 
way of living, taking no account of the impainnents other people have" (The New 
Zealand Disability Strategy, 2001, p.l). There is little doubt that Paul Hunt and his 
peers who made up UPIAS have made a huge impact that has nothing to do with their 
status, position or professional role in society, as they were on all accounts not 
positioned favourably within their social contexts. The point is, it is not them per se 
that have been a powerful force in the emancipation of disabled people but the new 
knowledge they created about disability. It has been this knowledge, taken up and 
reproduced, which has created influence. 
It is this very story about the social model that typifies and holds the key for me 
concerning why discourse and the allied concepts of positioning, subjectivity and 
agency, are critical for Disability Studies. The ideas inherent within the social model 
are not the answer; they provide one of a number of answers for disabled people. 
However the way that those people's ideas developed into a practice, which contain a 
set of values, constructing and reflecting a worldview that then constitutes and shapes 
how people interpret, make meaning of, and act in regard to disability, is an answer. 
Ifwe put our faith in the people who originally developed the social model, or 
alternatively the ideas and practices reflective of the social model, then we too are 
subjects of those ideas and practices, constructed by their relative merits and 
limitations and reproducing ofthem. But if our hope is based on the notion that 
"discourses are practices which fonn the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 
1972, p.49) then we are aware that it is critical to understand which discourses our 
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meaning-making reproduces, and what the respective implications are for the realities 
we will live out, in accordance with the discursive terms of reference we have taken 
up. If people were only ever subject to one discourse then having this awareness 
would not be critical, but as we have seen with discourses that construct disability, 
people constantly live at the intersection of multiple discourses. As Burr (2005) said 
"numerous discourses surround any object [for example, illness or impairment] and 
each strives to represent or 'construct' it in a different way" (p. 65). Medical 
discourse constructs illness and impairment as pathology requiring treatment. Social 
model discourse constructs illness and impairment as separate fi'om disability, the 
latter caused by disabling social an·angements. NormalisationlSRV construct illness 
and imp ailment as creating disadvantage that becomes less if the person can be 
supported to participate in the social roles and activities than people without illness 
and impainnent routinely engage in. A narrative discourse constructs impainnent and 
illness as story which is both personal and social, shaping "what we seek, what we 
fear, what possibilities we can imagine life holds for us, and what part we believe we 
can play in bringing about outcomes, for ourselves and others" (Frank, 2005, p.8). 
Discourse analysis deconstructs impairment and illness as the objects of discourse, 
exploring how discourse has constituted the way disabled people make sense of and 
live their lives. Critical realism discourse depicts impairment and illness as the 
outcome of multiple causal factors: biology, psychology, culture, socio-economic, 
psychosocial, and responses should be appropriate and relative to each domain. But, 
as highlighted in Chapter Two, these are only the discourses predominately discussed 
within Disability Studies and many other discourses also construct particular ideas 
and practices about illness and impaimlent. In my view there is merit in disabled 
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people developing further understanding for how any discourse, not just those 
traditionally taken up and reproduced by Disability Studies, produces people with 
illness and impainnent. For example, exploring what a particular discourse 
constructs as important, how the discourse positions disabled people, and what 
invitations are made possible by the discourse's ideas and practices for the kind of 
person the disabled person can be. 
Negotiating agency in response to position calls 
Positioning oneself to be a critical analyst of discourse is akin to what Davies (1991) 
describes as agency: 
When a person has access to a subject position in which they have the 
right to speak and be heard... is author of their own multiple 
meanings and desires (though only to the extent they have taken on as 
their own the discursive practices and attendant moral cOlmnitments 
of the collective(s), of which they are members) ... a sense of oneself 
that can go beyond the meanings in anyone discourse, and forge 
something new, through a combination of previously unrelated 
discourses, through the invention of words and concepts that create a 
shift in consciousness that is beginning to occur, or through imagining 
not what is but what might be. (Davies, 1991, p. 51) 
Seeking to understanding how discourse is positioning us, what subject positions are 
available to us at a given moment and what the implications are for us in engaging 
with those subject positions, is the process whereby we might negotiate agency as we 
live out the moments of our lives. When we can do this, for example, by 
understanding what the social model means for what we can and cannot say and do, 
and what impact that has on us and our relationships with others, I suggest that we are 
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conscious enough of our subject positions within discourse to be able to experience 
agency. If we find that the subject positions which aTe available to us are not ones we 
would like to choose, then it is helpful for us to understand what discourses are 
producing this desire for difference. We can then identify the meaning-making 
assumptions that will enable us to refuse or resist those discursive positions, what 
Drewery, Winslade and Monk (2000) refer to as refusing those "position calls" which 
we do not prefer. 
However, because ofthe taken-for-granted status of dominant discursive meaning-
making, refusing discursive position calls is challenging but not impossible: 
People aTe bringing to a paTticular situation their history as a 
subjective being, that is the history of one who has been in multiple 
positions and engaged in different forms of discourse [so that the 
person 1 is not inevitably caught in the subject position that the 
particular nan'ative and the related discursive practices might seem to 
dictate. (Davies & HaTre1990, p.48) 
An example of two options for a disabled person inevitably caught up in a subject 
position produced by medical discourse, is to accept the position call or refuse it, as 
the following example demonstrates: 
Position Call (made by pool attendant speaking to a disabled person 
going swimming): "It is good that you come swimming, it will help 
you a lot" 
Accepting Position Call (reply made by disabled person, accepting 
the pool attendant's meaning of swimming for disabled people 
being about rehabilitation and getting better - the medical 
discourse): "Yes, I think it's helping" 
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Refusing Position Call (alternative reply by disabled person, 
choosing a different discourse, such as disability rights): "Thank 
you for your encouragement but I do not come swimming to get 
better, simply to swim like anyone else, for enjoyment and 
exercise. " 
It is this particular understanding of agency, in relation to disabled people's 
experience, that this study has set out to investigate, the extent to which a disabled 
person understands the subject positions she/he is being called into and is able to take 
up an alternative and prefen'ed subject position. Laws and Davies (2000, p.206) refer 
to the dual nature of subjectification, which they say is hard to grasp because: 
One is simultaneously subjected and at the same time can become 
an agentic, speaking subject. The speaking/writing subject can go 
beyond the intentions of powerful others and beyond the meanings 
of the discourses through which they are subjected while necessarily 
and at the same time being dependent on their successful subjection 
for becoming someone who can speak/write meaningfully and 
convincingly beyond the terms of their subjection. Laws & 
Davies, 2000, p.206) 
Paul Hunt and his comrades within UPIAS are an example of how the dual nature of 
subjectification can work in practice. By redefining the tenns of reference for 
disability, from 'caused by impairment' to 'the result of societal barriers', the 
members of UPIAS became agentic speaking/writing subjects, going beyond their 
positioning as residents in institutional care not able or pennitted to live like non-
disabled people in ordinary homes. It was their experience of that very SUbjection 
that legitimated their resistance of the discursive positioning that was so 
marginalising of them. Their resistance was so convincing that in effect an 
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alternative discourse about disability was established, with its own production of 
subjections, ones that in years to come other disabled people, like French, Corker and 
Shakespeare took up a speaking/writing position against. 
By researching accounts of agency in the lives of disabled people, this study is not 
restricted to examining the prescriptions and effects of one or another disability 
discourse, such as the medical or social model of disability. Rather, I have been 
interested in the stories that people with illness and impairment tell about their lives 
for the purpose of understanding their views about what positions have been available 
for them to take up. In particular, my interest has focused on what discursive 
conditions have produced those subject positions and what those constructions have 
meant for their experiences of what is expected and possible (or not). It was my 
expectation that the stories people told of their lives would display more complexity 
than subjectification within anyone discourse, such as medical or social model of 
disability. Given this complexity, I also wanted to explore how and when people 
changed their experience of disablement by becoming agentic speaking/writing 
subjects going beyond the tern1S of one (or more) discursive prescriptions, thereby 
representing and (re )-producing an alternative discursive subjectification. Hence, a 
key focus for me with this study has been: 
In the stories and accounts told to me by six people who identified 
themselves as having either an illness, 10ng-telID health problem, 
impainnent or disability, what did agency mean, and what enabled them 
to find ways to negotiate agency in their lives? 
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[1J THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I continue the story, begun in Chapter One, of how my background as 
a Narrative Therapist created my interest in the ways in which disabled people are 
discursively positioned and how they negotiate subject positions so as to take up 
agency in their lives. However, narrative therapy does not have an exact research 
methods equivalent, as narrative research is not as discursively orientated as narrative 
therapy. A narrative therapist typically seeks to understand how a person's story has 
been produced by discourse (Bird, 2004; White, 2007; White & Epston, 1991), 
whereas narrative research rather examines how an idiosyncratic story has been 
produced and what that story suggests about the social world (Frank, 2004a; 
Josselson, Lieblich & McAdams, 2003; Smith & Sparkes, 200Sc). On the other hand, 
discourse analysis (Davies & Davies, 2007; Davies, Browne, Gannon, Hopkins, 
McCann & Wihlborg, 2006; Parker, 1999) does not take up the centrality of story and 
narrative in the creation of experience in quite the same way as narrative therapy, but 
focuses more exclusively on how power relations in language produce actions. Given 
my commitment to nan'ative therapy ideas and practices, I called on and brought 
together the concepts of both narrative research and a critical analysis of discourse 
when selecting and interviewing the participants, hearing their stOlies and bringing a 
discursive reading to their accounts. This chapter details the conceptual tools from 
both narrative and discursive research methodologies employed in generating and 
analysing data in this study, including an outline of the research process undertaken. 
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Narrative therapy and thickening the alternative story 
Nan'ative therapy is a relatively new counselling approach, developed during the 
early 1980s by White and Epston, from Australia (White) and New Zealand (Epston), 
In contrast to the psychoanalytic, hwnanist, and cognitive-behavioural therapeutic 
movements, naITative therapy is postmodern. White and Epston brought a 
combination of ideas from family therapy, anthropology, discourse theory, literary 
studies and feminism to their practice of therapy, At the risk of oversimplifying the 
theoretical antecedents of narrative therapy, White and Epston (1990, 1992) applied 
Bruner's (1987, 1990, 1991) notion of "storied experience", Bateson's (1979) ideas 
about "news of difference", Foucault's (1980) thesis about "powerlknowledge", and a 
feminist theory interest in power and minority group politics, to the therapeutic 
encounter. They aI'gued that experience is subjectively stOlied, producing narratives 
that constitute how a person makes sense of experience and acts (Epston 1989, 1996; 
White, 1997,2001,2004,2007). They took up Foucault's (1980) argument about 
subjugated stories, suggesting that for every problematic storying of experience 
produced by dominant discourse, there would be other stories that would provide an 
exception to the problem story, They extemalised the problems in people's lives, 
avoiding language that internalised the problem within the person, thereby creating a 
linguistic space between the person and the problems affecting him. A common 
mantra in the early years of narrative therapy was the person is not the problem, the 
problem is the problem (Morgan, 2000), 
NalTative therapists focus on constructing lines of inquiry that support people to take 
up and thicken alternative and preferred accounts of their lives (White, 
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2007),discovering those instances when the person has already taken up a discursive 
idea/practice that offers her resistance to that which is being experienced as 
problematic. As these re-positioning moments are paid attention to in the therapy, 
they can be constructed as part of a new story about who the person is, what she 
values, and how she can act. Narrative therapists also seek to deconstruct what 
specific discursive norms have constituted a person's problems and difficulties. For 
example, how Western ideals of success within contemporary society invite people to 
take up ideas and (re)produce practices of personal failure (White, 2004). Froma 
post-structural perspective, identity is constituted by language, where demarcations of 
either/or differences enact a power relation (Denida, 2000). For example, the 
language of medicine produces the category of illness as the absence of well ness. 
Within this binary. wellness is privileged and illness is not desirable. Indeed, Bird 
(2004) has noted that "people who belong to marginalised groups ... find limited 
belonging [within dominant di scursive nonns, instead] ... the descriptor which is 
readily available to them within the binary constructed world is an absence" (Bird, 
2004, p. 6). Once positioned in absence or deficit, it becomes difficult to re-position 
oneself so as to take up alternative subject positions that no longer disadvantage the 
person. 
People, in my view, are often aware when they are being positioned in a power 
relation that disadvantages them. Typically the person does not want the discursive 
line of action that is being offered by the discourse but are subjected by it and take up 
the position offered by the discourse nonetheless. Parker demonstrates the difficulty 
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for disabled people in resisting tbose subject positions that construct them to 
experience discrimination and disadvantage. She said: 
I was relieved when I saw an old friend in my gym class ... I walked 
up to her and asked her if she remembered me. I hoped that she did. I 
almost died when all she answered was, 'Yeah, aren't you that 
epileptic?' I just knew all tbe girls around us heard it and I could 
hardly speak. I was humiliated, but said, 'Yes'. (emphasis mine) 
(Parker, 1975, p.261) 
I have had similar experiences (see Arkwright, 2005, p.l 0) of finding myself 
disconnected from those discursive ideas which would enable me to refuse position 
calls which marginalise me on the basis of my having an impainnent. However, I 
have also shown (Arkwright, 2008) that whilst the privileged subject position is 
typieally not available for disabled people to take up, it is possible even when invited 
into a deficit position to negotiate moments of agency, thereby taking up a subject 
position of presence witbin a discursive expectation. The illustration I have 
previously used was how I took up an idea of being a "less than" Dad, because due to 
my impainnent, I could not play sport with my children. The discursive ideas that 
produced such a singular and problematic description of my parenting ability was the 
assumption that "good fathers" are physically active with their children. In this 
deconstmction, other information about my parenting came forward, which 
challenged the conclusion of my being a less capable Dad than non-disabled fathers, 
such as my listening well to my children and giving great wheelchair rides to tbem 
and their fiiends. These parenting competencies were invisible and silenced under 
the dominant discursive expectation that Dads must be active and play sport with 
their children. The shift from being a "less than" Dad, to a disabled Dad who 
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fathered capably, but differently from non-disabled fathers, meant that I was no 
longer only positioned in the absence of parenting competencies. Taking up a subject 
position of presence within the binary of good/not good fathering was made possible 
by the back and fortb exploration between the stories I was reproducing and the 
discourse(s) which produced such stories. It was this process of paying attention to 
the relationship between discourse and narrative storylines that was important for me 
to replicate in my research approach so that my inquiry and analysis processes were 
consistent with the discursive ideas I had become committed to in my professional 
practice. 
In regard to extending my interest in narrative and discourse from narrative therapy to 
research, case studies, biographies and life histories, inspired by Bruner (1990) and 
Polkinghorne (1988) and continued by others (Chase, 2003; Riessman 1993), have 
focused on the relevance of the subjective story for research. Post-structural 
philosophers (Derrida, 1977; Foncault, 1972; Lyotard, 1984), and others taking up the 
post-structural perspective (Burr, 2003; Davies, 1991, 1998; Davies et aI., 2006; 
Davies & Davies, 2007; Davies & Harre, 1990, 1999; Drewery, 2005; Drewery, 
Winslade & Monk, 2000; Laws & Davies, 2000; Parker, 1992, 1999; Wetherall & 
Potter, 1992) whilst not uninterested in the content and structure of people's stories, 
have been more concerned with the discursive production of subjectivity and the role 
oflanguage in the reproduction of discursive power relations. Given the overlap but 
also distinctions between the concepts and practice of narrative research and the 
critical analysis of discourse, I now examine more fully how each infonned the 
methodology of this study. 
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Narrative research and the storied self 
Narrative research, like narrative therapy, considers the narration of story as a 
primary way that "people make sense of experience, construct the self, create and 
communicate meaning, [and] that personal narratives, no matter how unique and 
individual, are inevitably social in character" (Chase, 2003, p. 79). Central to the 
process of narrative and story narration is how the meaning made of events creates a 
narrative theme or storyline, which is organised according to a plot with a beginning, 
middle and end (Polkinghome, 1988). Storylines are organising structures through 
which experiences are made sense of. In the interpretation of experience, an 
unfolding dialectic occurs between the person's storylines and the social world the 
person is engaged in. Often events, such as a grief experience, disturb or disrupt the 
ideas and practices of a narrative storyline, in which case a storyline may change or a 
new storyline may emerge (Neimeyer, 1998). The new or changed storyline then 
(re)constrncts how events are understood and responded to. Frank (2005a) tenns this 
understanding "thinking with stories, as opposed to thinking about stories" (p.3) 
(emphasis in text). Narrative storylines therefore are cultural constrnctions; they are 
not fixed or unchangeable cognitive strnctures separate and distinct from the social 
world. 
The interplay between a person and the social world occurs as the discursive subject 
positions made available to the person within any given moment, construct what the 
person, as subject, can take up and reproduce. At the same time, the narrative 
storylines of the person constrncts his engagement with events, the how and why he 
responds the way he does to the subject positions made available to him by discourse. 
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But in this engagement, new storying occurs, which can affinn or challenge existing 
storylines. This understanding of self, as involving both narrative and discursive 
actions, resonates somewhere between the "thicker individual/thinner social 
relational" and the "thick social relational" typologies on Smith and Sparkes (2008b) 
continuum for viewing narrative identities and selves. The mid-point in Smith and 
Sparkes' (2008) typology continuum is the "thicker individual / thilmer social 
relational" view, which they name as the "the storied resource". In this typology, 
"while narratives are personal, they are thoroughly shaped by socio-cultural 
conventions" (p.17). A more discursive category of identity within the continuum is 
"the dialogic" typology, which is when "culture [is] 'speaking itself' through the 
stories people tell" (p.20). The most discursive view of identity on the continuum, is 
the "performative perspective" where "nmTatives, selves, identities, mental processes, 
emotions and so on is derived from social and relational processes ... realized as a by-
product of relatedness ... [and] are viewed as multiple, fragmentary, unfinished, 
always changing" (p.24). 
In telms of how nmTative and discursive views of the selfwere called on and brought-
together in the analysis the participants' account-making, a three layered approach 
was used. The first analysis guide relates to the "storied resource" typology, where 
"individuals draw fi'om a cultural repertoire of available stories larger than 
themselves that they then assemble into personal stories" (p. J 9). The second analysis 
guide was discursive in orientation, theorising the participants' accounts on the basis 
of their moment by moment response to subject positions and how position calls were 
accepted or resisted: the "performative perspective" typology. The third analysis 
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guide combined aspects of the first and second analysis guides, and as such more 
depicted the practice of "the dialogic" typology. 1 
In the "performance perspective" and "the dialogic" typologies, narrative storylines 
are viewed as dialogic acts. Stories are told to an audience, even if that audience is 
oneself, and both the teller and the audience are taking up discursive subject positions 
in respect of how each tells and responds to the telling. Stories, therefore, as 
individual nalTative reproductions of discursive ideas and practices, intersect with the 
listener's or reader's narratives "creat[ing] a space that truly is liminal: neither here 
nor there, but between the teller's here and the listener's there ... stories work by 
effecting shifts in listeners' parmnount reality" (emphasis in text) (Frank, 2005a, 
p.18). In addition then to nalTatives ordering and constructing experiences (Bruner, 
1986), stories are the medium by which we can learn about others' experiences and 
the social/cultural/political discursive constructions that have produced them. As the 
medium by which we learn about others' experiences, stories contain dralna. They 
often provoke and challenge our sense of reality, in effect changing our own 
narratives (Frank, 2005a; Mattingly, 1998). 
When people are deeply in plight, what they have as their perhaps last, 
perhaps best resource is a capacity to tell their story. The least that 
might be expected from those of us for whom plight is still over there, 
still a background to our lives, is to hear their stories. We may also 
need to send food, medicines, and tools for rebuilding, but first we 
have to be willing to hear the story. (Frank, 2005a, p.20) 
1 Further details of the analysis processes used in this study are discussed later in this chapter. 
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Stories require engagement by another. As a counsellor I am aware of this, but 
qualitative research also provides a context for people to tell their story and be heard, 
for "what cannot be said cannot be acted upon ... what is inarticulate cannot be 
protested and changed" (Frank, 2004a, p.437). Furthennore, even in a person telling 
her or his story, it is not only her or his personal story for "no one existence is ever 
clearly bounded ... each voice is permeated with the voice of others" (Frank, 2005b, 
p.969). One person's story about having an illness or impainnent is greater than that 
person's life, it is a site of encounter for coming to further understanding about 
disablement, beyond the realm of that one person's narratives. 
Developing understanding about society through the study of people's stori es is not a 
neutral or objective process but a subjective co-production between the research 
participants and the researcher (Burr, 2003). Narrative research focuses on the 
"discovery of meanings that both constitute the individual participant and are co-
constructed in the research process" (Josselson, Lieblich & McAdams, 2003, p. 259). 
On this basis, the discovery of meanings that the participant holds about his or her life 
are not "gathered" but "'generated" (Crocket, 2002). My expectation was that the 
participants' stories would help me gain an understanding of how they understood 
and accounted for some of the events they had experienced, but that the account-
making they did with me would also be a response to how they viewed me and my 
research. The interview process whilst sometimes referred to as a dialogue between 
the researcher and the participants, also contains a power relation that privileges the 
researcher's priorities, objectives and process over the participant's interests and 
commitments. "The qualitative research interview entails a hierarchical relationship 
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with an asymmetrical power distribution of interviewer and interviewee. It is a one-
way dialogue, an instrumental and indirect conversation, where the interviewer 
upholds a monopoly of interpretation" (Kvale, 2006, p.484). 
Given the value of researching disabled people's stories but the problematic 
"asymmetrical power relation of the interview" (Kvale, 2006, p.484), some 
uncertainty remained for me in regard to how to investigate, interpret and wlite about 
what the participants have said in their conversations with me. Such uncertainty is 
common in narrative research data generation and analysis for "clear accounts of how 
to analyse the data ... are rare .. [with] no overall rules about suitable materials or 
modes of investigation, or the best level at which to study stories" (Squire et al., 
2008, p.l). Frank has argued that clinicians and researchers might listen for his 
typologies of restitution, chaos and quest narratives as a means of providing a 
thematic framework, as otherwise "a story can be easily dismissed as a one-off 
occurrence, a sad tale that has little claim on the listener" (Frank, 2004b, p.2!!). 
Other narrative tropes in addition to Frank's triad have previously been proposed. 
These include Gergen's (1991) "progressive", "regressive" and "stability" narratives 
or Frye's (1990) "comedy", "romance", "tragedy", "irony and satire" narratives. 
However, none of these narrative typologies were likely to provide the focus and 
detail I required in my hope of researching the discursive concept of agency, in 
relation to disablement, through an analysis of how discursive subject positions 
became available and were negotiated in the moment by the participants. In 
questioning and analysing velY specifically for narrative themes or tropes, there was a 
risk of presupposing what the participants' stories wonld tell, thereby losing the 
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particularity, complexity and richness of the narrative stories (Riessman, 2008). 
Squire, Andrews and Tamboukou (2008) have articulated well why people commit to 
narrative research when the process itself is not necessarily well sign-posted with 
clear maps for the process: 
Despite these [investigation and analysis] difficulties, many of us who 
work with narratives want to continue to develop this work. Most 
often, perhaps, we frame our research in tenns of narrative because we 
believe by doing so we are able to bring them into useful dialogue 
with each other, and to understand more about individual and social 
change. By focusing on narratives, we are able to investigate not just 
how stories are structured and the ways in which they work, but also 
who produces them and by what means; the mechanisms by which 
they are consumed; and how narratives are silenced, and even explain 
important aspects of the world. 
(Squire, Andrews & Tamboukou, 2008, p.1-2) 
Narrative research certainly suited my purposes for this study, especially my interest 
in making sense of people's storylines and understanding more about individual and 
social change. However, fi'om a discursive perspective, the focus is less "who" 
produces stories but rather how discourse produces the stories we tell, which become 
the narratives that frame what subject positions we take up and how we take them up. 
In order to research how this process works, in this study I also engage in a critical 
analysis of discourse by employing the concepts of position calls, subject positions 
and agency to participants' stories and accounts of experience. 
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Discursive analysis of position calls, subject positions and agency 
Clitical analysis of discourse is a fonn of social critique because it looks for 
explanations of people's experiences and actions as the product of social, cultural and 
historical contexts (Burr, 2003). It is well suited to the emancipatory agenda of 
Disability Studies. 
In Chapter Three, using the example of a disabled person going swimming (page 71), 
I showed how position calls work in practice, producing the subject. I gave an 
example of the swimmer accepting the subject position ofbeing helped, in tenns of 
disability by swinnning, and I gave a counter example of the swimmer refusing the 
position call, stating that the meaning of swimming for him was about "being like 
everyone else, swimming for fun and recreation". I then suggested that the 
acceptance of the position call illustrated the swimmer reproducing medical discourse 
in tenns of disability, whereas the example of refusing the position call demonstrated 
the swimmer reproducing social model discourse. In reproducing medical discourse, 
a subjectivity is produced that involves the person wanting to get well, to engage with 
rehabilitation and medicine. In reproducing social model discourse, a subjectivity is 
produced that involves the person viewing social barriers as what disables him, not 
his illness or impainnent. In regard to these processes of subjectification, Drewery 
stated: 
Once we understand how different fonns of subjective experience 
are produced, it seems to me we have a responsibility to move 
forward to thinking about what fonns of subjectivity would be 
preferred, and how different ways of speaking produce more or 
less preferred subjectivities. (2005, p.306) 
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Understanding what form of subjectivity is preferred will depend on the degree to 
which it is possible for the person to take up a position of presence within a 
discursive expectation or position call. If, for example, the swimmer is rehabilitating 
well, then accepting the pool attendant's position call may serve him well. On the 
other hand, if the swimmer only finds a position of absence in the expectation of 
swimming helping him to get better, then the preferable subject position is likely to 
be refusing the pool attendant's position call. Taking up a subject position within 
social model diseourse will enable the swimmer to refuse the medical discourse 
position call of "swimming will help a lot", but it may not be the only discourse 
which offers a subject position of resistance to the pool attendant's position call to the 
swimmer. It is not necessarily obvious and requires deconstruction to establish what 
subject positions are preferred and how different ways of speaking may produce more 
or less preferred subject positions for a person living with illness or impainnent. 
In the scenario of the swimmer and the pool attendant, the swimmer has been 
portrayed as taking up only one discursive subject position at anyone time but the 
person as subject is less rigid than this and is always in a process of change: 
The new subject is theorized as fluid, fi'agmented, with more open 
boundaries (Davies, 2000), as co-existing with texts in which it is 
constituted, texts in which contradictions can be embraced (Cixous & 
Derrida, 200 I), as texts that one can play with, and, through that play, 
generate new possibilities of being (Barthes, 1977). (Davies et aI., 
2006, p.88) 
In other words, it might well be that the swimmer's subjectivities are not a simple 
representation of either medical discourse or social model discourse. The subject 
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positions the swimmer takes up each day, including each moment, might well be 
some kind of intersection between a number of discursive possibilities, some of 
which could contradict one another. The swimmer might easily be swimming to get 
better, taking up medical discourse, and with a statement about having the right to 
swim and have access to swimming like non-impaired persons, taking up social 
model discourse. Hence, whilst Disability Studies has traditionally positioned the 
social model in contestation against the medical model, and established each as 
opposites of one another, both discourses might be considered as co-existing and co-
shaping within a subject's subjectivities. And it is these kinds of narrative 
contradictions, the juxtaposition of multiple positionings and selves (White, 2007), 
that has been of interest to me as a nan-ative therapist which I wished to also explore 
in this study. Furthermore, the swimmer is not just discursively "constituted by 
multiple discourses [but] a subject who is in process, a verb rather than a noun, a 
subject with boundaries permeated by others, by discourse, a subject identical with 
the text through which it is being constituted" (Davies et aI., 2006, p.93). Both the 
swimmer and the pool attendant are constituted by the experience of each other; their 
engagement with each other is a discursive and nan-ative performance, which 
potentially produces new discursive and nan·ative perfonnances. The possibility of 
new discursive and nan-ative productions by either (or both) the swimmer and the 
pool attendant come through each person's later storying of the encounter with each 
other, as well as in the moment ofthe encounter. As they tell stories about the 
encounter (to self and others), each person's narratives will be reconstructed, which 
in tum will shape how they respond to future position calls. Davies refers to this as 
"mo(ve)ment", signify[ing] the simultaneity ofspecitlc embodicd moments and the 
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movement toward the subject as a process that can come about through the mode of 
telling" (emphasis in text) (Davies et aI., 2006, p.92). It was my hope that this 
research would deconstruct both the "embodied moments" and the corresponding 
"mo(ve )ment" that had occurred for the participants through the processes of their 
discursive sense-making and storying of experience - those "moments" when new 
narrative and discursive subject positions had been taken up, or were even being 
taken up - through their experience of participating in this research. 
The process of deconstruction, as introduced in Chapter Three, is a process that 
reveals how discourses produce subjects (Davies et a!., 2006). I wanted to hear the 
participants' stories with a discursive ear that showed how discourse constructed the 
subject positions they took up but also showed the moments of agentic action, when 
they resisted position calls that had positioned them in disadvantage. The point of 
such deconstruction, is that when the process of subjectification is made visible to the 
subject, the person is no longer the "subjected subject" (Drewery, Winslade & Monk, 
2000). Davies et aI. (2006) call this "decomposition[:] the name we might give to 
subjective movement through which we umnoor our embodied selves from the 
discourses we have worked deconstructively to make them unthinkable" (p.99). On 
these terms, the UPIAS group experienced this "subjective movement" when they 
made medical discourse "unthinkable" by their reframing of what caused disability, 
namely social barriers not impainnent. Similarly, I hope that this study's 
deconstruction of disabled people's stories and accounts of their lives generates new 
understandings about disabled people's narratives, impacting on how we theorise the 
discursive production of disablement. Hearing the participants' stories was critical 
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for achieving these understandings because "life continues to unfold in the account of 
it, and the account making is, in that sense, always a new event, a new experience" 
(Davies & Davies, 2007, p.1141). Given my agenda ofresearching agency in the 
lives of disabled people, I was espeeially seeking to inquire about moments or events 
when "habitual ways of thinking are dislodged, are pulled out from under" (Davies et 
at., 2006, p.99). 
However, the inquiry process by which to achieve a deconstructive discursive reading 
of the participants' narratives appeared no clearer than the data generating process for 
narrative research for "as any kind of text may be made a subject of deconstruction, 
there are no specific requirements for interviewing ... [there is] no worked out 
practice of deconstructivist interviewing" (Kvale & Brinkmmm, 2009, p.232). In 
practice, I drew on the kinds of inquiry processes that I had learned as a narrative 
therapist. I now discuss in more detail the interview and analysis processes I engaged 
in for this study. 
The Research Process 
There were three aspects of the research process. First, a plan of inquiry that enabled 
me to engage with the participants' stories and accounts about their lives. Second, a 
critical discursive analysis of the participants' accounts of their experiences, 
particularly in regm-d to what discursive subject positions have been available to the 
pmiicipants to take up, the effects on their lives of taking up those subject positions, 
and to explore the extent to which the pmiicipants took up subject positions which 
indicated actions of agency. Third, develop a view of the study as a discursive co-
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production between myself as researcher and the participants of the study. The power 
relations and corresponding subject positions made available to the participants in the 
process of participating in the study, needed to be made visible and considered in 
light of the analysis I was making of the participants' stories and accounts of their 
lives. 
Accessing participants 
Six people who self-identified as having an illness, long-term health problem, 
impainnent or a disability, were interviewed. In my invitation to participants, the 
wording of each description for disability was deliberate in that it was assumed that 
the very way each participant viewed their body/mind status would reflect the 
respective discursive production they were caught up in. Those persons who had 
taken up social model understandings of disability would be likely to see themselves 
as 'having an impairment', and a disability only if their impainnent needs were not 
accommodated. If the participant took up the meanings inherent within the minority 
group model of disability, they may perceive themselves 'a disabled person', an 
identity description distinguishing them from non-disabled persons. On the other 
hand, those persons who were less involved in the disability movement and had taken 
up a construction of themselves as unwell were more a production of medical 
discourse and as such were more likely to see themselves as 'having an illness or 
long-term health problem'. Other people might view themselves as 'a person with a 
disability', which was the languaging of disability during the 1980-1990s when the 
normalisationlSRV philosophy of disability was quite dominant and influential, 
especially taken up by non-disabled people advocating for and working with disabled 
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people. Having said this, while each participant had probably taken up one dominant 
discursive subjection, they were also likely to have been produced by some 
combination of more than one discourse. Indeed, the degree to which this was or not 
the case was of interest to me as part of the study's exploration. 
The study was promoted through posters at a small tertiary education institute, where 
I work, that stated: 
• Are you interested in being part of a collaborative project about 
disability? 
• Do you have experiences of disabling social stOlies? 
• Do you have experiences of standing up to disabling social 
stories? 
• If you have answered 'yes' to any of these questions then you may be 
interested in participating with J ames Arkwright in his doctoral research 
project. 
Three students from the small tertiary education institute made up a "convenience 
group" (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2001) as they were selected for the study on 
their ability to be available for the time required for the interviews and their level of 
interest in the study. I interviewed each participant on two separate occasions, with 
each interview being up to one and a half hours in length. A further three people 
from elsewhere in New Zealand were selected by me from my personal and 
professional knowledge of the disability field in New Zealand, and invited to 
participate in the study. Those three p31ticipants were "purposively" selected on the 
basis of being prominent within the disability field and/or their profession (Cohen et 
a!., 2001). In making this selection I assumed that community, if not nationwide, 
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prominence may indicate that the individual had negotiated moments of agency in 
their lives. The three people whom I approached to participate in the study accepted 
my invitation. 
Ethical considerations and process 
Prior to the study commencing, an ethics application for the study was submitted to 
the University ofWaikato, Faculty of Education Ethics Committee. The committee 
approved the study as a supervised postgraduate research project. 
The ethics application detailed how the participants would fill out and sign an 
infonned consent foml (see Appendix I). Within the consent fonn it stated that all 
infomlation about the participants gained from the research would be kept strictly 
confidential and the pmiicipants would remain anonymous within the thesis, other 
public documents and public presentations, unless someone specifically requested 
that she or he did not want to remain anonymous. In writing the thesis, it becmne 
clear that it would be challenging to keep the identity of one of the pmicipant's 
anonymous. After consultation with my supervisors, it was decided that I would 
contact the participant to talk about my writing of their account in the thesis and the 
challenge of ensuring that the person would not be identified as one of the 
participants in the research. The participant replied that everything that had been told 
to me during the interviews was "on public record anyway" and that in this person's 
high profile role "it comes with the job that people write about me; it is fine with me, 
Jmnes." In writing my account of what the pmicipmlt said to me during the 
interviews, I have still endeavoured to protect the participant's identity as much as 
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possible given the constraints of keeping the account appropriately specific to the 
social contexts that are a critical part of the person's story. 
Part of the ethics application explored the potential for harm to the participants. Of 
concern was my dual role with the participants. Three of the participants were 
envisaged to be students at the tertiary education institute where I worked, and the 
other participants I would have had, to varying degrees, a relationship with them prior 
to their involvement in the study. The ethics application outlined several steps I 
would take as an attempt to reduce the extent to which participants might feel 
vulnerable or experience harm as a result of becoming involved in the study. First, 
no students who were currently studying in the courses I taught would be able to 
participate in the study. Second, with each participant I would discuss the nature of 
my dual role with them, what vulnerabilities this might bring forward for them and 
what would they need to know from me or have so as to feel less vulnerable2• Third, 
my letter of introduction to the participants outlining the purpose of the study, and the 
consent fonns, clearly outlined that participants could withdraw from the research at 
any time should they choose to do so. Fomih, a clear complaints process, should a 
pmiicipant wish to make a complaint about any part of the research process, was 
outlined to pmiicipants within my letter of introduction to the participants and the 
consent fonns, and the complaint process was also discussed during the first 
interview. 
2 Further details on aspects of my conversations with the participant.") about my dual role vrith them, as 
in my knowing them beyond the context of the researcher - participant relationship, are discussed in 
Chapter Eight when I review the researcher - participant power relation 
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An ethic of collaboration and respect was prioritised in the ethics application. All 
participants were infonned at the beginning of their involvement in the study that 
they would receive: a letter of introduction about the research and a consent fonn, 
copies ofhislher interview transcript (for review), copy of my analysis of their 
interview with me (for review), a summary of the final research report, and a copy of 
any resultant ariicle/presentation from the study up to 2 years after the study was 
completed. The participants were also informed that the thesis, when completed, 
would be held as a public document in the University ofWaikato library. 
Finally, due to the study being conducted by myself as a lecturer at the tertiary 
education institute where 1 worked and involved three students studying at the 
institute, the institute required that I submit a research ethics application to the 
research ethics committee at the institute. This ethics application was undertaken and 
was approved by the committee. 
Engagement with the participants and the interviews 
All six potential participants received a letter from me, infonning them about the 
study, and preparing them for being a participant in the study. In the letter, I asked 
each person before the first interview to: 
Reflect on experiences when you think an idea or a practice has 
positioned you in ways that meant you had to reflect on how to 
respond, either at the time or after the event. I am very interested in 
hearing your stories about these times. 
(extracted from first letter to participants - see Appendix 2) 
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Examples were then given regarding a wide range of responses that a person with an 
impailment or illness might have to a situation in which a disabled person was 
subjected to a pejorative and exclusionary position call (see Appendix 2). When the 
interviews began, each participant had appeared to understand the scenarios pOlirayed 
in the introductory letter and had been reflecting on experiences which had some kind 
of parallel or link from their life to the examples I discussed in my letter. 
In order to maximise the opportunity for a dialogic encounter between myself and the 
participants, I followed an infonnal, unstructured ethnographic interview process 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2001). My initial letter was the starting point for the 
interview. In keeping with a. narrative research interview, I asked questions that 
invited the participants to tell stories about and give accounts of their lives. I also 
asked questions that invited the participants to think about interactions with people or 
situations that they had found difficult, to make sense of what was difficult for them, 
and how they responded in those times. In these stories I was listening for and asking 
about the ways in which they had been positioned by discourse, as well as the 
discursive subject positions they took up in their responses to the positioning they had 
found difficult. I was interested in how they made sense of these experiences, 
notably the assumptions and nonns that produced them. 
I prepared questions for the interviews in advance, not to be used in a structnred way 
during the interview process but in order to provide something of a background 
practice template for the inquiries, a practice that is consistent with narrative research 
methodology: 
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I tell [the students 1 that a well constructed interview guide prepares 
them to be open to a wide range of stories their interviewees may tell, 
and it helps them know what in general they want to hear about. But 
once they are prepared in this way, inviting and listening well to this 
person's particular story should be their main goal. Many of their 
interview questions will be answered without even being asked. 
(Chase, 2003, p.83-84) 
A sample of some of the questions I crafted prior to the interviews are listed below: 
• What might be some of the things which stand behind you 
deciding to participate in this research project? 
• It is my idea to research the concept of agency as it relates to 
disabled people's lives. What do you know about the concept of 
agency? What would you like to know about the concept of 
agency? 
• I wonder ifI shared a story of agency operating in my life if that 
would he helpful in terms of orientating us in this discussion? 
• As you have heard that story, has it connected to any st0l1es of 
your own for you? 
• If so, can you share those stories with me? 
• Could we discuss now about some of the ways you have been 
positioned because of your disability? 
• How did the positioning influence what you felt, thought or did? 
• What might support you or has supported you in the past to resist 
that positioning which you don't like? 
(extracted from the full version - see Appendix 3): 
In preparing these questions I was particularly interested in taking into account the 
power relation of the research process; how the researcher and research participants 
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are respectively positioned in relation to each other. I wanted to position myself as 
interested in their views, their stories and their accounts of resistance to 
disadvantageous position calls, as a person who might have similar stories and 
subjective experiences. Reflecting on my position as researcher has been important 
because within Disability Studies there has been discussion about research dis-
empowering disabled people further, primarily benefiting the researcher rather than 
participants or the collective of which the participants are a part (Barnes, 1996; 
Oliver, 1999). In response to this criticism that research in the disability field has 
taken advantage of disabled people, I have had an ethical commitment to work 
collaboratively and respectfully with the participants, as detailed in the ethics section 
of this chapter. 
In the interviews, I endeavoured to ask mostly open ended questions and reflect and 
clarify what the person had told me in a similar way to having a counselling 
conversation with a person (client). Reflecting statements, clarifying questions and 
open ended questions are conversational skills often used by counsellors to generate 
rapport and explore the person's thoughts and feelings (Davis & Buskist, 2008). As a 
narrative therapist, I place an emphasis on using the person's (client's) own language 
and to ask questions that focus on their meaning-making (Bird, 2004; White, 2007). 
An impOliant skill is to ask questions that are connected to what the person had just 
said to me. Such questions can draw out more of the story the person is telling, 
exploring the meaning-making that accounted for how she has storied experience the 
way she has. In the interviews I paid particular attention to those words and phrases 
the participants used which appeared to indicate a discursive subject position they had 
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been positioned by or had been invited to accept. For example, one participant said 
''I'm sort of one that doesn't like to use the words 'unweIl' or 'sick' because I don't 
actuaIly know what determines sickness for me. So sometimes I just think 'not firing 
on all four cylinders' or eight or twelve or whatever". My question in response to 
this statement was "do you have any ideas about the preference for the words 'not 
firing on all four cylinders' as opposed to not saying 'sickness' or 'illness'?" My 
intent in asking this question was to see how the person accounted for her refusal to 
take up the subject position of being iII or sick. 
After the first interview I sent the transcript to each participant for her or him to 
review, and I enclosed a letter. The letter began with a general statement that was 
very similar for all the participants: 
It is my belief that eonversations are never neutral or remain in a 
vacuum but continue to act in our lives both during and after a 
conversation has OCCUlTed. Therefore, I would like to suggest that we 
begin our next conversation by reflecting on any thoughts you have 
had since our last conversation together. For example, perhaps you 
have considered some aspect of our conversation further or maybe 
some paJi of the transcript has stood out as interesting or significant to 
you. (extracted fi'om second letter to participants - see Appendix 4) 
After this general statement, I wrote some very specific questions in relation to the 
first interview I had had with the pmiicipant. TypicaIly I was curious to know a little 
more about what the story suggested about her or his narrative storylines and the 
subject positions taken up in the production of such nan·atives. These questions 
served to alert the participant to the kinds of accounts of experience and sense-
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making I was interested in hearing more about in the second interview. For example, 
in the letter to one participant I said: 
On a number of occasions you said you "were working on it" or 
"it's a work in progress" in relation to finding ways of disclosing 
the effects of illness in your life without being positioned as "less 
than". The word "work" indicates intentionality to me as in being 
proactive rather than reactive and I'm wondering if the word 
"work/working" has the same meaning for you? I am interested in 
uncovering the thinking and activities that go along with the word 
"work" for you, such as the history and effects of "working at 
things" or things being "a work in progress" in your life. And of 
course, I'm interested in what the thinking and activities of "work" 
have meant for how you have responded to the effects of illness in 
your life. 
(extracted fi·O!TI letter to Carole - see Appendix 5) 
In posing the above questions, I was hoping to gain more understanding of the 
person's narrative responses to how her illness positioned her. In the second 
interview, I explored what discursive ideas she took up in her refusal to be positioned 
as "less than". 
In other letters, I deliberately invited the participant to consider what discursive 
assumptions they had reproduced or had refused. For example, for another 
participant I asked questions in the letter that invited him to explore his views about 
being referred to as "whose is that?" by a senior doctor when he was in hospital as a 
child: 
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What do you think [name of Doctor 1 words "whose is that?" might 
indicate about how children were positioned within pediatric 
hospital wards prior to 1969? 
Would you refer to a child as "whose is that?" now that you are an 
adult? If so, why? If not, why not? 
(extracted from letter to Ron - see appendix 6) 
The rationale for the letters I wrote to the participants between the first and second 
interview was based on my knowledge and use of narrative therapy "therapeutic 
letters and documents" which are designed to thicken the person's (client's) 
alternative and preferred storying of experience (White & Epston, 1991). And whilst 
the research letters were not intended to be therapeutic in themselves but more a 
process for furthering my understanding about the way the participant had been 
constituted by discourse, in effect they often did appear to support the person in 
taking up a preferred account of their life. For example, one person, at the start of the 
second interview said: 
Something that I did find interesting was that how strong the family 
discourses were. I hadn't even picked them up or recognized them 
before we talked so that was really really good for me... it was 
interesting to see how many strengths my family did have and a lot of it 
was actually in my very younger years .. I think it's helped me 
understand my mother and my family a bit more. 
For some of the participants, prior to the second interview, I drew what I referred to 
as a 'discursive map' as a way of wondering about the relationship between their 
stories and accounts and the discourses which produced them (see Appendix 10). 
The purpose of the map was to orientate me to asking specific questions which might 
lead to the generation of more understanding about the discursive position calls 
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experienced and the subject positions taken up by the participants. The second 
interviews were again informal and unstructured. In the second interviews I again 
sought to clarify and understand more about the specific meanings the participant had 
made in relation to how they had stOlled experience. For example, in the second 
interview with another participant I was cUll0us to know more about these subject 
positions that were available to him in the early years of his life: 
Q: What do you mean by that - 'honouring the impainnent?' 
Q: How have you concluded that because people ran to the finish line 
together with you at a cross counh·y race and because people passed 
you their pencils when you ran out of your own, how has that led 
you to conclude that your impairment itself was likeable and 
intriguing? 
At the conclusion of the second interview with the six participants I had many stories 
and accounts to make sense of in regard to my topic of interest, namely the narrative 
and discursive production of disabled people's lives, including their actions of 
agency. The next step was to develop some processes that would help in this task of 
analysis. The analysis of the interview transcripts was explored through three 
separate interpretation guides that I developed as a means for providing different sets 
oflens by which to understand the participants' accounts. 
The analysis of the interviews 
Initially, in seeking a way to analyse the data, I followed an approach similar to 
grounded theory, where "the researcher simultaneously codes and analyzes data in 
order to develop concepts. By continually comparing specific incidents in the data, 
100 
the researcher refines these concepts, and integrates them into a coherent theory" 
(Taylor & Bogdan, 1988, p. 137). Nan-ative researchers, Chase (2003) and Riessman 
(1993) suggested looking for narrative themes in the participants' stories, first coding 
the different kinds of content discussed, and then categorising the codes into broad 
groupings. Accordingly, I explored the participants' accounts in light of what they 
had indicated as important and meaningful to them and what that suggested about the 
discursive subjections available to them. A number of categories and codes were 
developed as a grid for interpreting the transcripts, such as the following: 
Table 3: First analysis gnide (extracted from the full version see Appendix 7) 
Discursive Categories Narrative Thematic codes 
Medical Discourse Receiving medical treatment 
Becoming less ill or impaired 
Feeling less than/a failure 
Disability Rights Discourse Refusing to be less than 
Disability caused by society 
Disabled and proud 
Desiring to make a difference for other disabled 
people 
Normalisation / SRV Discourses Career/work is very important 
Social roles are valued 
Feels there is a place for herlhim in society 
Family/ Whanau Discourses Relationships and family are important 
Faith/Spiritual Discourses Faith and spirituality support individual 
I Feeling blamed for not being healed 
The categories and codes were very helpful for establishing the common ground 
between the participaJlts' accounts, but there were two problems with this approach. 
First, the distinctiveness of each person's nanatives was being lost; and second, the 
relationship between the codes and categOlles did not match very well with discourse 
theory ideas about fluid, fragmented and multiple selves. The categOlles and codes 
becaJne too reductionist, creating simplistic connections between a discourse and 
subjective experience. For eXaJllple, all "less than" thoughts/feelings/actions were 
101 
viewed as produced by medical discourse because that discourse typically produces 
illness and impainnent as abnonnal, as in need of fixing. However, to collapse all 
"less than" or failure experiences as a product of medical discourse is problematic. A 
finer discursive reading of participants' stories was required. FUlihermore, the 
category and code analysis was not providing very clear understanding about the 
participants' processes of agency, the focus of my research. As Carr (1997, pp. 98-
99) has said, "what is at issue in interpretive studies is the relationship between the 
data and the theory, the concepts, the conceptual framework or the model", and these 
relationships between my conceptual framework and the analysis of interviews were 
not being achieved by the first guide I employed. 
I therefore turned to a much more discursive analytic process. I focused on four 
aspects of discourse theory. These were: position calls; participants' responses to 
position calls; the extent to which a participant took up multiple positions as a 
discourse user; the effects of the research process on researcher and participants. I 
also considered the degree of synchronicity between narrative therapy and narrative 
research. I crafted a series of open ended questions with the intention that they would 
form a kind of template by which I could make sense of the participants' accounts of 
their lives. I asked, for example: 
• What were the position calls that the participants were invited 
into? 
• How are they called into existence for the different participants? 
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• What are the effects of these position calls on participants in 
telms of the participants' (and their friends/family) concrete 
actions and meaning making? 
• What were the participants' responses to these position calls? 
• What were critical moments or sites of resistance to discursive 
position calls, examples of refusing to take them up as a 
singular disabled identity? 
• What were the effects of the research process on making visible 
the practices of agency? 
• To what extent is the research process, itself a discursive 
practice, acting as an agent of change for participants thereby 
enabling them to experience moments of agency? 
(extracted from the full version - see Appendix 8) 
This second guide was especially useful for producing an analysis of the interviews 
that related to the study's focus on agency. However, this approach also had its own 
problems. The participants' narratives were not maintained and their stories became 
Ji"agmcnted, as the analysis prioritised a deconstruction of the participants' accounts 
according to positioning theory. Such results seemed to contradict the philosophy of 
narrative research and therapy, which understands story as the mode of operation that 
produces experience. Given that I do take up this idea, it did not make sense to lose 
the sense of each pm1icipant's story within the discursive reading of the interview 
transcripts. 
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I then developed a third analytic process, one that could build on the narrative themes 
established in the first guide and include the coneepts of nalTative within the 
discursive analysis of the second guide. The new analysis remained concerned with 
discourse, positioning, subjectivity, agency and power relations but made room for 
the participant's storying of experience. The questions I asked in this third lens or 
layer of analysis were designed to read the participants' accounts as narrative and 
discursive performances. The questions kept mueh of the content material of the 
second guide but extended the questions to include the concept of story. For 
example, I asked: 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about 
the discursive position calls they have been historically invited 
into? 
• What subject positions did the paliicipants take up and what 
storylines did these subject positions make available for living 
their lives? 
(extracted from the full version - see Appendix 9) 
The advantage of this third approach to analysis was that it paid attention to three 
aspects at once. Firstly, it maintained some coherence of each person's story and 
account; secondly, it allowed for some thematic common ground between the 
participants' accounts; alld thirdly, it focused on the detail of the shaping effects of 
language, and on moments of agency. Having said that, each of the three processes 
of analysis was useful as lens by which I made interpretations and came to make 
sense of the participants' accounts of their experiences. 
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The next three chapters offer my discursive and narrative reading of the participants' 
interviews, shaped by each layer of analysis. In this chapter, I have already drawn on 
small aspects ofthe data generated from my interviews as I illustrate the methods I 
employed. I turn now to a fuller introduction of the participants prior to my 
theorising of their accounts in the remaining chapters. 
Introducing the participants 
All of the participants described their ethnicity as either New Zealand European or 
New Zealand Pakeha. One of the limitations of the study was that nobody of a non-
white ethnicity participated in the study. Of the six participants, three were women 
and three were men. With some reserve, I have decided to name what each person's 
illness or impainnent is but I am very aware that I am taking up medical discourse in 
committing to such a practice. Given that impainnent or illness is the only parameter 
by which people could be eligible to participate in the study, it does make sense to 
discuss, albeit briefly, each participant's respective illness or impairment. However, 
given the inevitable disadvantageous positioning that occurs whenever a person is 
identified as being ill, impaired or disabled, it is in itself quite problematic to 
introduce participants on the basis of their body status according to medical tenns. I 
ask the reader to hold the medical description of each person lightly, and to look 
forward to my telling of each person's accouuts as they respectively uufold in the 
next three chapters. In order to help protect each participant's identity, the names 
used for each participant are pseudonyms. 
105 
Chapter Five features David's story. He was born with an impairment that affected 
his movement and speech, in which a story of discrimination dominated his life for 
many years until some very particular experiences enabled him to develop a counter 
understanding of himself and his life. Chapter Six explores Fay and John's stOlies of 
turning illness and impairment into an opportunity for new life directions. Fay had 
experienced rheumatoid arthritis (RA) for over ten years and John lost his sight 
through trauma some twenty years earlier. Chapter Seven looks at how Carole, Jan 
and Ron took up a "less than" subject position on the account of having an illness or 
impainllent but how they also were active in using discourse to refuse such 
positioning. Carole had for several years been living with systemic lupus 
erythematosus (SLE). Jan had for over ten years experienced significant medical 
conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure and as result had 
developed a significant hearing impainllent. Ron was born with some body 
defOlmities for which, during his childhood, he had many surgical reconstructions; he 
had a significant hearing impainllent and a life long journey with speech impainllent. 
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INTO, THROUGH AND BEYOND DEFICIT DISCOURSE: 5 DAVID RE-NEGOTIATES HIS PARENTS' LEGACY 
The stories David told about his life constructed him as having an "ever-fresh" 
childhood, while his teenage years were "stinky and dark". The discourses which 
constructed David's experiences during his childhood, where he was included and his 
impainnent was accommodated, were very different than the discourses he was 
subjected to during his teenage years when he was positioned in deficit. In this 
chapter, I detail David's account of his journey from being told by his parents he had 
"nothing wrong with him", to experiences of being excluded and feeling "disdained" 
after the age often, to his re-description of what it meant for him to be termed "a 
spastic". 
In this account of David's account-making, I especially focus on exploring the deficit 
position calls that David was subjected to and took up, and the events which occurred 
that led to David accessing subject positions that did not position him in deficit, and 
did enable him to act with agency. In his actions of agency, David re-negotiated his 
parents' refusal to subject him to medical discourse. David took up a different 
version of "having nothing wrong with him" - which was his parents' legacy to him-
instead, David engaged with the idea that he was "a spastic with attitude"; a person 
with an impairment who would resist those practices that marginalised and excluded 
him. 
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Having briefly overviewed David's journey of 'into, through and beyond discourses 
that positioned him in deficit', I now turn to explore his account more fully, 
beginning with his childhood when he enjoyed practices of inclusion. 
Early Years: The practice of "hanging ont" with friends 
David said that plior to ten years of age, he had not thought of himself as having an 
impairment or disability, or being disabled. He viewed himself more as "a guy that 
was uncoordinated" and "wobbly". David attributed these non-medical descriptions 
of himself to the influence of his parents, especially his mother, who he said "would 
never, period, ever talk about my impairment, ever". David's mother refused the 
position call within medical discourse to understand David as having an impairment 
and being disabled, which David said related to her own disabling experiences: 
My Mum has polio ... and she was in an iron lung and she's haunted by 
stt!!f .. she used to associate anything to do with disability with her 
own bad experiences and she was vigilant about me, you know. I didn '/ 
know I had {type of impairment}, I didn't know it was called {that} 
until I was 21, they would say to me it's a co-ordination problem. 
The "co-ordination problem" description given to David by his parents to explain his 
impainnent, worked well for him dming his childhood. It was a subject position 
which constructed him as being like other children but likely to have difficulties with 
physical activities. This way of understanding David's impairment meant he enjoyed 
"a lot of interactivity and interdependence". In speaking about his primary school 
years, David selected stories that gave an account of him being included and 
receiving help from his friends regarding his physical needs. For example, he said 
"people saw that I needed a new pencil. .. so they would slip their pencils onto my 
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desk". David's friends also accommodated his impairment when he participated in 
sport, such as when running cross-country. He said, "I would be the slowest. .. but 
everyone would run at my pace so we'd all come in together". 
David referred to the quality of relationship he had enjoyed with his friends to 
account for the sense of inclusion he expelienced during his early years at school. He 
said, "they wanted to belong with me and 1 wanted to belong with them, so any 
barrier that came up, we just dismantled it fairly unconsciously because the sole 
desire was to maintain connection, unification and hang out together". In describing 
this experience of "belonging" David drew on the metaphor of 'family', saying "we 
were kind of like brothers". He al so took care to distinguish the relationship of 
mutual belonging he had with his friends as being different from people having 
empathy for him: 
The word 'empathy' is a bit too clinical, they would somehow have a 
connection to where I was at... like we would walk home together 
and there were often many ways to walk home, but we intuitively 
would take an easy way to walk home because they knew that I was 
having trouble with hills. 
The word "connection" represented more inclusion for David than the description 
"empathy". It positions David as an equal rather than someone who required 
empathy from otllers. David's "connection" with his friends was like that found 
within families and as such, any impairment-related needs he had were "intuitively" 
dismantled. 
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David was unsure about what informed the "intuition" which guided how he and his 
friends undertook activities together. In considering this story, I wondered if there 
was a process whereby David's friends learned what he was able and not able to do, 
perhaps by watching him or by talking together about what they were doing. 
Regardless, David and his friends became aware that he could not walk up and down 
hills easily when going to school, and somehow, whether over time or almost 
immediately, they chose to walk the easy way home because that was less difficult for 
David. 
In describing the relationship he had with his childhood friends, David said "they 
valued me, they desired my company and participation ... my continning co-operation 
and participation was cherished". The discursive ideas David and his friends were 
taking up were those that esteemed the practices of "connection", "co-operation", 
"negotiation" and "interdependence" and any "block" that prevented that from 
happening was '''dismantled''. David and his friends appeared to have not taken up 
any ideas that restricted disabled people from "connecting" to others and working 
together in an "interdependent" way. 
David desclibed the way his friends related to him and accommodated his impainnent 
as "functionalistic" and "naturalistic". David was passionate about the importance of 
replicating what he had experienced as a child. He said, "disabled people with non-
disabled people, chetishing one another, honouring the impairment, honoming the 
impairn1ent!. .. seeing it [the impainnent] as valuable and likeable and kind of 
intriguing". In other words, not only were David's-impainnent related needs met 
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within his social circle but his point of difference was engaged with as something 
valuable. In referring to his childhood relationships, David said 
They did recognise] was different and there was a lot of talk about it 
but in a neutral way. No, not in a derogatory or you're worse off kind 
of way ... we would often talk about how] moved and how] did things 
but it was more from the perspective of that's the way you do it and 
how are we gonna work out how to etc ... it was from that perspective, 
not a, oh you're in deftcit kind of thing. 
In selecting such stories to tell of his childhood, where he experienced a strong sense 
of "belonging" with his peers, David was promoting an idea and practice of how 
people "without impainnents" and those "with impairments" could interact with one 
another. David's parents refused to describe him as having an impairment or being 
disabled; these positive childhood experiences of David's were presumably the social 
legacy they had endeavored to create for David. A boy with an impainnent who was 
not storied as disabled; a boy with an impainnent who felt he belonged, who viewed 
himself as likeable and valuable. Until the age of ten, David had been protected from 
any understandings and practices that would disable him. He had been offered only 
subject positions that interpreted the functional effects of his impainnent as being 
about him having differences but not being positioned as disabled or in deficit 
because of those differences. 
Teenage Years: Positioned as "the spastic" 
The position calls that David was subjected to dramatically changed once he became 
ten years of age. One particular memory stood out for him as a turning point. He 
said it began as a playground "tussle" between him and his best friend but escalated 
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to name calling when his friend called him a "spastic" and then other children joined 
in and also called him "spastic" and "retard." David said until that moment, he had 
never heard the word "spastic" before. The effect on him he said was "like a staple in 
my heart, it felt like a staple gun through my chest". David said he got np and said 
"no way" he was "not a spastic", he was "no different" but then they called him "a 
liar". David said the group by then had "circled" him and one child said "you don't 
belong with us anymore David, you belong in an institution". He also recalled his 
fiiend throwing him to the ground and when he tried to stand up and hit back, he said 
another boy hit him back to the grouud. David finished the story by saying that after 
being "hit down" he "stayed down". 
The event was extremely traumatic for David because he was no longer constituted as 
belonging and accepted. Previously David's friends and peers had taken up discourse 
that produced them to value and prioritise "connection" with David but on this day 
they took up a competing discourse, one that had them objectifying David as 'other' 
to themselves. Critical in this telling is how David had no knowledge that his "co-
ordination problems" and "wobbles" could call him into a position of being termed a 
"spastic" and a "retard", thereby categorising him as no longer being one ofthe 
group, but someone who should live in an institution. However, David's friends and 
peers, or at least some of them, were already familiar with discourse which positioned 
pejoratively people who had an impairment and on this occasion they shifted from 
merely thinking such ideas about David as 'other' to them, to performing actions that 
reproduced those ideas in practice. Any engagement with the notion of impairment 
was always likely to be problematic for David because of the extent to which medical 
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discourse as the constructing knowledge of impainnent denounces it as a derivative, 
non-preferred embodiment. 
In thinking about embodiment, if "subjecthood is granted ... in recognition of the co-
existence of oneself with the text. .. the sense that there is no fixed referent existing 
outside the text. We are the story happening to us, we are 'freewheeling in language' 
(Barthes, 1977: 56)" (Davies et ai., 2006, p.96), then the story of who we are in any 
given moment is dependent on the discourse that is being taken up (in that moment) 
in the construction of us. And unfortunately for David, as he neared his teenage 
years, the discursive text by which his friends and peers were 'reading' him was 
changing, which meant the story of who he was, was also changing. David's account 
illustrates how "the subject is always vulnerable to the possibility that the terms of its 
conferred existence might be disrupted by the withholding of recognition, or some 
kind of sudden break in the certainty of belonging (Davies et ai., 200 I, 2002)" 
(Davies et aI., 2006, p.96). David's friends and peers, in taking up ideas about what it 
meant to have an impainnent on the tenns of disablist discourses, namely to be 
constructed as "spastic" and "retard", were no longer 'recognising' David as one of 
them. They had a new story of David as not having belonging with them. Moreover, 
the speed of occurrence and force by which David was exposed to the knowledge that 
he 'was' a "spastic" and "retard", was especially positioning for him. Untortunately, 
David had no alternative discursive understanding by which to resist the group's 
meaning-making of him, even if only a silent protest in his own thinking. David's 
only possible defense, that he knew at that point in time, was his parents' construction 
of him that there was "nothing wrong" with him but when he voiced this 
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understanding that "no way" was he "a spastic", they called him "a liar" and "hit him 
to the ground". At that moment, David's parents' discourse, which constructed 
David in non-disablist ways, was subjugated and silenced. The dominant discursive 
understanding of David was no longer that he was valued, instead he was 'other'. 
In re-telling his story, David was aware of the subjectification process that had 
occurred in the playground that day, the labeling of him as "spastic" and "retard" 
which he then took up, owned and reproduced as a subjectivity (Davies et aI., 2006). 
He referred to the experience as a "gateway ... my birth into this new world of dual 
identity and disability". David now had a sense of who he was according to two very 
different discourses, firstly, his parents wishing to position him in the presence of 
health, as someone who had "nothing wrong with him", and secondly, his peers 
taking up a construction that positioned him in the absence of health, physical and 
mental, as someone who was "a spastic". The impact oftl1is discursive conflict on 
David was that he became confused and unsure as to which position call he should 
take up: 
I'd get confilsed 'cos my parents were telling me you know, you've just 
got a co-ordination problem, there's nothing wrong with you, and yet at 
school they were calling me mental, retard, spastic and cripple, and so 1 
became really confused about what was the truth. 
Despite the competing subject positions, the 'truth' of medical discourse dominated. 
David said he was shifted from someone who felt "valuable" and "likeable" to 
somebody who was "ugly", "abhorrent", "disgusting" and "disdained". In discussing 
this shift, David identified three contextual changes that he thought contributed to 
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him becoming increasingly positioned as a person who was different from and less 
acceptable than his peers. He identified these as the introduction in class of testing 
and grading; an increasingly competitive enviromnent in the classroom and on the 
sports field; and being eligible for special needs or specialist disability services. 
Achievement within the domains of the classroom and sport are key indicators of 
success within the majority of New Zealand schools. David's athletic and academic 
perfonnances were well beyond the margins of what was considered nonnal and 
acceptable. For example, he said that by the age often, "exams came into the system 
and I started to get 9-10% ... and the teachers became to speculate that I was retarded". 
Later, at secondary school, David's peers were no longer running the cross-country 
race at his pace, as they did in his early years of schooling when they all finished the 
race as a group so as to accommodate David's capability. Instead, David said "it was 
so competitive and nasty and cut throat that everyone's gone home and they're 
pulling down the track and I'm still running the fucking thing". The practice of 
competition, where each child is constructed in comparison with and measured 
against another, had significant effects for David. Not only was David clearly 
positioned to fail in compmison to all the other runners but it appeared there was no 
recognition of his effort in participating either. David re-iterated how different this 
was from his primary school years when completion was what mattered most. To 
emphasis this point, David told the story of how when he first went to school he 
participated in swimming races by doing "the whole length pulling myself along the 
railing and see ifI could beat them. I never could but I could reach the other end and 
they would celebrate [and] I would celebrate by being at the end with them". Here, 
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David highlighted his enjoyment at being able to celebrate his successful reaching the 
other end of the pool. The story presents how both persons 'with' and 'without' 
impairment can participate alongside one another, respecting each other's differences. 
David is not depicted as a failure or someone who does not belong. He succeeded on 
the tenns by which he could compete, that is, pulling himself along the railing. 
However, such opportunities for participation and inclusion became rarer for David 
as he progressed through his schooling. Segregation occurred once David received 
additional tutoring. He noted "the more support I got from disability resource, the 
more my friends hated me". David said his friends questioned why he needed 
disability resource support when previously they had helped him in the classroom. 
Hence, his position as 'other' was also a reproduction of special needs discourse. 
Being excluded was a COlmnon experience for David during his teenage years, which 
was well captured in the number of stories he told that showed how he had clearly 
been discriminated against because he had an impainnent. For example, David said 
p110r to ten years of age he and his friends would play around the swimming pool, 
often pushing each other in and laughing when they did that to each other. However, 
at a friend's eleventh birthday party, the boy whose birthday it was pushed David into 
the pool but this action was not responded to in the way it would usually have been 
with everyone laughing about it. Instead, the boy was reprimanded and sent him to 
his room for "push[ing) that handicapped boy in the pool". This particular incident 
positioned David as not being like the boy's other friends, with consequential effects 
on David's friendships from there on. He said, the party was: 
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One of my last birthday parties I ever went to ... my friends one by 
one deserted me... it was like a virus... and what really made me 
distraught, is it took just two years for the conversion to be complete 
and I'd basically lost most of my friends. 
David's image of the virus is apt because his friends had become infected with ideas 
about David being "a spastic" and "not belonging" with them. These ideas 
effectively prohibited the possibility of David continuing activities together with 
them and the sense of "connection" with his friends that he had grown up with. 
David's life became dominated by experiences of exclusion. On another occasion, 
David spoke of how his younger cousin had referred to him as "eating like a pig" and 
to David's shock his aunt did not correct her son by saying David did not eat like a 
pig. Instead, she said David "could not heJp it". In saying this, David's aunt may 
have been attempting to be supportive of David, implying that his impainnent 
precluded him from needing to submit to the same standard oftable manners as other 
children. However, David did not interpret the comment as supportive. He "thought 
'what! I can't help eating like a pig? (laughter), you bitch! (laughter). I expected her 
to say 'no he doesn't eat like a pig', you know, to validate me ... the way I act and 
that sort of thing". In his response, David was positioning himself as the same as his 
cousins - they did not eat like a pig and neither did he - as in the nan·ative fostered by 
his parents, namely that he had "nothing wrong with him." 
When people treated David on the basis that he did have something wrong with him, 
that he was not like other people, then the understandings David had of himself were 
in dispute. People could potentially be well meaning toward David but if they 
offered position calls that invited him into a subject position of being different and 
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less than other people, then it was an assault on his narrative of only having a "co-
ordination problem" and some "wobbles." One case in point, was when David was 
twelve years of age. His fonn teacher, whom David introduced as a "magnanimous" 
and "kindly" man, attempted to explain about David's impairment to the class but it 
only served to emphasis David's difference: 
1 remember one morning, my teacher, out of compassion, he said 
"now 1 want to share some ideas about David David can you come 
up?" He starts off, he said, "1 want you to know that David is a 
spastic". He said it with good intentions, but 1 ran out of the room. 1 
was so hurt and humiliated 1 ran out of the room to my reader person 
who taught me to read and 1 cried and cried and cried. Now, he was 
trying to educate the kids but 1 mean the word "spastic" was like a 
staple gun in my heart, it was a punchy kind of word, punchy. 
David's hurt and humiliation related to how he had been positioned. Nobody else 
was called to the front of the class, with their point of difference being explained by 
the teacher, only David. All other children, irrespective of ethnicity, gender, size, age 
or ability were positioned as 'the norm', whereas David was positioned as 'outside 
the norm', his impairment needing to be explained. When this happened, school was 
not safe for David, and he experienced this event as ifhe had been shot through his 
heati by a staple-gun. David also spoke of another experience at school when a 
teacher's words positioned him as being different. He remembered the teacher saying 
"this is a psychiatric thing David, your body's ... it's a psychiatric thing, you might 
have to go to a mental ward". In reflecting on this experience, David said "I was told 
that when I was ten and a half] Imagine my fucking honor leading to ten'or, I was 
terrorised and the thought of an institution would send me stim." "Horror" and 
"terror" are strong words. They illustrate how much fear David felt about the 
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prospect of having to live in an institution but perhaps the ultimate act of exclusion 
perpetrated against David was when a slightly older boy said to him "you should have 
been aborted". The idea being privileged in this statement is that people with 
impainnents are not entitled to life. It is this very eugenic notion that disability 
rights' campaigners have advocated against, especially in regard to the detection and 
tennination of human fetuses with birth defects (Rock, 1996). Unfortunately, only 
later in his life was David introduced to disability rights. At the time this childhood 
event occulTed, David had no alternative discursive understanding about the value of 
his life, which would position him and others supporting him to advocate against the 
abortion of disabled people. 
Of course, it is hard not to imagine David's parents challenging abortion on the 
grounds ofimpainnent, but their denial to David of his impainnent meant David had 
no tenns by which to make sense of his differences. All he knew was that his life had 
ilTevocably changed and it was a very painful experience. He said, 
I mean, as a ten-year-old boy [ didn't even know what was going 
on ... all [knew was that my heart in my chest would ache. [remember 
having these real chest aches, heart aches, physical aches because 
everything seemed /0 be being ripped apart and [couldn't ... when [felt 
it, it was like a ripping apart of my citizenship, my identity, of how I 
had found myself, I mean, I'd found in myself, and now as [ was 
growing and building a skyscraper of identity, now it was the ... the 
foundation was being ripped apart and it was like .luck' I, I had no 
idea'. 
David's words were that he had "no idea". Indeed, he had no subject position 
available that would enable him to story people's actions toward him as prejudicial 
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and discriminatory, and in the absence of such a position he was blaming himself for 
other people's negative responses to him. He said he kept "coming back to blaming 
my character, I always came back to that, 'oh you're a bad ... it must be because 
you're evil, or it must be because you're nasty, or it must be because they can see that 
you're sinister or selfish". These ideas remained with David for many years, for 
which he went to psychotherapy as means of "weeding the weeds out of my 
character". And even many years later, David was still unsure as to why he was so 
ostracised during his teenage years. He said "as intelligent as I am, and as 
articulate .. J don't know [why there could not have been] a continuation of what I 
had at ten?" 
The effect on David of continually being excluded and positioned as different fi'om 
others during his teenage years, was that he stopped taking up subject positions in 
which his contribution was legitimate and valued. Rather, he developed a practice of 
giving up competing, thereby accentuating his experience of exclusion: 
I struggled at school ... I didn't have any typewriters so I struggled 
through school and I would just turn up and listen.. and after a while 
to be honest with you, I was too frightened to compete, it was like I 
started to self-exclude you know what I mean, 1 started to think 1 
don't want to compete, what if Ifail, if I fail then I am a retard. You 
know like 1 started to self-exclude ... do things like that. 
Hence, the boy who pulled himself along the rail so as to "try and beat them" became 
the boy who did not compete because he was frightened of failing. Failing, fear of 
failing, no longer trying to compete, and losing his fiiends, became the new narrative 
in David's life, which was very different from the earlier story-line of having fiiends, 
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doing activities with his friends, and being helped by his friends. David had been 
treated as different from other people and so he took up that subject position of being 
different. He became aware of how he "had different social experiences ... different 
public reactions [and] had lots of uneasiness around [him]"; and subsequently 
concluded he had a "mental problem". 
Teenage Years: The sUb.iectivity of "rebel" 
In being subjected to a psychiatric construction of his life, David said he began to act 
in the image of someone who was "mental": 
I started to swear a lot more and I remember writing 'fuck you' and 
passing it to someone and the teacher got it and he read it and I got 
on detention. So the only two words, you know if it was three words 
I wouldn't have had enough coordination to write it, but the only 
two words I write and he has to .find it. You're suspended, not 
suspended, you're detention. It's interesting, I use the word 'fuck' at 
10 and I used it because I felt disdained and I grew to feel disgusted 
about myself It was like a stain and I still didn't really get it. I 
thought they were angry at me because I had a fault in my character. 
I still didn't really identifY with my impairment at that time and 
because I didn't, I got the message that they were doing this because 
they found somethingfaulty in my character. 
Marginalised by his friends, failing at school and believing he had something faulty 
with his character, David began engaging with others who were also disdained. He 
said: 
The only friends that I maintained were the rebels, the trouble 
makers, the ones that were outside of'the rules. I started doing 
really rebellious stuff, you know and that would serve me and my 
need to belong but at the same time they were calling me mental ... 
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oh look he's mental 'cos he's broken a window or he '5 doing this 
or ... 
David was disobeying the rules, which furthered his construction of being outside 
dominant social norms. First, he was the "spastic" boy, then he was the boy with 
psychiatric problems, the "mad" child, and now he had become the 'bad' student. 
However, in taking up the subject position of "'rebel", David was positioned in the 
presence of the '''rebel'' discursive expectation, which did provide some new 
narrative opportunities for him: 
1 was suspended from this private school, big scandal, you know. And 
it was all about being creative and it was all about using your 
imagination. 1 mean we would build elaborate labyrinths in the out-o.f 
bounds bush. It was about using your imagination, it was about 
expressing anger. 
According to this account, David was able to succeed as a "rebel". He could get into 
trouble well, he could be imaginative in his rule breaking and he could perform anger 
well. Davies et al. (2002) drawing on Butler's (1997, p.45-46) theory of subjection, 
have noted that, 
Where one might expect submission to consist in a yielding to an 
extemally imposed dominant order, and to be marked by a loss of 
control and mastery, it is paradoxically marked by mastery itself; the 
lived simultaneity of submission as mastery, and mastery as 
submission, is the condition of possibility for the subject itself. 
(p.168) 
By both submitting to and mastering the practice of rebellion, David enacted a subject 
position that created a new possibility for him. For the first time since the playground 
incident where he had been called disablist names and hit by his peers, David was 
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able to take up a position where he had an agency in his position of marginalisation 
for he had a place of inclusion within the "rebel" group. Davies et al. (2000, p.26) 
have referred to this as the "dual nature of subjection" where, 
The speaking/writing subject can go beyond the intentions of powerful 
others and beyond the meanings of the discourses through which they 
are subjected while necessarily and at the same time being dependent 
on their successful subjection for becoming someone who can 
speak/write meaningfully and convincingly beyond the tenns of their 
subjection. 
(Davies et aI., 2000, p.26) 
The many interactions that produced David as the marginalised, excluded subject 
meant he was no longer able to occupy the subject position of being valued, 
connected and liked within the discursive practice that subjected him as a "spastic". 
However, in being subjected to this position of 'other', David spoke and acted in 
ways that went beyond the tenns of that subjection. His new subject position of the 
marginalised rebel made it possible for him to own, resist and critique the discourse 
that produced him as "other." As such, he said, 
In my teens when I started to get angry you know what they'd say. Oh 
you're angry 'cos you're a spastic, you know. So then it flipped 
around, oh you're angry 'cos of your impairment, oh you're angry 
'cos you were born that way, oh you're angry 'cos you can't deal with 
your wobbles. And I'd say I'm not angry, I'm angry because you're a 
pack of fuckers. 
David refused the invitation to view his anger as a sign that he had not coped with his 
impainnent, preferring to understand it as his response to how he has been treated. 
David's opposition to people's interpretation and assessment of him continued the 
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new narrative of him being a "rebel", a story-line which gave him a position by which 
to confront others. Such confrontation, though, only continued to invite David to be 
more subjected to the gaze of psychiatric discourse. By the age of twenty one he had 
been assessed as having a psychiatric diagnosis, which only confirmed the story for 
him that he was "'mental"; 
Imagine how horrified I was finding out that I had regular depressions 
and they called it bi-polar 2 and they reckon that it's 'cos I've had 
some hard times you know. But imagine my horror because I've grown 
up with people calling me mental. So imagine that. 
The construction of having a mental illness fmthered David's sense of disparity 
between the early years of his life before he was ten years old and how his life 
changed after this age. He said, "when I was a kid it was all ever-fresh and a 
wonderful environment and then it became just smelly, stinky and dark". David's 
images of "smelly, stinky and dark" captured how the deficit constructions of him as 
a spastic, mental, retard and cripple became the reality of who he was and how he 
experienced life. For example, despite never having been fonnaIIy assessed as 
having an intellectual impainnent or having ever been referred to live in a group 
home for people with intellectual imp ailment, when David left school he 
"volunteered to live in an IHe home for four months". 
Teenage Years: Practices of "finding comfort" and "connection" 
For David, the discrimination and marginalisation he experienced after the age often 
had led him to feel like "a foreigner in my home land, a refugee, an outcast, a 
scapegoat". He said, "the thought of going to school each morning after thirteen was 
quite scary, horrific, really uncomfortable ". However, his teenage journey with 
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sexuality became a comfort for him in the loneliness and fear of expeliencing such 
exclusion. He said: 
I did feel very traumatised and very discomforted and it was the start 
of my looking for comfort and issues around sexuality. It started after 
being so uncomfortable up until thirteen, Fom ten to thirteen, then 
when I found fourteen, sexuality was my comfort and I started to 
explore my sexuality to comfort myself I remember waiting for the bus 
and women would walk down the street and I noticed that their 
breasts, that they would bounce when they walked down the street past 
my bus stop and I kind of liked looking at their breasts and it gave me 
some kind of enjoyment, some kind of comfort every time I looked at 
their breasts. And at the time as I was in such discomfort and then 
when I noticed that they had bras on, so I became fascinated with 
bras, so I'd see on the clothesline ... you know ... bras and I'd say wow! 
So I wanted to touch the bra ... you know ... I used to think the bra was 
silky and soft, so there's a softness against my skin and I'd put it 
against my cheek and it would feel soft, the silk of the bra and so here, 
I felt comfort and then I remember my brother had a room which I 
loved poking into and because he had all this illicit stuff around. He 
had this book called the "Little Red Schoolbook" and I was going 
through it and I got up to this page and I remember not seeing this 
word before, it was called 'masturbation '. It was very practical ... that 
was my first masturbation session in my brother's room, reading this 
ftlcking' Little Red Schoolbook' and then I thought, 'my god! thaI 
pleasure is so great, it's a bit like the silk of the bra - it's soft and 
pleasurable' ... you know ... so that was my journey into comfort 
again ... and I found myself when I hurt, masturbating a lot ... so it was 
the way I cornforted myself. .. 
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From David's account, sexual experiences became his first means by which he was 
able make a difference for himself when he felt in emotional pain due to the 
stigmatising subject positions he was constantly being called into. 
By the time David was eighteen he had not been able to "follow in his brother's 
footsteps and have a girlfriend". He began to see women sex workers, which 
continued the nanative of sexual pleasure providing him with comfort. David said he 
tended to see one sex worker once a week for three years: 
J was kind of honest enough about connection. making a connection. 
so sometimes we would cuddle and talk ... a lot of times we would 
cuddle and talk and talk about our dreams and there was a lot of, you 
know. just feeling connected and so it wasn't just having an orgasm. J 
mean, that was part of it. but it was more about feeling connected 
again, and feeling comforted, and feeling cherished, and kind ofwarm, 
andfeeling her breasts on my chest. that kind of thing. 
Seeing a sex worker enabled David to re-experience connection again, a practice he 
had enjoyed prior to the age of ten and not dissimilar to him becoming part of the 
rebel group at schoo!. As a result, David was able to reproduce the social expeliences 
from his earlier years, namely inclusion, connection, comfort and creativity. Through 
the experience of seeing sex workers, David's confidence in his sexuality and relating 
to women grew. He said: 
Well J noticed that up until [18 years of age} when I was with a 
woman I was very anxious and uptight and nervous but when I started 
exploring myself with escorts, even though there were rules. even 
though it was one hour and J was paying for it ... so I didn't become 
disillusioned, I noticed that then in my day to day life I became more 
comfortable with women. J didn't get so nervous or anxious in their 
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presence. I could sit with a woman and kind of just get to know them 
as people. 
David said he met his first girlfriend at twenty-one years of age. In this occurring 
some years after his brother entered into a relationship with a girl, David concluded 
that his pathway to sex and relationships was very different for him compared with 
his brother's journey with relationships. The subject positions available to David in 
respect to being involved in boyfliend-girlfriend relationships were limited by the 
power relations present within dominant disabling discourses, in which David 
expelienced "much social uneasiness around [him]" and being told "you don't belong 
with us." On the tenns of dominant teenage discourses, David was not constructed as 
an acceptable friend, much less as a boyfriend. However, discourse theory would 
suggest other subject positions would have been available for David to take up that 
did not position him so unfavourably. The "subject who could eclipse the conditions 
of its own emergence; [who] eclipses power with power ... the subject emerges both 
as the effect of a plior power and as the condition of possibility for a radically 
conditioned form of agency (Butler, 1997, p. 14)" (Davies et aI., 2000, pp. 206-207). 
The discursive conditions of David's sexual emergence were in respect of his 
construction as a "spastic", "retard" and so forth but he eclipsed t11ese conditions even 
in being constrained by the subject position of being constructed as "other". David's 
experiences of exclusion did not preclude him from looking at women's breasts, 
touching bras, masturbating and seeing sex workers, which for the most part sit 
outside monogamous relationship discourse. However, in taking up sexual practices 
on the fringe of monogamous relationship discourse, David found a place by which to 
resist those position calls that constructed him as 'other'. In oilier words, subject 
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positions within monogamous relationship discourse were not available to David but 
in enacting alternative sexual practices, David was able to challenge the prior power 
of those discourses that had originally marginalised him as 'other'. 
Challenging the power of those discourses that constructed him as 'other' was 
something of an unfolding story in David's life from his mid teenage years onward. 
There were a number of critical moments in which David took up agency which 
tended to have an accumulative effect of enabling him to refuse those position calls 
that constructed him as 'other'. For example, David said that his mother would say to 
him, "David, the right woman will corne along for you, the right woman will come 
along, she might not have two good legs or two good arms but the right woman will 
corne along". David said he loved the first part of the statement, '''the right woman 
will corne along" but said he hated the second half of the statement "she might not 
have two good legs or two good arms, but she'll come along". In recounting this 
story, David said, "I hated that [second] side of the sentence, so I always cut her off 
[but] the first half of the sentence had so much promise to it. .. (laughter)". David had 
not verbalised his refusal of the position call but in tenns of his own meaning-making 
he resisted the idea that his partner might have to be disabled like him. In taking up 
this position, David was calling on ideas of disability rights discourse. He was 
asserting his right to not be prejudiced against because of his impainnent and 
therefore be entitled to have a 'non-disabled' partner, but in taking up this position he 
also legitimated the practice of discrimination against disabled people; in effect, 
refusing himself as a disabled person. David has been constructed by medical 
discourse to desire a non-disabled partner, but in accepting this position call he is 
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participating in the very same disabling practice he is taking exception to. At the 
same time as being subjected by medical discourse, David is taking up disability 
rights discourse in refusing to be positioned by medical discourse as not eligible for a 
non-disabled partner on account of him having an impairment. In this example, 
medical and disability rights discourse are not clear compartmentalised separate 
practices, but co-exist and contradict each other within David's one response of 
refusing to accept his mother's statement that his partner "might not have two good 
legs or two good arms". 
On other occasions, when David refused a deficit subject position, the position calls 
were less discursively complex. When David's cousin said he ate like a pig, as 
recounted earlier in this chapter, David expected his aunt to say "no he doesn't eat 
like a pig" but when she didn't, David said, "I thought, 'no I'm not going to accept 
that!' ... (laughter) ... ". On other occasions, David resisted the position calls created 
by people who reproduced medical ideas and practices: 
My mother had a friend whose son was training to be a 
physiotherapist and her son said "bring Dave down and we 'Il just 
work with him a little ". And it was thefirst time I'd been involved with 
medical stl1ff since I was born you know .... And so I went down and he 
evaluated me and then they checked my balance and I was thirteen ... 
they gave me an expectation list at the end of the evaluation and they 
said one thing, "given your balance don't try to ride a bike you know 
because it's just too dangerous. " And I said "well, what am I going to 
do?" And they said "well, you can bus. " I said "no, what am I gonna 
do with the bike outside 'cos I just rode here .from school!" (laughter) 
Yeah it was another realisation actually that what medical people say 
is not entirely what will happen. 
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In addition, when David was.a teenager overseas with his family, he had some 
experiences that contradicted and challenged the way he had been positioned in New 
Zealand. For example, one year when he was with his mother in Malaysia he 
received a very different response to his eating than he was used to; rather than his 
eating style being likened to how a pig ate, he was celebrated because his "messy 
eating" brought "great honour to the cook". After the cook had hugged David 
because of the honour David had brought him, David said he began to realise that 
what I was experiencing at school wasn't the absolute truth and so I 
had many experiences such as that when I travelled around the world 
that ... I started to get an inclination that what was happening at 
school was not the absolute truth of the matter ... I started to realise 
that other cultures had different ways of looking at me and that no one 
way was correct, that it was all independent of me, it wasn't me, it 
wasn't my fault. 
The more David had experiences in which he was positioned very differently from 
how he had been positioned at school, the more David was able to refuse the 'truth' 
of those discourses that positioned him as 'other'. A few months after the encounter 
with the cook in Malaysia, David had another very significant agency-producing 
interaction. He said: 
One day I was in town and Dad was doing business and J was getting 
a little bored and I was only about fifteen. He said "well look, go to 
the arcade but before you do take my briefcase down to the car ". So J 
took Dad·s ... I had his briefcase like this, and J walked down, and as 
you do when you're a kid you never go straight to the car. I looked in 
some of the shops you know, and I've got this briefcase and 1 noticed 
the shopkeeper would come right up to me and say "excuse me sir can 
J help you, would you like to buy something?" And up until then they 
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would say quite the opposite you know, they'd think I was dumb and it 
took me a while to figure out, it was this god-damn briefcase! And 
what I figured out was they thought well there are", in there, 
intelligent papers, so he can't be too retarded if he's got intelligent 
papers in his briefcase, he must be a businessman, And here again 
another key moment like the cook, it changed my thinking about hey, 
it's not me, it's their interpretation it's their perception and not more 
than that, much less than that, it's over a bloody fucking briefcase 
which is $11.50 in the shops, For $11,50 I can change my whole 
sociological worldfor $11.50"" so when J came to university I came 
with briefcase, I came with a god-damn briefcase and I would, even if 
I just had my lunch I would stick my fucking lunch in there and 
nothing else, And I did that right up till I was 26, I'd carry a fucking 
briefcase everywhere! That's the god-damn truth! 
The briefcase became a concrete metaphor for David taking up the new idea "hey, it's 
not me, it's their interpretation, it's their perception and not more than that", By 
holding a briefcase in hand, David was no longer • other' . In carrying a briefcase 
David was taking up another narrative for his life, of being successful and confident. 
He was returning to the kind of subject positions that his parents had first introduced 
him to when they said there was "nothing wrong with him", except that he first had to 
endure and negotiate past those discourses that constructed him as very much having 
something wrong with him. Constructed as 'other' by dominant discourse, David 
was positioned to engage with those also in the margins, such as the rebellious group 
at school and sex workers. By taking up these subject positions within "heyond the 
margins" discourses, David was able to refuse those position calls that constructed 
him as 'other' on account of his impairment. 
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DUling the years that David met with a woman sex worker, his relationship to the 
word "spastic" changed for him. Prior to this time he hated the word "spastic" as he 
said it felt like a staple gun in his heart but when the woman he had sex with called 
him "spastic" during love making, his relationship to the word changed: 
It took the power out of the language and I felt OK. It was okay to call 
me spastic when we were making love. 1 would sometimes hope that 
she would do that because I started feeling that that was OK. I was 
curious, actually wanting to connect with that word ... like intercourse 
is about the ultimate connection maybe so like before say 16, 15, it 
would flare me up with anger, if I heard the word spastic, I'd kick a 
wall in, or 1 was really angry about that word ... angered thefuck out of 
me but by the beginning of 21, someone would say 'oh you silly 
spastic' and it was kind of. .. it was kind of. .. I don't know if 1 ever liked 
it, but it was neutral, I didn't have any anger about it. 
David had undertaken what Butler (1997) has referred to as "embracing the injurious 
tenn [because] it constitutes [him] socially [and] only by occupying - being occupied 
by - that injUlious tenn can [he] resist and oppose it, recasting the power that 
constitutes [him] as the power [he] opposes" (p.104). David had taken up a social 
model understanding of himself, in which pejorative disablist labels are not rejected 
but invelied and purposely taken up as an identity marker of minority group plide 
(Crow, 1996). Once introduced to the idea that he could be a "spastic" but not be 
positioned detrimentally by that word but rather have it as defining feature of his 
point of difference, David began to use the word as a motivating force in his life. For 
example, he said: 
1 remember doing weight training .. .! was big on weight training and I 
remember pushing a bench-press, saying 'get that up youfucker get it 
up' ... you know what 1 mean? Because if you don't push that weight 
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and you don '( burn it... it would get me angry to push the 
weights ... 'push that weight you big bad spastic mother 
fucker' ... {laughterj ... it would wind me up to push that weight, you 
know ... [I was] a spastic with attitude! And ... and that attitude was 
rebellion ... I kind of owned the label now ... it didn '( own me, 1.owned 
it! 
David re-positioned himself in relation to the word spastic. It no longer held meaning 
for him as someone who "did not belong". Instead, he used his re-description of the 
word to represent and tell the story of how he had rebelled against those practices 
which positioned him in deficit. He had, to use Davies' (1991, p. 51) definition of 
agency, developed "a sense of oneself as one who can go beyond the given meanings 
in anyone discourse, and forge something new ... captur[ing[ a shift in consciousness 
that is begimling to occur, or through imagining not what is, but what might be" 
(emphasis in text). 
Later years: The new narrative of empowered and aware 
David's twenties became a period where he shifted from his father's mentoring of 
him into business, to his taking up a subject position within the disability 
movement where he engaged in disability advocacy work. He explained how an 
experience initiated and changed his thinking about what he wanted for his life: 
I started to read books on perception and I left the business and it 
broke my Dad's heart. I was importing stuff It was the late 80s and it 
was the thing to do, it was importing clock radios with TVs in them. 
We were quite wealthy and I was quite wealthy and I wanted to be a 
millionaire before I was 30. My Dad had financial goals jar me. And I 
got this import into the harbour ... and I got an order from a guy out at 
South Auckland. I got the TV and put it in the back of the van and got 
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out there and it was this guy with an intellectual disability and I went 
down this metal driveway and the place was really run down and 
really shabby. He said, "would you set it up in my bedroom ", and I 
said, "sure." And I went in and the carpet was threadbare and it 
changed my thinking because 1 went away wanting to, wanting a better 
world/or that guy. And that was the beginning 0/ me getting involved 
with disability issues. 
In this story, David is not positioned 'in deficit' but rather he takes up a subject 
position of assisting those who are positioned in disadvantageous ways. He was 
taking up the subject position of what WeingaIien (2003, pp. 18-19) has tenned the 
"compassionate witness", a person who chooses to engage with another's experience 
which in tum makes a positive difference. Weingmien (2000, 2003) named four 
witness positions: empowered and aware, empowered but unaware, disempowered 
but aware, disempowered and unaware. At the moment that David thought to himself 
that he "want[ ed] a better world for that guy" he was shifting to the empowered and 
aware position. He recognised how the person was positioned in disadvantage and 
his response was to try and make a difference for him and people like him. As the 
boy who had previously been bullied in the playground, David had experienced the 
disempowered aI1d unaware position. Later, he became the rebellious boy who called 
those who judged him "a bunch oHuckers", which was more the disempowered but 
aware position. Now, David was taking up the preferential position, that of the 
empowered and aware witness, responding with compassion to others, aware of his 
own favourable positioning. 
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In taking up the empowered and aware witness position, perhaps David was engaging 
and reproducing his own parents' legacy for him. They had been compassionate, 
empowered and aware witnesses to his experiences of disablement. David's mother 
well knew the disadvantageous position of being institutionalised as a disabled person 
and she chose to protect her son from any such experiences. David's father had 
groomed him to experience financial success. Perhaps he even deliberately gave his 
briefcase to his son to carry, hoping that it would create positive social reactions for 
him from other people, as something of an antidote to the stigma and bullying he was 
experiencing at sehool during that time. His mother, perhaps deliberately, chose to 
take David to a restaurant in Malaysia where she knew the response to David's 
"messy eating" would be positive and in so doing challenge the way he had been told 
he "ate like a pig" by his cousins. Without asking David's parents, it is not possible 
to detennine the extent to which David's parents sought to create these agency-
producing experiences for him. Regardless, on Weingmien's (2000, 2003) tenns, 
David's parents were empowered m1d aware of how David was positioned in deficit 
because of his impainnent. They had always refused to respond to him in ways that 
conceded to any discursive practice that positioned David to experience disadvantage. 
They offered him two discourses. First, a non-medical discursive understanding that 
constructed him as only having "a co-ordination problem" and "having nothing 
wrong with him". Second, a business discourse, having the opportunity of being 
"wealthy", with the respective options and possibilities that can occur through having 
money. Neither discourse offered David the subject position of being a disabled 
person making a difference for other disabled people, a career involved in disability 
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politics, theory, rights and advocacy. However, this is precisely the discursive 
practice David went on to take up. 
The disability rights advocate was a subject position that produced David as 
empowered and aware, no longer positioned in deficit. In many respects, this 
subjectivity of making a difference for other disabled people, was the legacy of 
confidence and success David's parents might have endeavoured to offer him, but 
their discursive construction was very different than which he went on to take up. By 
taking up disability rights ideas and practices, David was able to critique those 
discourses that positioned him, and others with impairments, in deficit. He was 
finally able to make sense of and dispute disablist disclimination. 
David's accounts are told from the perspective of someone who has come to 
understand how having an impairment positions a person to experience 
discrimination. He became knowledgeable of what supported him to experience 
subject positions of privilege versus disadvantage. For example, the experience of a 
relationship altered David's social experiences so there was less "uneasiness" around 
him. He said: 
Well people started to kind of .. it was interesting, people started to 
see how connected and accepted I was with [girlfriend] and so that 
would give them a prompting to accept me ... so relationship made me 
more acceptable in the community, they'd say, 'well if this girl, this 
non disabled girl, is living with me and loving me, then this guy must 
be okay'... 'you're okay, I'm okay, because you're okay with this 
girl' ... so it made me kind of more connected to the community again ... 
[The relationship] allowed me to go into circles and networks that I 
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normally was secluded from and 1 mean .. .! didn'l consciously say 
'yippee, she's my gateway to inclusion' ... it was just...!loved her and 
as a result, as a natural extension of that I was involved with her 
family, her whanau3, her networks, they got to 1010W me, they liked me 
and it blossomed ... 
However, the privileged position within discourse was not always available to David 
just because he was in a relationship. He did, however, learn to recognise when he 
was being constituted by disablism. For example, he said: 
[my girTjriendJ was Maori... and 1 remember this story ... together we 
walked into a ... cafe and there was a table right in front of us with two 
mature women there and the one mature woman looked at us and then 
quickly looked away, but then talked to the other one and said "don't 
look, but two ... two people just walked in and ... he must befi'om an 
institution and she must be his caregiver because she's a Maori girl 
and you don't see Maoris in this town and he's kind C!f crippled and he 
must be ... here with his caregiver and that's her" ... so we ... there was 
racism, ableism, biculturalism ... we had all this fucking coming at us, 
disableism .. .}ustfrom walking into a cafe and so .. .!t kind of just 
summed up that sometimes the reality was too truthful for people's 
stereotypes, so they would make out that she was the caregiver and I 
was the cripple. 
David's analysis shows how he has taken up the theorising of marginalisation 
processes, which equipped him to resist those very practices. 
3 Whanau = Family in Maori 
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Later years: The interplay of different stOl-ylines 
David's account is a powerful illustration of how discursive ideas and practices, as 
mediated by language, produce subjective experience and power relations. For much 
of David's early life, the subject positions available to him are only those which 
positioned him pejoratively, but as testimony to Foucault's thesis, alternative subject 
positions and storylines are also available for David. As David takes up the idea that 
how people treated him was just an interpretation, he is more and more able to refuse 
those discursive position calls which disability rights' discourse produced him to not 
like. Disability theorising becomes the meaning-making lens by which David gave 
an account of his life to me. 
The teenage storyline of "not belonging" and concluding there was "something wrong 
with my character" was still an active narrative for David, as evidenced by him 
continuing to seek psychotherapy as a means to "weed out the weeds in my 
character". The purpose of this David said, was to restore his life to that of his 
childhood years, when he felt "valued" and 'liked". These early narratives remained 
as something of an enigma for David, indicated by when he said "why could that 
have not continued?" They served as a driving force for David to escape "the dark 
stain" of exclusion that he suffered during his teenage years. In time, a new nan'ative 
emerged, which was the negotiation of his parents' discursive legacy to him. His 
engagement with disability rights, politics and theory, made it possible for David to 
take up his life as the politicised subject who advocates for social change against 
disablism. 
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THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE: FAY AND JOHN SHAPE 
INTENTIONAL IDENTITY CLAIMS 
This chapter explores how John and Fay made sense of their lives and their respective 
impainnents, reflecting on the different discursive subject positions they had each 
taken up and lived out since having an impainnent. 
Fay and John take up medical and/or rehabilitation discourse 
Fay and John did not experience impainnent until adulthood; their accounts 
suggested that they had come to understand quite quickly what their impainnent 
and/or illness was and what it would mean for their lives. Medical and rehabilitation 
discourses had constituted John and Fay to live their lives in very particular ways. 
After becoming blind, John engaged in the process of rehabilitation. The culture and 
practice of rehabilitation for persons with vision impainnent provided him with a 
social enviromnent, training, equipment, technology and a guide dog so he could 
develop skills in managing and succeeding as a blind person. In speaking about his 
life as a blind person, John used phrases such as "develop as a blind person", "it's my 
lifestyle", "it's part of who I am", "access and independence", "being one of the 
crowd", "walking alongside my blindness and not being led by it", "accept[ing] it 
[blindness]", "assimilat[ing] into other communities". John's language conveyed the 
ideals of what life, according to the nonns of rehabilitation discourse, could, or even 
should, be like for a blind person. The values and agenda of rehabilitation, 
nonnalisation and SRV that underpin the policy and practice of rehabilitation in 
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RNZFB were evident in the words that John used in his account -making about his 
experiences since becoming blind. 
Fay was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis (RA) as an adult. On the tenns 
constructed by medical discourse, she was positioned to adhere to the advice and 
medication prescribed by the medical professionals involved in her treatment, in 
order to manage and minimise the effects of RA on her life. When Fay described 
RA, she used language that embodied the diagnostic treatment model of medicine, 
which emphasises the importance oflessening and managing the effects of the 
disease: 
Having RA or being diagnosed with RA, what that means, it is a 
muscular skeletal disease and it affects the connective tissue that 
connects the muscle to the bone, and it affects your bones as well. 
Long term, if it's not treated properly or quickly enough, then you can 
get a reasonable amount of your body being out of control 'cos it's an 
auto immune disorder and once that happens, you get impaired 
function and the bones tend to sort of crumble away. Then there's 
impairment of movement and surgeries and things like that ... so [it's 
about] manag[ing] the disease's progress medically, physically and 
emotionally so that you can maintain an optimal wellbeing. 
In speaking about some of her understandings and experiences since havingRA, Fay 
often appeared to select stories that illustrated how she had been managing the effects 
ofRA on her medically, physically and emotionally. For example, in refelTing to the 
use of medication to manage RA's disease process, Fay said: "I've had it [RAJ for 
about ten years and we've [Fay and the rheumatologist whom she consults 1 really 
struggled to try and get it under control". Fay also discussed her cognitive and 
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emotional management of RA. She spoke of "not buying into unwellness". She said, 
"yes, I have patches of it [RAJ where it's not very nice but I have managed to get 
myself through those patches ... it's very rarely like that and I know that my thinking 
and attitude plays a big part in that". In this conversation, Fay is perfonning the 
subject of medical discourse, who has achieved well according to the tenns of the 
discourse. 
Fay, since being diagnosed with RA, had taken up medical discourse and John, when 
blind, had taken up rehabilitation, nonnalisation and SRV discourses. However, 
neither Fay, nor John's storying of experience was exclusively dominated by these 
discourses, for both had lived for over twenty years without having an impairment. 
Unlike David, John and Fay had not always been positioned beyond medical nonns, 
which meant to a certain extent they were able to call on those pre-impainnent non-
medical discursive ideas and practices in the ways they made meaning of experiences, 
and acted subsequent to having an impairment. 
Fay's refusal of the illness subject position 
Fay accepted a medical diagnosis of her body, in respect of what that indicated for 
her in anatomical tenns. However, in regard to what having RA meant for her 
, 
personally, Fay's account portrayed her as resisting RA impacting on her sense of 
identity. She said: 
There's a lot of fatigue associated with it [RAJ and a general sort of 
feeling of notfiring on all four. I'm sort fif one that doesn't like to use 
the words 'unwell' or 'sick' because 1 don't actually know what 
determines sickness for me. Sometimes I just think not firing on all four 
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cylinders or eight or twelve or whatever ... if I was to use the word 
'sickness' or 'feeling unwell' or feeling 'rotten' that sort of says to me 
that there's, that I'm actually sick and in my mind I'm not I'm sort of 
not admitting to that. 
Fay used the mechanical metaphor of "not firing on all four cylinders or eight or 
twelve" as a way of understanding her body that enabled her to take up a position 
against a deficit construction of sickness and illness. She actively shaped her identity 
by refusing the position call of illness because she did not want the physical impact of 
RA to prescribe who she was or how people related to her: 
I think emotionally I would tend to sort of slide into that mentality of 
being sick and what comes with that sometimes is a dependence or 
sometimes people start treating you dijJerent~y. Sometimes people even 
play on the fact that they're not well and for me it's very much not 
about that at all so I tend to have that way of thinking as opposed to 
falling into that sickness category. 
Fay's "way of thinking" was a refusal to "slide into" the disadvantage of being 
positioned in tbe absence of medical discourse's wellness ideal. She called on a non-
medical metaphor to re-position herself against the deficit subject position that occurs 
for people diagnosed with a progressive illness. 
When asked what infonned her resistance to "slid[ing] into the mentality of being 
sick", Fay responded by talking about her reaction to being diagnosed with RA. She 
said: 
I knew there was something in my mind seriously wrong because J 
couldn't account for the reason why my body was in the state that it 
was in, so to hear the diagnosis in one respect was a relief and I 
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started thinking, "good, what we can do about it?" so that] could get 
some relief 
Fay's sense of "relief" and proactive stance of "good, what can we do about it" are 
subject positions that, arguably, are produced by medical discourse's diagnostic 
treatment model. Medical practice involves making an assessment so as to be able 
provide effective treatment. Diagnosis of pathology is the first step to recovery within 
medicine. However, in addition to re-producing medical discourse in her proactive 
response to the diagnosis ofRA, Fay's reaction was also constructed by what she 
described as "a dominant story ... a deep understanding of myself as not failing". This 
narrative had begun in Fay's childhood. She said "there were lots of times of fear and 
unceliainty and not knowing what was happening, and not knowing ifthe decision I 
was making was right, [but] I pursued it anyway ... and it panned out that it was 
[right]". Fay said that because of these childhood experiences, she "had [over the 
course of her life] been successful [and] then instinctively I drew upon those skills to 
get me through having RA". 
John's identity claims of heing "a hard nut" and "a bloke on the ground" 
Like Fay, Jolm's pre-impairment nan'atives continued to shape how he understood his 
blindness and responded to becoming blind. In describing his growing-up years, John 
said "my life as a kid, it was bloody tough. I mean we never had a telephone, we 
never had a fridge ... my parents were divorced when it wasn't fancy to be divorced". 
In describing himself during his growing-up years and as a young man, John said, "I 
was a hard nut". When asked if, over twenty years later from living in a single-parent, 
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poor family, the sense of being "a hard nut" was still an active part of his life, John 
said: 
I'm more than happy to look across the table and say "no" and 1 do: 
"If we have to do it this way, let's talk through how we get to this point 
but this is where we need to be" ... so it [being a hard nut} does come 
through. You know I'm happy to say 'no '. 
John told other stories that illustrated how his sense of himself as "a hard nut" 
continued to construct how he engaged in his work as a "blind professional". For 
example, he said: 
Some people will sit down and write, they're wordsmiths but no, that's 
not me. 1 say that to my boss all the time, "look I'm not a wordsmith ", 
and she says "yes, you will" and 1 say "no you won't!". Over the last 
three years she's realised 1 ain't a wordsmith and so she doesn't ask 
me to write things anymore. For monthly reports, what she's done is 
set it up so it's a bloody table, so it's a template, and 1 just fill in the 
blanks!" 
John's story of himself of not being a "wordsmith" might, perhaps, have also been 
linked to his family and work background prior to his impairment. After he left 
school, Jolm said he "caught fish [as in he worked as a fisherman for his living and] 
played rugby". The working class discourse of the fishing industry, and the dominant 
male masculinity discourse of rugby, were likely to have supported his identity claim 
as "a hard nut", as well as produced the idea John had of himself as "a bloke on the 
ground". In another story John told, he profiled his sense of identity by defining who 
he was not: "I am not an academic, academics get right up my nose ... academics 
navel gaze all day, they just sit writing on bits of paper and get doctorates for it." [n 
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contrast to being an academic, John positioned himself as the "blind professional", 
who was "trying to make a difference ... hav[ing] a crack at changing society" by 
getting on "the soapbox with a megaphone." John's work often involved him 
undertaking public speaking in his role of raising disability awareness. The metaphor 
of being "on the soapbox with a megaphone" invokes a kind of union protest image, a 
reproduction of working class discourse and respectively; John's storying of himself 
as someone who was "part of the groundswell". In making the identity claims of 
being the "the blind professional", who was "having a crack at changing society", and 
in so doing was prepared to challenge others by "look[ing] across tbe table and 
say[ing] 'no", John told stories that positioned himself as knowledgeable and 
sometimes critical of rehabilitation and disability politics practices undertaken by 
others. For example, in referring to people naming 'disability awareness training" as 
"impact training", he said: "Impact training, I mean how wanky is that!? Look, it's 
awareness training and they talk about oppression of disabled people. I mean, hello, 
you're only oppressed because you let yourself be oppressed to some degree." In 
another illustration, John told the story of a rehabilitation instructor whom he thought 
had been overly sensitive to the feelings of the blind person he was training. In this 
story and others, John in his account-making, often appeared to be reproducing the 
ethic of working class discourse, such as being prepared to be direct and pragmatic in 
his approach with others. For example, in response to aspects of current blindness 
rehabilitation practice, John spoke of not being over-protective of people when they 
were rehabilitating. He said, "I often tell people, look, if a blind person wants a 
cigarette, put them at the other end of the house and they'll find a cigarette lighter in 
the kitchen all right!" 
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In their accounts, John and Fay recognised how their pre-impainnent narratives 
continued to shape how they storied themselves and acted after having an impainnent 
and/or illness. In addition, they both spoke of stories which suggested that they had 
developed new narratives since having an impainnent and/or illness. 
Fay negotiates new body/self narratives 
Rheumatoid arthtitis (RA) impacted Fay's sense of identity. Fay spoke of "doing a 
lot of physical activity and work" prior to having RA. Her initial response, she said, 
to having RA, was "trying to continue on with my lifestyle and trying to maintain who 
Fay was [because] I wasn't ready to change my identity". However, RA meant it was 
not possible for Fay to continne with her physical lifestyle. Unless she could recover 
from RA, successfully taking up the restitution narrative (Frank, 1995), Fay was 
positioned by medical discourse to experience a sense of loss. Fay had engaged with 
psychological theories of loss as a means by which to understand her experience of 
having RA. She stated that she had "gone thtough the whole grief cycle" because she 
was unable to experience "normal" health. In her account of what it had been like for 
her in the "early days" of having RA, Fay highlighted how RA had changed the sense 
of control that she could have over her body. She said: "my body performs in certain 
ways that sometimes I have no control over [and] sometimes I think this body has a 
mind of its own". Fay had been unable to reproduce the nonns of medical, body-
aesthetic, sport and physical work discourses, as in "produc[ing] a body which is 
'docile', that is one which can be subjected, used, transfonned and improved 
(Foucault, 1977, p.136)" (Tremain, 2002, p.36). 
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In asking Fay what it was like for her to have a body that "sometimes she had no 
control over" and "sometimes ... has a mind of it's own", Fay replied: 
I don't fight it [now] like I may have in the beginning ... you can't defY it 
[the impact of RA on her body] for too long. I've tried doing that, I've 
been there. I've tried pushing myself regardless, thinking that you can 
do it, do something that I want to do. I didn't want to be told what to do 
by this body of mine. I wanted to be the one to make the decision to that, 
you know, either I can't do this or I can't do that. I've sort of been 
through a lot of that sort of stuff ... if I'm having a bad [body] day, I 
manage my activity in such a way that I don't have to do so much that 
day so I actually listen to my body and the way that it operates now and 
I know what I can get away with and what I can 'I so if I'm having a bad 
[body] day I may choose to take it easy for that day or for that few days 
then I know I'm going 10 come out of that and therefore I may be able to 
pick up the activity a little bit more or I might take on a little bit more in 
the next few days. I tend to be sort of tuned in physically to my body and 
my body tells me when I need to have a rest, things like that, and I need 
to go and take it ... 
In this account, Fay has storied a shift that occuned in the way she thought about and 
responded to her body. She had tried taking up the subject position that constructed a 
"docile" body but she realised that she could not "fight" against or "defy" her body 
(that has RA). As an alternative to disciplining and using her body, Fay took up a 
different subject position and began to "listen" to her body and the "way it operates". 
Collaborating with her body was more helpful for Fay than fighting her body. In 
being "tuned in physically to [her] body and what [her] body was tel1[ing] [her]", Fay 
became aware of when she needed to rest and how she could manage the activities 
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she had planned to undertake during the day, when she was "having a bad [body] 
day". 
By actively choosing not to accept the position call to discipline her body, instead 
taking up the invitation to listen to her body, Fay was acting with agency. She 
understood the benefit to herself of taking up the "listen[ing] to her body" subject 
position, which produced the outcome of her continuing to achieve her goals, 
although perhaps within an extended time-frame. Although not stated definitively by 
Fay, there appeared to be an unspoken assumption or understanding by her, that 
fighting her body only increased the extent to which her body was out of control, 
thereby creating even less control for her in how and when she could undertake 
activities. She said, "there's an acceptance of my limitations but it doesn't stop me 
from still pursuing in my mind or having the determination and the courage and the 
perseverance to do what I need to do". Fay has re-positioned herself in regard to how 
she relates to her body but she has not re-positioned herself in respect of achieving 
what she understands that she needs to do. She said, "I put a long term goal in place, 
and smaller goals along the way. so that I can actually obtain the larger goal as well". 
In taking up behavioural psychology goal-setting discourse, with the "limitations" of 
having "a body" that "sometimes has a mind of its own", Fay strengthened her 
identity claim as being someone who has "determination", "courage" and 
"perseverance" . 
In telling her story, Fay recalled that people had said to her "I can't believe you're so 
happy or you feel so joyful when you know, you're telling me that your tests indicate 
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this and you've got this much activity in your body and you're struggling with 
fatigue". When asked how she might account for people's description of her as 
"happy" and "joyful", when she was "struggling" with the effects ofRA, Fay replied: 
"It's actually a state of mind; I have to wake up every moming and consciously make 
a choice to be a certain way". to live my life tbe best you can for that day". In 
discussing with Fay what she had found "a struggle", she referred to a period prior to 
having RA, before her "twenties" she had been "too afraid to have an opinion". Fay 
said that having RA had been a helpful for her in changing from a person who 
thought she had "no rights" to someone who was able to "cballenge her doctor", 
should she feel it important to do so. When asked what might have supported such a 
shift occun-ing from "being afraid to have an opinion" to being able to "challenge her 
doctor", Fay said: 
I honestly don't know, all I can think of that makes sense is that I can 
remember going to church once and there was 'a word' spoken over me 
and I've always been reasonably skeptical about that sort of thing, I've 
tended to just shelf it until something gives me an indication that is true 
but there was a particular word spoken, it was actual~y taped for me, 
and 1 remember playing the tape when 1 got home. It was quite a long 
word but there was one piece that I think must have spoken into my 
spirit and it spoke about "daughter" as in my being God's daughter 
"arise form the ashes ", and 1 remember repeating that and just 
repeating it over and over and over. I'm not too sure if that was the 
point or if other things were influencing me that '1 have the right as an 
individual', 1 don't really know, but that still stands out to me this day 
At the time of attending "church" and baving "a word spoken over [her)", Fay had 
been diagnosed with RA. The statement, "daughter. .. arise from the ashes" was a 
position call constructed by Christian spiritual/faith discourse, which involved an 
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understanding that "the word" was about Fay being "God's daughter", which was 
"spoken into [her] spirit" (emphasis mine). It was an invitation that called Fay into 
action: "arise from the ashes". The ashes, Fay said, represented her struggle with 
"having no rights" and having "a body" that she "sometimes had no control over". It 
was a subject position that produced personal change for Fay in how she viewed 
herself. She said: 
As I was saying before, I think I've spiritually developed as I've grown 
as a person as certain situations have come along. I don't think it has 
been predominately RA that is the sum total of who I am now but I think 
it has given me more strength, determination to focus on what I want ... 
everything becomes that much harder, including emotionally at times 
and it's like you need tofind that extra strength and determination if you 
like to pull yourself through the tougher times ". because I don't feel it 
(RAJ is a destructive force in my life, I feel it is something that has 
happened to enhance my life. 
In this account, Fay positioned herself to refuse dominant medical discourse's 
construction ofRA as a "destructive force" in her life. Instead, she re-frames the 
meaning for her of having RA, which is that it "happened to enhance [her] life". 
A third discursive change Fay engaged in after having RA, was how she came to re-
position herself and take up a more feminist, less patriarchal discursive practice in 
regard to how she related to her husband and daughter. In recalling an incident 
within her family some years earlier, when RA had "first happened". Fay said; 
"All I'm asking is that you help me in certain areas so how is this so 
difficult for you?". I just could not see what the problem was for them. 
And of course it wasn't until we discussed it reasonably recently that 
[my daughter 1 said, "you know, I didn't really see it from your point of 
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view all 1 thought was from my point of view", that she was forced if you 
like, in one respect, to be like the mother sometimes. She felt, you know, 
"mothers are supposed 10 do this and mothers are supposed to do that 
because 'this' mother always had. Now 'this mother' needed help to do 
the things she could do before so that meant [my daughter's} role 
changed a little bit ... so there were some changes there for her and for 
[my husband} ... 1 think 1 had a problem in the beginning of being able 
to able to voice to him what was happening for me ... it was the whole 
thing of having to come out and say (laughs) .. "1 can't do this, 1 can't do 
that" so it was this whole identity thing for me of having to say that I'm 
not the person that 1 was before. 
Due to RA, Pay could no longer take up a presence within the discursive binary of 
what a mother and wife should be. Pay said this had been difficult "for a long time" 
but now the family "interact with each other; it's more of an interdependence because 
I still like to feel that I'm independent as I can be but I don't have much difficulty 
asking for assistance when I need it", The construction of the idea and practice of 
"interdependence" enabled Pay to continue to be able to contribute to her family, She 
said, "[my husband] appreciates the support I do give him ... I think he's actually said 
to me, 'You probably support me more than most wives would support their 
husbands. '" 
Hence, even though Fay was initially positioned in deficit as a mother and wife 
because ofthe impact that RA was having on her physical capabilities, she did not 
continue to story herself in this way. She made an identity claim of having capability 
in offering "spiritual" and "emotional support" to her family. 
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John's multiple suhjectivities 
When first becoming blind, John continued to live in the town he had grown-up in, 
which John said he "found difficult because [he was J totally unusual and different: 
you were the blind man" (emphasis John's). John said he then went on to become 
involved with the Royal New Zealand Foundation of the Blind (RNZFB), where he 
met other blind people and was no longer positioned as "unusual", but was 'just one 
of the crowd". John said his experiences within the RNZFB enabled him to "walk 
alongside his blindness" and "accept" his blindness more than if he had continued to 
be "led by his blindness" as when he was the only blind person in the community. By 
participating in the blind community, Jolm was much less positioned as "other." 
In describing what it meant for him to be blind, John used language that constructed 
blindness as an identity statement, which is consistent with how the social model 
positions people with impainnents, as representative of and belonging to a minority 
group. For example, John talked about his blindness being "my lifestyle"; himself as 
"a professional blind man"; and nndeliaking his work as a blind consumer advocate 
in a way that "only another blind person would have been able to do". However, 
John also described his blindness as "an impairment, yes, it's a disability to some 
degree"; a definition which is similar to The World Health Organisation's (WHO) 
construction of impainnent as causing both a functional and sociological impact on 
the person. On these tenns, blindness is not a cultural marker, but rather an aspect of 
one's life. John captured this way of understanding his impainnent, when he said "to 
a large extent blindness is just one of the currents that runs through my life." At other 
times, John separated his identity from his blindness, saying "it's the personality, it's 
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not the blindness". For example, when snow skiing, John was functionally blind. He 
wore a bib that said "blind skier" but in comparison to when he took up the subject 
position of "the blind professional", when skiing John described himself not as "the 
blind skier" or even a skier who had a vision impairment, but as "just another skier". 
John told a story that illustrated how he was sometimes offered contrasting subject 
positions between being blind and sighted, depending on whether other people 
recognised him as being blind or not: 
I've come off [ski-jield] at the end of the day and we'd be standing in the 
public bar of the [name of town] Pub and somebody would be standing 
there and say 'oh did you see that blind skier up there today.' [I'd say] 
'Oh yeah, I did actually!' ... They don't see me, they see the blind skier 
... they don't realise I'm blind ... I mean I'm just another skier as far as 
I'm concerned, just another skier up there. And I worked hard 
developing those skills as a skier because being blind is nothing. I mean 
being blind and been given all the assistance sure but at the end of the 
day it's me that's turning my feet ... You know what I mean. It's me 
that's doing that and I enjoyed that, it's not being blind, that wasn't why 
I went skiing, 'cos I just loved it. 
In giving this account, John is storying himself as someone for whom his blindness, 
while having a functional impact on the assistance he needed when skiing, was not a 
defining construction on how he viewed himself as a skier. As he said, he skied 
because he "just loved it". 
Part of John's story was his passion for sport and outdoor activities, like snow skiing. 
In his account, John said he grew-up playing rugby, cricket and running marathons. 
John had a well-developed sportsman nalTative before becoming blind. He continued 
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to claim this sports identity after becoming blind, by coaching basketball and playing 
goalball (a team sport designed for people with vision impainnent). Blindness 
impacted what sports John could play, and how he accomplished an activity, such as 
having a guide when skiing, but it appeared that John's sense of identity as a 
sportsman was not contingent on him being blind, but constructed by his enjoyment of 
sport. John told stories that portrayed his love for sport. For example, he recalled an 
experience with a girls' basketball team that he was coaching: 
I was coaching a girls' team ... and we were one or two goals away Fom 
winning the national championships and I went out and said, there was 
a time-out or something, and I said "look girls, enjoy this now, enjoy it. 
This is the time now, this is where you really want to enjoy this, just get 
into it, live for the moment, this is the life, just really enjoy this next 
minute or two, this is the fun time, this is what we're here for". And I 
mean they just had a ball ... Live the moment and remember it, savour it, 
but it's not the only moment. 
In this account there is nothing to distinguish John as blind. In terms of Jolm's 
identification of himself in his coaching role, he did not specifically position himself 
as a blind coach, as he did the "blind professional". He was perhaps drawing on his 
life experiences, some of which he might have gained as a blind person, as he 
encouraged the team to enjoy the chance of playing to win their championship. 
In speaking about sport, Jolm presented himself as someone who enjoyed 
competition. He said, 
In sport, once I get the blood up ... mate, the blood's up ... the 
adrenalin's pumping mate, there's nothing, you know and I don't 
care, I just throw myself in Font of a bus if I have to. That's the way 
it's always been. That's the gladiatorial sort of stuff, you know, the 
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old rugby player ... always, always in 'ports, always been absolute 
death ... I try to win. Yeah but I'm not a bad sportsman. You know I'm 
a, in terms of that ethical thing, I'm not a bad sports, I'm not, I mean I 
hate to lose, [I] refuse to give in but at the end of the day I'll be the 
first person who walks over and shakes somebody's hand and say 
"Well played, " and have a beer. You know I'm the first one there at 
the end of it to say, "Look, let's give it death on the paddock, " but at 
the end of it we're the ones who walk away and have a beer 
together ." I've always been very sportsmanlike you know 
The nouns, adjectives and metaphors that John used in descl~bing himself as a 
sportsman, were replete with masculine constructs, such as "blood's up", "adrenalin's 
pumping", "gladiatorial." On the sports field, Jolm is constituted by sports 
competition discourse. He perfonns the uncompromising competitor who wonld also 
be a good sportsman should he lose. Arguably, these are iconic Kiwi images that all 
New Zealand children, especially boys, are subjected to and objectified by. John was 
successful in fe-producing these New Zealand discursive ideals and so he took up the 
privileged subject position within the binary of competitive and good at sport/or not. 
Notably, John is a sportsman not a blind sportsman. He might be a blind man who 
plays sport but the way he engages in spOli is not constituted by specific blind or 
disabled discursive practices but rather an acceptance and re-production of dominant 
masculinity as an identity claim (Pl~ngle, 2003). 
Often, such as when he was skiing or coaching basketball, John took up a subject 
position in which his ideals and values were broader than the story-lines that had 
developed since he became blind. For example, John identified himself as having a 
'hard work' ethic. He said, "I've never been frightened of hard work ... working hard 
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makes the day goes fast". In perfOlIDing the subject who can work hard, John said he 
was "making a difference for others and that's the role I want to do": 
At the same time in doing it [working hard], I'm actually earning 
money so that my kids can actually do things. I came from a home ... 
when having single parent families was very, very unusual right, in 
the early 1960 's it was a stigma, and I don't want my kids to go 
through that. And I also want to give them a chance. My son next 
year will be going to university and moving through. Now his 
generation would probably be the first part in my family that have 
achieved tertiary qualifications. And they've taken that for granted. 
There's never been a thought ever of their not going to university ... 
[whereas] my Mum left school at 15 [and] my Aunty lefl school at 
14. 
In this story, John speaks of how he has created a different social experience for his 
children from what he or his family experienced. He portrays himself as a father who 
wants to give his children "a chance" to go to university. This claim contrasts with 
John's earlier derisive remarks about academia. These two story-lines sit alongside 
each other and John calls on them in relation to the discursive context he is speaking 
to. When speaking to me, a doctoral student, he positions himself as a subject who 
has been a disability activist for many years, the bloke-on-the-ground who doesn't 
waste his time "writing on bloody bits of paper." He positions himself as loyal to the 
activist cause. However, when he is speaking of his family, he positions himself as a 
responsible parent who has provided opportunities for his children. He said, "My 
children live a pretty privileged life. What I'm trying to do, is give them every 
advantage that they can possibly have. I provide to them the things that I never had: a 
settled home life". 
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John's sUbjectivities of "activist" and "parent" called him into taking up quite 
different subject positions. Both are constructed in co-existence witb the discursive 
context he is both calling on and speaking to. Another identity claim, from activist 
and parent, that emerged in Jolm's storytelling was that he could be "the bloke on the 
piss". For example: 
I'm in a pub in [home-town 1 having a few beers at a bar, but I wasn't 
'John, pillar of society', r was John back thirty years ago talking to 
people I'd Imown back then. It was interesting. I'm back home again. I 
can slip back into that, I was on the piss. I was very conscious of it, I 
was having a ball. It's like having a chance to step back and not be who 
I am you know ... and you walk away and we had a great time. It was 
the night of the world cup final and we went from there to another pub, 
we thought this is a bit of us, there was some spunky bird singing good 
songs and playing, they had a guy playing, it was great, it was 
wonderful, we had a bloody good night and watched the World Cup 
final on the TV 
In telling this story, John showed how in one social context, he can be "John, the 
pillar of society", that is, the blind professional who is actively making a difference, 
and in another discursive context, he can "slip back into" being the guy who is "on the 
piss". John said he was "very conscious" of the difference between the two ways he 
could be John. He accepted the discursive invitation to perform John who "is on the 
piss", having "a bloody good night out" with "some spunky bird singing good songs". 
John's language, in this story, embodies dominant masculinity and drinking culture 
discourses. 
In comparison, John -the blind professional's language constitutes a different kind of 
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John: 
Whenever we needed to really really do something, it was me who was 
wheeled out 'cos J can do it in a way that nobody else can ... I'm the 
person that's the sharp end. I'm the one that can step up there and 
people will listen ... and it's a positive approach. I mean J can be giving 
a negative message in a positive way, you're influencing people, you're 
guiding people and getting to where you want the thing to be 
In this account, John is constituted as someone who is influential, unique, pioneering 
and responsible: He had multiple ways of understanding and living-out what it meant 
for him to be blind. The language he used in his account-making of his experiences 
would suggest that depending on the discursive context he was in, he would take up 
respectively the subject positions produced by the social model, medical and 
rehabilitation, SRV, parenting, dominant masculinity, and sports disconrses. 
John and Fay had both concluded that their impainnent had provided them with 
opportunities and new directions in their personal and career lives. Their accounts 
illustrate how after having an impainnent, they were able to take up new and 
preferred story-lines, concerning what they did and the kind of person they were. 
Fay negotiates the power relation within medical discourse 
Fay spoke at length about how she consciously and very actively positioned herself 
so as to have input into the discussions and decisions about her medical treatment. 
She said: 
When I'm sitting in front of my rheumatologist ... I want to be the boss 
(laughs) ... what I tend to do is take his power away from him by not 
going along with what he wants sometimes (laughs) or telling him 
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"What are WE going to do?" or "What I'm NOT going to do!" Yeah ... 
and reminding him that it is a collaborative effort here and sometimes he 
likes to play the expert and I don't like that. I like us to be the expert 
together. It's taken ten years and we've built this relationship and we've 
come to this understanding (laughs). He calls me tongue in cheek, his 
problem patient but r think he really quite likes it (laughs) because I do 
put him in his place occasionally. 
In the above example, Fay refused the traditional doctor-patient power relation in 
which the patient accepts the authOlity of the doctor to discuss and prescribe 
treatment for him or her. When Fay challenged her rheumatologist, he appeared not 
to position himself at fault but constructed Fay, perhaps fondly and/or paternally, as 
his "problem patient." Medical discourse legitimates and privileges the 
rheumatologist's understandings and actions and objectifies the patient. Within 
medical discourse, only two subject positions were available to Fay, either she was 
the good (complaint) patient or the problem (challenging) patient. When I asked Fay 
to account for why she felt so strongly about having her rheumatologist working 
collaboratively with her, she shared how being a patient had always been a struggle 
for her because of how she felt disempowered by medical practice when she was a 
child. She told a story of how, as a child, she had a blood transfusion in hospital, 
having had her tonsils removed. She said: 
And 1 can remember being woken up in the middle of the night, not 
knowing what was going on, not being told anything and dragged into 
another room. And 1 remember there were a whole lot of nurses and 
doctors around and they were all poking, prodding and cutting me 
trying to find my veins ... And 1 remember screaming the place down 
(laughs) and 1 remember asking for my mother because 1 was terrified 
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and I remember looking up and one point and there was blood 
everywhere and they were pretty much holding me down. 
Pay said that because of the fear and confusion for her concerning this event, she now 
had "this really strong sense, not that I have to win but I have to change that balance 
of power a lot with medical professionals". 
John is offered inclusive and affirming subject positions 
Over twenty years had passed since John became blind. He said: 
I don't know how many years of my life being blind, where I became 
pseudo sighted, that's the only way I can phrase it, that I was so into 
looking "normal", and people ofien say to me you don't look blind, but 
the more relaxed I become about it [being blind] the more I assimilated. 
John said he endeavoured to be "pseudo sighted" so he could pass for a "normal" 
sighted person. Although, he said, that as time passed he became "relaxed about 
himself' and he "assimilated". When asked what he meant by the word 
"assimilated", John said that regardless of the social context he was in, whether he 
was "one blind person in a crowd of blind people or the only blind person in a group, 
I am comfortable within myself'. When asked what might have attributed to the 
sense offeeling "relaxed" and being able to "assimilate", John spoke of the 
oppOliunities that had OCCUlTed for him within his work. He said, he had been able to 
"rub shoulders with some of the... most amazing people from around the world who 
have spent fifty bloody years of their lives battling on behalf of other people to give 
them the opportunities that we now take for granted." John positioned himself as 
plivileged to spend time with seasoned campaigners within the blind rehabilitation 
industry. John spoke of how he was no longer "in isolation" but was "central", with 
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others working in rehabilitation for persons with vision impainnent in New Zealand. 
It was a subject position that offered John inclusion and purpose, which supported 
him to" relax" and be able to" assimilate". 
Fay and John's positive identity claims 
Fay was thirty years of age when she was diagnosed with RA. She described it as the 
"catalyst for change" for her overcoming being "dis-empowered in many areas of my 
life." She said, "1 don't feel it (RA) is a destructive force in my life, 1 feel it is 
something that has happened to enhance my life". Hence, if David's story is 
distinctive for the number of years that he had no medical understanding about his 
impainnent, John and Fay's accounts are illustrative of how the onset of illness 
and/or impainnent in adult life does not necessarily produce an on-going loss 
narrative about that experience. John's account storied him as the blind professional 
who went from being "a hard nut" to becoming "the pillar of society" after he became 
blind. His story depicted him producing many achievements as a person who was 
blind, including raising blindness awareness in New Zealand, being a competitive 
blind sportsman and skier, and being a husband and father who supported his children 
to be the first generation in his family to attend university. 
Both John and Fay made claims that impainnent and/or illness had been an 
opportunity for them. Each had refused subject positions that positioned them in 
deficit and both had accounted for tbeir impainnent and/or illness in very appreciative 
tenns. Fay stated: "I've come to believe that it [RAJ was a gift given to me, so that 1 
could be who I am now because without tbat, 1 don't know if 1 would have walked 
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the same road" . John was equally positive about how his life had improved since 
becoming blind. He said :"it ain't been better. .. It's never been better for me as a 
human being than it is right now. I'm talking about me as a person, ain't never been 
better". 
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STORIES OF DEFICIT AND LOSS: CAROLE, JAN AND RON'S 
JOURNEYS TO RECOGNISE AND CONTEST POSITION CALLS 
Deficit and loss descriptions prevail in Carole, Jan and Ron's account making. The 
overriding story for Carole was how difficult both physically and socially she had 
found the expelience of having an illness. She described the onset of her illness as 
"exhausting", "distressing", "just telTible", "an intense grief". Furthermore, Carole 
noted that due to having an illness, she often felt socially positioned as "less than" 
other people. In remembering his childhood, Ron said "I don't have any positive 
memories, it's all pretty bad, the bad always was, I don't recall a time when the bad 
was never there". He retold incidents that showed why he would describe his life as 
having always been bad. His illustrations often related to how he had been treated in 
discriminatory ways by doctors, school teachers, and peers within tertiary education. 
Jan's story was also one of how arduous it had been for her since becoming ill and 
having an impairment. She shared how she had felt "a complete failure" because she 
could no longer do her own housework, be practically available for her children, or 
work so as to contribute earnings to the household income. 
The constmction of impainnent and/or illness as an absence within health, gender, 
education, faith, work and spOli discourses meant that Carole, Jan and Ron's account-
making prominently storied impairnlent and/or illness as a problematic experience. 
However, within this overall negative picture of impainnent and/or illness, they each 
relayed times in which they were able to recognise and contest position calls that 
disadvantageously position people who have an impainnent and/or illness. These 
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actions of agency by Carole, Jan and Ron indicate how the impainnent and illness 
expelience can be a production of multiple, competing and contradictory discursive 
realities, rather than the reproduction of only singular pejorative conshuctions about 
impainnent and/or illness. 
In this chapter, the discussion primarily focuses on the co-existence between those 
position calls which construct the subject in deficit and how prefen'ed subject 
positions are recognised and taken up. Carole, Jan and Ron's experiences within 
medicine, work and education are initially examined in regard to the operation and 
effects of such discursive practices when a person has an impainnent and/or illness. 
Following this analysis, I then explore Carole, Jan and Ron's accounts in relation to 
the position calls that are produced by sports, gender and faith discourses for persons 
with impainnent and/or illness. In the final section of the chapter, I consider the ways 
and extent to which Carole, Jan and Ron recognised and contested those position calls 
that produced them as feeling "less than" in some way. 
Medical discourse constructs impairment and illness as a pl'oblem 
Jan, Ron and Carole told stories about the impact of their impairment and/or illness 
on their physical and/or sensory functioning. Their language was a reproduction of 
the tenns of reference found in medical discourse. Jan talked about having coronary 
heart disease, a heati attack, angina and high cholesterol, which caused her to have a 
hearing impainnent that in turn affected her speech. Ron stated he had "a substantial 
hearing loss" being "completely deaf in one ear" and having "only partial hearing in 
the other ear." He also had a speech impairment and was born with physical 
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defonnities, for which he had re-constructive surgeries when he was a child. Carole 
did not describe the nature of her illness in great detail, other than stating that she had 
been diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE). However, she did discuss 
the effects of the illness on her. She desclibed being overwhelmed by pain, feeling 
very fatigued and overcome by despair. 
For Jan, Ron and Carole the impainnent and/or illness was very impacting on their 
bodies, significantly affecting what they could do. Jan said: 
When I first had my heart attack and chronic angina, I couldn't do 
anything. I couldn't walk to the letter box without having angina and 
I still can 'f vacuum my house without getting angina and things like 
that. 
Jan's language constructs the impact of her heart attack and subsequent angina as 
being very encompassing of her life: "I couldn't do anything." Illness had changed 
Jan's life because activities that had been a normal part of her day, such as walking to 
her letter box or vaeuuming her house, she could no longer do. The account she takes 
up is one that portrays how her life was worse for her once she had an impairment 
and illness. Ron's language was similar in the way he described the impact of his 
impairment on him. He said, "I don't have any positive memories". Carole also took 
up this language of loss when she described the "serious consequences" for her of 
having to stand for two hours when coaching a youth sports team." She said, "You 
know, I lost a great big chunk of the feeling in the fi'ont of my leg just from that 
night. .. and that doesn't come back." In this story, Carole is storying her experience 
according to the tenns of a progressive illness. 
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The stories ofloss for Jan, Ron and Carole were not confined to the effects of the 
impainnent and/or illness on their bodies but also what their impainnent and/or 
illness meant for how people responded to them. Each spoke of experiences when 
they felt they had been positioned depreciatively in their interactions with others 
because they had an impainnent and/or illness. 
Ron's story of experiencing disc"iminatory actions within education 
Much of Ron's childhood involved him having medical treatment. He recalled a 
scene when he was in hospital as a child: "1 entered the staff dining room and 
apparently the room went quiet, absolutely stony, stony quiet and [name of the 
surgeon 1 just said without looking up 'And whose is that?'" Such an experience 
positioned Ron as powerless, objectified by the power relation of medical practice. 
The experience of being objectified and powerless was common for Ron during his 
childhood, especially during his school years. For example, one of Ron's teachers 
did not believe he had a hearing problem and thought he was "just being naughty" 
and put his desk "at the rear of the class facing the back wall." Another teacher 
"renowned for picking on kids" sent Ron "downstairs to the new entrants' class ... to 
sit on the mat for half an hour", a directive which Ron considered was connected to 
his speech impaim1ent. DUling tertiary training, Ron found his classmates surprised 
when he scored top in a test. He said his peers assumed that "because 1 had a speech 
problem, I had to have an intellectual problem too." 
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The subject position that was most available for Ron during his school years and in 
tertiary education, was a deficit position. In this respect, Ron's story of education is 
very similar to David's experience of school. At school, David was positioned as the 
"handicapped", "spastie", "mental", "retard" and "crippled" boy. During school, Ron 
was positioned as the "naughty" boy, and then when studying after school, he was 
viewed as who had an "intellectual disability." The impact of this on Ron was that he 
expected to be excluded in education, which impacted his expectations of how he 
would be responded to when studying. He spoke about an education experience in 
recent years when he had been included, which was such an unusual subject position 
for him to be offered that he struggled to take it up. He said, 
For that entire [enrolmentJ interview, I don't think I strung together a 
coherent sentence .. and I came out and I thought "Well, I've stuffed 
that up, what am I going to do now?" ... it's quite strange, because 
I've spoken to [the interviewer] a couple of times since... and I 
actually said to him, "How the hell did I get through it?", so ] still 
don't actually know. If] was in (the interviewer's) shoes, ] probably 
would have said, "Where 's the bin!?" At the end of the day, after the 
interview, ] adopted the "Oh, well, that isn't going to work"[attitudeJ 
and started looking for something else... it's probably [something] 
have] learnt from past episodes of ridicule, past episodes of 
apprehension ... but I've stepped into this [education] programme that 
will teach me, we hope, to make a living out of speaking to people - "] 
can't do that, you're mad!" 
In this example, despite being positioned favourably, Ron was expecting to being 
positioned in deficit so his internal dialogue of "I can't do that, you're mad!", 
continued to construct him as a person with deficits. 
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Jan's account of storying herself as a "complete failure" 
Jan also had experiences of being positioned disadvantageously on account of her 
having illnesses. She said: 
I wasn't allowed to have any help in the home because I was too 
young, I was only 40 when I had the heart attack ... I was devastated, I 
was really devastated, (if I had been older) I would have had 
everything I needed, I could have asked for anything and got it. In 
fact, it probably would have been automatic and I wouldn't had to 
even asked. (It was) more than unfair, what's the word, I felt I was 
discriminated against because of my age. It made me feel worthless. 
In this story, Jan's account of not meeting the usual age criteria regarding qualifying 
for home help suggests that she was outside the medical nonns for having the kinds 
of illnesses she had. Therefore, on the one hand, the tenns of medical discourse were 
the construetions that provided the explanations for why Jan was unwell and impaired 
but then those same constructions disqualified her from meeting the criteria by which 
it was aeceptable to have the illnesses she had. Consequently, the decision by health 
authorities to not fund domestic support for her, left her feeling "'worthless" as a 
person. It would appear from Jan's account that the age-range symptom was not 
considered critical in detennining if she had any of her illnesses, but it was essential 
for establishing if she was eligible for funding. The policy as legitimated by medical 
discourse, worked to exclude Jan, effectively disabling her further because not only 
was she impaired in having the illnesses she had but she was also discl1minated 
against by a funding policy that disqualified her from receiving support. 
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Jan's illnesses resulted in her being positioned in deficit in three ways. First, she was 
positioned in an absence of health discursive. She was medically fragile and 
physically sick, she had a hearing impairment, and her speech intonation was 
different on account of her deafuess. Second, on the basis of how health policy drew 
on and interpreted medical discourse, Jan was ill before she should have been. Based 
on the terms of medical diagnosis, it was not usual for her to have the illnesses she 
had for the age that she was. Third, the messages of "being independent" and 
"working hard" were emphasised in Jan's family of origin. She said "In our family, it 
was don't expect help from anyone else unless you've tried yourself. .. there was no 
such thing as sitting at home, you got out and worked, you earned your way." 
However, as a consequence of her illnesses Jan could no longer do housework. She 
said "1 couldn't keep my housework up to date because it was physically taxing. J 
used to do house-work for others and took pride in the fact that I cleaned and worked 
really hard to make people's homes nice". Furthermore, not only could Jan not keep 
her house or earn by cleaning other people's houses, she was unable to undertake 
other mothering activities that she deemed were important for her to do. For 
example, she said "I couldn't go on school outings as it was too much for me." By 
not being able to reproduce traditional gender expectations, Jan storied herself as "a 
complete failure." 
Carole's protest against disempowering practices of "kindness" 
Much of Carole's struggle was about finding ways to challenge others' interaction 
with her when she felt she had been positioned disadvantageously on account of her 
illness. For example, she said, 
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One of the things 1 notice is that people that know I'm living with an 
illness, out of kindness and to save me, people make judgements about 
what 1 can do and can 'I do but it positions me as being globally 
disadvantaged rather than having a difficulty in a particular area. An 
example of that is at work ... you know, I'm having struggles in my 
body but there is absolutely nothing wrong with my mind ... out of 
kindness, people have thought to protect me and have given other 
things to other people so I've actually been made less than an 
experienced [health professional4j based on the assumption that 1 
can't take on extra stress or challenging work. 
Carole was not claiming that her illness does not affect her but that people's 
"judgements and what she "can do and can't do" disadvantaged her. The difficulty 
for Carole was that such 'Judgements" were not "malicious" but motivated by 
kindness, endeavouring to "save" and "protect" her. She said, "1 got tripped up by 
what the motivation was for it. .. I felt that I lost my voice, 1 was silenced ... if it had 
been malicious, I would easily have had plenty to say about it but because it was out 
of kindness I didn't know how to respond." Since having an illness, Carole had lost 
her sense of agency at work because without "access to a subject position in which 
[she had] the right to speak and be heard" (Davies, 1991, p. 51). She desclibed how 
she would try to resist when "challenging work" that she would normally be given 
was allocated to other people to do. She came to realise that "kindness" prohibited 
people from hearing her when she said she "liked" and "was fine" to still do 
"challenging work". She said people responded by thinking she was "protesting but 
not really meaning it". "Kindness" was a position call that was hard to refuse 
because it appeared benign. The paradox of "kindness" producing effects that were 
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not experienced as kind arose because "kindness", on these occasions, embodied 
more than one discursive practice. In one sense, being kind to one another is an idea 
held strongly within the Judeo-Clnistian ethic (Gal. 5:22). It resonates with the ethos 
and Biblical principle oflove one another as you love yourself (John 13:34) and do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you (Matt. 7:12). However, if actions of 
"kindness" are also constructed by medical discourse, then the "kindness" practice 
may not produce effects consistent with the intention of the original discursive 
practice. A contradiction occurs between the idea of an experienee and the actual 
practice of the experience. This was Carole's experience, that "out of kindness and to 
save me, people make judgements about what I can do and can't do", a practice 
which she experienced as un-kind and dis-empowering. 
The construction of illness as "less than" produces Carole's "secret world" 
Carole did not like being positioned as being "less capable" than she considered she 
was. Bird (2004) has argued that the experience of being "subjected to the measure 
'you don't measure up' [occurs because of] internal dialogue, anticipated external 
dialogue and received information from others (including the media)" (p.228). 
Relative to this point, Carole said her internal dialogue about her illness became 
much more and proportionately larger in comparison to her external dialogue with 
others because she typically found other people's responses to her were not helpful. 
She said: 
I think initially, I was quite open with a number of people and I notice 
now, I call it my secret world. I have a whole secret world and it's got 
more secretive as I've had more experiences where it's gone wrong. I 
think it's to do with chronicity when something goes on and on, how 
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many times you're allowed to say it. [feel more and more uncertain 
about how people are going to respond and [find their responses very 
unhelpful. [find there are very few people who 1 might get a response 
from that might be useful to me. 
Carole was suggesting that the "chronicity" of her illness impacted how people 
responded to her. Medical discourse is orientated toward helping people recover but 
if impairment and/or illness continue then the person has not met the ideal of medical 
discourse and consequently is positioned pejoratively. Carole said, "I haven't yet 
worked out a way of telling them [about my illness] without denigrating myself, 
describing myself as a 'less-than' person." 
Referring to experiences from coaching youth sports teams, Carole gave several 
illustrations of how people responded when she disclosed her illness. Sometimes 
during a Sports Meet or event, Carole disclosed to others how fatigued she felt, to 
which she found people replied with how they were even "more tired" than she was. 
When this oCCll11'ed, she 'Just dropped it but I knew that they just couldn't know 
when I said tired, I'm not talking about ordinary tiredness". Carole said that in order 
to dispute this understanding that her fatigue was different fi'om the kind of tiredness 
they were referring to, she would need to "do a great big thing about how bad it was" 
but she did not want to give a "detailed explanation." When this happened, Carole 
said she was "positioned" to either disclose her illness and be positioned in deficit or 
not disclose her illness and be positioned problematically on account of her fatigue. 
She said, "How do I describe myself in a way that they believe me, that I can't do it 
and I'm not shirking?" 
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In addition to Carole having to manage disclosure dilemmas about her illness, she also 
found herself positioned by the unpredictable nature of her illness in regard to not 
knowing in advance what she could commit to. She said, 
[name] [My daughter's] got a (rip for class for Friday this week, you 
know, and 1 can '( tell whether I'm going to be able to walk on that day 
or not, so she says to me, 'Can you come and do mother help?' and 1 
say '1 don 'f know yet" (small laugh). 1 can't say "why not? ", you 
know, in the long term 1 probably feel quite guilty. 1 feel I'm not 
always the parent I would like to be. I'm probably a lot more tireder 
and irritable than I would have otherwise been. 
The physical effects of Carole's illness meant it was not easy for her to take up the 
subject position of mother and wife on the terms that she wished to or on the tenns 
that a family member might expect. She talked about not discussing her fatigue and 
pain when family needs "coincided with her being really unwell", describing this as 
"an inevitable part of living with other people that you consider them and I think 
that's hard actually and it's hard with children." Hence, Carole did not have access to 
a subject position in which she could care for her own health needs and her family's 
needs at the same time. She discussed a situation that demonstrated how her illness 
prevented her from going shopping with her son so he could purchase "a cap" before 
"a social" he was going to attend. When Carole said, "We will get it by the social but 
I can't get it today, I'm not feeling well," her son replied, "But you're always sick 
Mum, you're just slacking, you're always sick, what's the difference today from any 
other day?" Carole described her son's response as "being blasted by him" when she 
said "I just can't do it." In making sense of this incident to me, Carole said her son 
"couldn't possibly understand" how it was not "reasonable to take him to [the 
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shopping mall] in this tiny gap of time". This effect of this incident on Carole was 
that she was "really upset" and "felt really guilty". Furthermore, she "resolved to say 
nothing," not wanting her illness "to negatively impact on her as a parent". In this 
example, Carole is again canght between disclosing the effects of her illness on her 
and being pejoratively positioned or not disclosing and managing the experience of 
her illness on her own. When Carole responding to this dilemma by "pulling right 
back" and not disclosing, then she said her "secret world got bigger." In explaining 
the phrase "my secret world", Carole said: 
It is how it really is, how I feel... people walk in and out of bits of it 
[the secret world}, no one would have all of it but me and [husband} 
would probably have the most of it [but] there would be parts only I 
have because that's the Ihing with chronicity. I don 'I enjoy it [the 
secret world} (said quietly). I feel quite depressed by it. 
While the phrase' secret world' was Carole's own tenn, Jan and Ron shared 
experiences that indicated that the subject positions that were available for them to 
take up were not common or universally known. In a very real sense they also had 
impairment and/or illness constructed experiences which were secret to them. For 
example, Ron said "I still deal with the issue that every time I speak ... I stiII have this 
hesitation, is this going to sound understandable?" And Jan shared how her illness 
positioned her to fear losing her husband. 
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Male sex drive, gender and Christian discourses position Jan to fail 
In respect oflovemaking with her husband, Jan recounted a time in which she felt 
split between the fear oflosing her husband if she did not make love to him and the 
fear that she would have another heart attack if she did have sex. 
Dominant masculinity discourse and Christian marriage discourse together position 
men as entitled to and needing to have regular sex and wives as needing to meet their 
husband's sexual needs. However, medical practice had constructed physical 
exercise, such as lovemaking, as medically dangerous for Jan to engage in. She said, 
It was frightening because I have an incredibly supportive husband, 
he has always been there no matter what but there was always a fear 
that if 1 couldn't give him what he needed [sex} and he would be 
tempted in some way .. I was caught between a rock and a hard place. 
If 1 did make love with him, I would end up with angina all night and 
end up having to sit up all night or even end up in hospital. If I didn't, 
I felt like I was rejecting him and I was having to help him understand 
that I wasn '[ rejecting him. 
Jan was storied as responsible for her husband's sexual needs and his protection from 
the temptation of being unfaithful to her. The assumptions, in this idea, positioned 
her, not her and her husband, as having the problel11, when illness impacted on their 
lovemaking. It became her responsibility to help her husband understand this 
dilemma for her. 
Jan's illnesses prohibited her from fulfilling the expectations she had learned from 
her family of origin, in regard to how she should be as a mother and wife. She said, 
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"I was brought up with "you look after your family, your children, your husband, 
your house, you made sure your house was clean ... [if you did those things] you were 
a good mother and a good wife." These messages are infonned by gender and 
working class discourses, which positioned Jan as failing if she could not be a mother 
and wife on those tenus. As women, Carole and Fay were also positioned very 
similarly. For example, Fay had, until her impaimlent, also taken up the idea that 
women were to serve and put the needs of their husband and children first. Once she 
became ill, Fay said she had "to come out and say (laughs) '1 can't do this, I can't do 
that'''. The person that Fay was before she experienced RA was someone who in her 
own words was continuing the beliefs sbe had learned from her family and church 
while growing up. She said, 
The type offamily 1 was brought up in and the sort of church belief we 
had, a lot of it was }i'om a patriarchal, dictatorial, authoritarian place. 
It was certainly serving a purpose for someone greater than myself at 
the time, it was serving the greater whole. 
Fay called such beliefs "social stories," which "definitely came from my parents". 
However, having RA meant Fay was much less able to serve her family. As a result 
she reviewed the "social stories", and decided her "contribution" could at times be 
"for Fay." 
Jan, like Fay, through the experience of becoming ill, also reflected on how her family 
training constituted her to meet her family's needs at the cost of caring for herself. 
She said: 
Yep, I had done something really wrong because 1 followed my 
mother in that 1 worked hard and put myself last, the family, the 
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children and the husband all came .first, well before. And in looking 
back, I think I have put myself last to the detriment of myself I had 
neglected myself in some respects by putting others first. 
Jan concluded that she had taken up so fully the idea that she must put her family first 
and herselflast, that she had actually neglected her wellbeing, thereby becoming 
vulnerable to being ill. As a woman, the subject position that had most been 
available to her during her growing-up years had also included neglect and being 
physically and emotionally abused. Referring to her growing up years living with her 
mother and stepfather, Jan said, 'The violence entailed [me having] increasing fear. It 
started with violence on Mum but turned to me so I was fearful of confrontation 'cos 
it'll always lead to a beating which happened most days." 
Experiencing a power relation in which men were privileged and women were 
subordinate and abused continued for Jan outside the home in the context of church. 
She said: 
In the first churches that I attended it [the violence] wasn't so much 
physical but there was fear there because there was an intimidation 
and very strong control. And so if you did something wrong I guess it 
was done as far as humiliation, humiliating you in front of others ... 
they said that women were equal ... [and] weren't downtrodden but 
there was an awful lot of emotional manipulation and undercurrents 
that kept you treated like a second class citizen. 
Hence, Jan's experience of church during her childhood and early adult years, 
perhaps stands alongside Fay's childhood experiences of church as a "patriarchal, 
dictatorial, [and] authoritarian place." Jan spoke about the pressure within one 
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church she attended to ask for faith healing but being positioned as being at fault, 
when after being prayed for, she was not healed. She was accused of "lacking faith", 
of having "strong sin in [her ] life" , of "needing to repent for past issues" and she was 
questioned whether she "liked being sick": did she "get more attention from being 
sick and therefore didn't want a healing." The church in which Jan experienced such 
interactions believed that God healed people. This meant J an, as a person with 
impairment and illness, was a target for prayer but then when healing did not occur, 
she was blamed for not being healed. Such a practice positioned God, the prayers, 
and the people praying as not at fault. The pressure within the church to be prayed 
for and healed implied that it was unacceptable for Christians to be sick or disabled, 
meaning that anybody who was not healed after being prayed for was positioned as 
spiritually unwell, as well as being physically impaired and sick. Such deficit 
positioning only added to Jan's sense of failure having already failed her family of 
Oligin training that women were to cook, clean and look after their family, otherwise 
they were lazy. Clearly, within the contexts of her extended family, health services, 
and the church she attended, Jan did not have access to a subject position where she 
might feel well supported or understood in her experience of having impairment and 
illness. Gender, working class, medical, masculinity, male sex drive, Christian faith, 
and Christian healing discourses, all positioned Jan poorly. 
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Carole, Jan and Ron contest deficit and loss position calls 
Carole, Jan and Ron's stories illustrate how medical discourse with allied 
reproductions occurring in education, work, class, gender, sports, healing and faith 
discourses, construct impainnent and/or illness in deficit tenns. However, despite the 
prevalence of this construction, Carole, Jan and Ron each gave examples of how they 
had consciously taken up ideas and practices that positioned them less 
disadvantageously. These actions of agency bear evidence of Foucault's (1980, p.82) 
thesis regardiug "subjugated and disqualified knowledges appearing and perfonning 
critique on dominant discourse". In accordance with Davies and Harre's 
conceptualization of multiple subject positions, Carole, Jan and Ron were able to: 
[bring] to a particular situation tbeir history as a subjective being, that 
is the history of one who has been in multiple positions and engaged 
in different fonns of discourse [so that each respectively was ] not 
inevitably caught in the subject position that the particular narrative 
and the related discursive practices might seem to dictate. (Davies 
and Ham~, 1990, p.48) 
One discourse that had shaped Carole's life prior to her illness was competitive sport. 
Her illness meant she was no longer able to take up the sportswoman subject in ways 
that she was used to. She described the "athletic part" of her as "an intrinsic part of 
her identity." However, despite the presence of illness prohibiting her from 
continuing her narrative as a sportswoman in the way she had known, she found ways 
for her knowledge and practice as an athlete to continue in her life. She said, "it [the 
athletic part] does inform my life and what I've done is try to funnel it into helping 
other people by coaching". Carole's account about her coaching did not, however, 
construct it as an activity that was necessarily a "loss" for her. She said,: 
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I need it because I can't run around and do all those things which have been a 
big part of my identity and it's my way of actively seeking good things in my 
life, and I love it. I love children, I love helping people and teaching them 
skills. For me, the standing is very difficult but it's wonde11ul, I love it, it's 
rewarding, I've made a choice to do it. 
In this example, Carole has intentionally re-positioned herself to "seek good things in 
my life." Carole's practice of "seeking good things" was not something that occurred 
by chance or unconsciously but developed as a result of a very specific experience. 
She said, 
I was walking around the stadium and you know being very low indeed 
and having all these negative thoughts going round in my mind about 
loss and I decided that I was just noticing them and I was feeling sad 
and I was noticing that and I was thinking how unhelpful they were 
and somewhere in that reflection there came the idea that maybe I 
could change it by doing something differently. 
Carole "notices" her "noticing" about "being very low indeed" and "having all these 
negative thoughts going round in my mind". The experience of "noticing" her 
"noticing" provides Carole with some space from feeling "very low" and "sad" and 
thinking "negative thoughts." In narrative therapy terms, this would be called 
externalising, when a linguistic space is created between the person and the problems 
she is experiencing (Bird, 2004; White, 2006). In "noticing" the negative thoughts 
and feelings, Carole concluded "how unhelpful they were" and had an "idea that 
maybe I could change it by doing something differently". Carole said she had already 
"reflected extensively on what connected me with loss and what cOlmected me with 
good feelings" but in addition, she then began "thinking of the concept of bad news 
and the effect of collecting bad news rather than good news". At this point, Carole 
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asks a very agentic question of herself. She said, "How can I collect some good 
news?" In responding to this qnestion, she said, "It occurred to me that I'm very goal 
orientated as a person and I've always had a lot of joy about working towards a goal". 
Carole then described how these nnderstandings created some new actions for her. 
She began to set physical goals for herself, knowing that "doing my best was enough". 
She said "I have had to literally walk lamp posts [taking) ten months to walk three 
kilometers and I've been cycling and I've been doing all sorts of things to try and add 
to it very slowly; it's been a very patient process". The effect for Carole on deciding 
to set physical goals for herself and "adding to it slowly" was that this goal orientation 
was a practice she was familiar with. It connected her to the stories she had of herself 
as someone who has "a lot of determination or drive to keep on, I don't give up. I'm a 
real not-giver-upper." 
As a result of this reflection, Carole began to refuse medical discourse's position call 
to collect bad news about her health and began to look for ways that she could 
collect good news about her body. The refusal was critical because medical 
discourse constructs progressive illness as an experience that measures and focuses 
on the extent of deterioration that has occuned. In contrast, Carole began orientating 
herself toward noticing when small steps of progress had been achieved. Carole 
enjoyed the re-orientation from collecting bad news about her body to collecting 
good news about her body. She said, 
I'm measuring my fitness and so I'm getting lots of good news about 
my body.... Well [il} has been absolutely exhilarating. II's really 
really changed my thinking, from loss thinking to how am [ going to 
work at this, what am I going to do kind of thinking. Very positive 
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thinking from the area that was the biggest sadness for me. It's been 
enormously significant in terms of how my future will be. " 
Carole's actions of agency in relation to filing good news about her body 
demonstrate Davies' concept of "mo(ve)ment", signify[ingJ the simultaneity of 
specific embodied moments and the movement toward the subject as a process that 
can come about through the mode of telling" (italics in text) (Davies, 2006, p.92). 
Carole's process was to experience herself as having an illness but not have it 
constructed as only an experience ofloss and deficit. To use Davies' phrase, she was 
"umnooring" herself from an aspect of medical discourse. She had recognised how 
she had been subjected by medical discourse, namely noticing the effects of 
collecting bad news about her body on her, and had taken up a position which made 
that practice unacceptable or "unthinkable" to her (Davies, 2006, p.99). In this 
regard, she was no longer the subjected subject (Drewery, Wins lade & Monk, 2000) 
of medical discourse. Carole was able to do this because she was used to "notic[ingJ 
what it is that connects me with feelings of grief or different power hierarchies, and I 
would review that and ... talk to myself kindly about that or do something differently 
about that or change that." In regard to her work situation where she felt 
'challenging work' was being given to other people on account of her being too ill 
and tired to do such work, Carole took up a subject position that enabled her to share 
her understanding of her experience, thereby challenging the positioning effects of 
other people's judgments on her. She said: "I've got stronger and stronger at trying 
to create a space of understanding. I've been very direct. I've said a repeated 
statement now when I'm doing work - "my body might be sore but there's nothing 
wrong with my mind" or "my mind is perfectly capable"". Through these claims, 
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Carole is actively refusing the construction of her illness impacting both her body 
and her mind. She distinguishes the difference, with the result that "kindness has to 
get in behind me at that point because I've actually given instruction about where it 
can go, where it can be useful." In other words, actions of "kindness" can. be 
directed toward supporting her body that has been impacted by illness but she does 
not need any support or help with her mind. 
Carole was very active in constructing meaning and undertaking actions so as to take 
up a subject position that worked for her. She refused those ideas that positioned her 
in ways that she did not like and accepted different ideas that she evaluated as 
preferable for her. Another illustration of how Carole took up a practice that cared 
for herselfwhcn she was being invited into a deficit or loss construction of herself, 
was how she watched two comedy movies a day for four months when she first 
became ill. She said, 
It was the only way that I could think of intentionally [doing 
something). I couldn '( drive and things, so I sat and I watched 
comedies. I knew that that would fill in the time, that it would be 
uplifting, that it would help me cope, it was a planned strategy, 
laughing is good Iherapy, isn 'I it? 
r was interested in what ideas informed Carole's responses to position calls that 
invited her into an experience ofloss and being in deficit, for example, creating good 
news for herself when feeling overwhelmed with bad news, creating a space of shared 
understanding when she felt misunderstood, and creating an experience oflaughter 
when life felt desperate and unbearable. In response to this question, Carole spoke 
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about three social contexts: her family of origin, her work as a health professional and 
her family. She said she grew up in a family where people with disability were 
viewed as capable and never seen as "other" to her. In her work she spoke of seeing 
how difficulty in one's life produced a person who would "have more understanding 
and might have a big opportunity in their life to growenonnously." She also said 
that the "framework" she used in her work was very helpful for her in being able to 
analyse the "construction oflanguage, power structures and the forces that come on 
to a person". She described it as an "on-the-spot analysis that allows me to work 
things out, it's a huge resource [that] also provides a way of understanding kindly 
why people might do what they do". Carole's process of analysis appeared to enable 
her to re-position herself when she felt dis-empowered by others' actions but at the 
same time tend not to blame or position negatively people whose actions had 
positioned her problematically. She sought a socio-cultural-political understanding 
for people's actions. In Carole's analysis she de-constructed discourse and the impact 
of discourse on her. Consistent with this approach, was how Carole made sense of 
her body and her illness. She said, 
1 just always felt it [my body] was doing its best for me. 1 think that 
again that 1 had a good relationship with it [my body] in the past, 1 
think that makes a difference perhaps ... 1 seem to talk about how my 
body is but when I'm actually thinking about the illness 1 think about it 
separately ... the actual way that 1 think about it is that they're separate 
in a way ... [the body is having to] deal with it [the illness]... it 
deserves to be looked after ... and cared for. 
In this story, Carole has not conflated her body with her illness but separated them, 
constructing the illness as a problem for her body, thereby positioning herself to feel 
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compassion for her body, rather than feeling depressed or despairing about her ill 
body. Finally, Carole said that she felt her social circumstances provided a context of 
support and enabling for her. She referred to having a loving husband, living in a 
home environment that she found replenishing and economically being comfortable. 
She spoke about how much harder it would be if she did not have those resoW'ces, 
referring to a friend with the same illness who was a solo mother living on a domestic 
pW'poses' benefit. Again, in this analysis, Carole is noticing how the social context 
produces realities, constructing the kinds of experiences a person has. 
Carole drew on pre-illness narratives to resist position calls that disadvantaged her 
on account of her illness. However, Ron was born with a hearing impainnent and 
physical defonnities and can only ever remember speaking with a speech 
impairment. And like David's school experiences, Ron's growing up years were 
shaped by experiences of discrimination and marginalisation, especially during his 
schooling. Ron did however, emerge from his school experiences of being 
positioned as "other" to actively take a stand against practices that discriminated 
against him. For example, he told the story of how his teliiary class peers assumed 
he had an intellectual disability because of how he spoke. In response to their 
assumption about him having an intellectual impairment, Ron said to himself, "I 
don't think so. I thought, 'I'll show you buggers, I'm not stupid'. I understand at 
times and especially when I'm disfluent, I do appear to have an intellectual problem. 
Well, no, I can understand how they viewed it". 
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In this example, Ron has refused to be storied as someone who was stupid. In 
recounting this scene, Ron began to say when his speech was disfluent he did 
"appear to have" an intellectual problem but then he changed his language to state "I 
can understand how they viewed it." In this wording change, Ron created more 
agency for himself. "How they viewed it" suggests his classmates had a perspective 
or interpretation about him having an intellectual disability, whereas the words "I do 
appear" more constructs Ron as agreeing with his classmates or even believing that 
he looks as Ifhe has an intellectual disability when his speech is disfluent. 
When I asked Ron how he accounted for his determination to prove that people's 
assumptions about him were incorrect, he surmised that it would be related to having 
read detective fiction since he was fourteen years of age. He said he was an avid fan 
of Agatha Cbristie crime fiction and he had identified with the detective hero in the 
stories. He said: 
The hero is told they're wrong or the hero hits a dead-end or the hero 
goes off on a tangent to find it isn't the right one but our detectives 
often come up with a trump and it's their ability to keep going after 
being ridiculed, after getting to a dead-end, after seeing things that 
don't add up ... that resilience ... that keeps me going. It probably 
instilled in me that HI can do it". You have to go on despite the odds 
or regardless that you know that it's going to be a bad outcome. 
The ideas of "resilience" and "you have to go on despite the odds", became a theme 
in Ron's life. On a number of occasions he talked about "forever pushing the 
boundaries", which related to "the boundary that says 'don't speak up because you 
are going to be ridiculed' not because of what I say, but because of the way I'm 
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saying it." Ron told stories of specific times when he had pushed the boundaries, 
such as using radio telephones when driving a taxi or courier van, doing radio 
interviews and even counting down and starting ninety cars for a car race in which the 
timing of the countdown had to be precise. Ron said he was "forever looking for the 
next challenge," the purpose of which was to try to be like non-impaired people. He 
said: 
I'm only striving to be normal, so I don't see the things I've done with 
my speech as extra to what a lot of people have ... I'm not normal. I 
still believe it's only me coming up to, coming up to "normal" 
because I'm in deficit mode [but} I think that is just the way it is and I 
don't think I'd actually like it any other way ... I don't believe I'm 
ever going to be number one, number two is forever going to be the 
best place because you're forever working. 
In this description, Ron takes up the deficit subject position available to him within 
medical discourse but he then reframes the position to be that which he prefers, a 
position that enables him to be like the detective hero in Agatha Christie's novels, 
overcoming the odds and coming up with a trump card, the person who is not normal 
but is coming up to be nonna!. 
Ron's narrative of being in deficit mode but working to be normal, embodies a sense 
of struggle. He described his "speaking issue ... as a twenty four hour challenge" in 
which there was always a fear of "not being understood", "looking stupid" or "being 
ridiculed." However, in more recent years Ron's fear about his speaking became less 
and he attributed this to a smooth speaking programme he had undertaken, which he 
said improved his speaking fluency to the point where he "could actually talk to 
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people." He said the impact of this on him was that he was "more comfortable 
talking to people, [he) could hide his problem [and) a personality was starting to 
emerge [and) that personality was saying 'I'm here! '" Rehabilitation practice, as 
produced by medical discourse, enabled Ron to be less positioned in deficit. He 
responded by performing a subjectivity that previously had been impeded by the 
impact of his speech impairment on his relating to other people. In other words, he 
submitted to and achieved a degree of mastery on the terms of medical discourse and 
therefore was less positioned in the absence of nonnality as defined by medical 
discourse. Ron's desire to overcome and not be limited by his speech impairment 
was in part also informed by how he had felt inspired by a prominent Christian 
educator and media personality who had had a speech impainnent like his own. For 
over twenty years Ron said he had admired the man's "nerve, knowing he had a 
speech problem, to do a show like that." Ron said watching the TV show "re-started 
[his) faith journey." It offered him a subject position that declared the possibility of 
working with people in a public role whilst having a speech impairment. It was a 
position call that invoked the idea of not being limited by speech impainnent, to 
succeed on the grounds of medical discourse which was to become less disabled by 
overcoming and reducing the effects of the impairment on the person. 
Interestingly, in regard to his hearing loss, Ron did not define his impainnent on the 
tenns of medical discourse. He said: 
You see a lot of people say to me "Gh, you don't hear normally", 
which J reply, "Yes, J do hear normallyfor me." That isn't normal to 
the level that others hear, but I've always heard it ... J was talking to a 
lady ... who just got hearing aids ... and she was having some trouble 
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adjusting to it, and we got talking and she said to me, "so how bad is 
your hearing?" and I said, "it's anything between 45 and 50 odd 
percent" and she just about fell over, she said, "Oh, but you don't 
hear normally" and I said "yes, I do!'" 
In defining his hearing as "normal for me", Ron is taking np a suhject position akin to 
the philosophy of the social model of disability and disability rights' discourse. This 
is a different subject position to that which he takes up concerning his speech 
impainnent. A discursive contradiction co-exists in which Ron reproduces the tenns 
of the disability movement in regard to his hearing impainnent, but takes up the 
counter to the social model of disability, medical discourse, in his thinking about his 
speech impairment. Many debates, theoretical exposition and research agendas have 
occurred in relation to the social model being advocated as opposite ii-om and more 
advantageous for disabled people than the medical model and yet Ron reproduces 
both discourses simultaneously. One way of making sense of this contradiction is to 
consider the impact of visible versus invisible impairment. Carole's disclosures 
related to her illness for the most part being invisible to people, while the effects of it 
on her body were very visible to and impacting on her. From Ron's account, it was 
clear that the visibility of his speech impainnent caused him to have experiences in 
which he felt ridiculed by people and considered stupid. On the other hand, while he 
did speak of how he had been discriminated against as a child because of his hearing 
impairment, he told of no adult incidents of being positioned as "other" on account of 
his having a hearing impailment. He did wear hearing aids but this is not uncommon 
and there was no evidence that he had difficulty hearing what was said to him. 
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However, it was very evident that Ron had a speech impairment, which did impact on 
his conversations and communication with other people. 
Medical discourse constructed Ron in deficit for both his speech and hearing 
impairment but as an adult he was more able to refuse the position call of being in 
deficit in regard to his hearing impainnent because it was more invisible to others. 
Nevertheless, Ron still contested the deficit position call of medical discourse in 
relation to his speech impairment but more within the terms of medical discourse. 
That is, Ron liked to challenge an idea that he would not be able do something on 
account of his speech impainnent. For example, he got top marks in his class when 
he left school and later he trained and worked in an occupation that required him to 
be a proficient communicator. Ron took up the subject who worked at not being as 
disabled as medical discourse might position him to be. In regard to Ron 
understanding his hearing impainnent as normal for him, the extent to which Ron was 
very consciously taking up the social model of disability was not clear, but he did 
reflect on how ideas and practices about disability had changed over the last twenty 
years. He said, "difference is now embraced rather than shunned ... discourses 
around disabled people are definitely changing, society is becoming more 
accommodating". It may have been this knowledge that supported Ron to take a 
stand as an adult, against one of the teachers who he described as "picking on" him 
when he was at school. A number of years after leaving school, Ron recognised the 
teacher who had sent him to the new entrants' class to sit on the mat and had picked 
on him and a girl in his class "who also had disabilities." At the time he saw his ex-
teacher, Ron was working in a restaurant. He spoke of how he very deliberately 
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chose to serve his ex-teacher the "the scungiest, horriblist meal 1 could lower my 
standards to". In this moment, Ron refused the narrative of being a victim of 
discrimination. He re-positioned himself to "get even" with "the bully". 
Jan's aecount shared some similarities with Carole's and Ron's, in that she called on 
ideas and practices which enabled her to contest position calls that constructed her as 
"less than." When Jan first became ill, she was unable to meet the expectations she 
had grown up with concerning being a homemaker and so she storied herself as a 
complete failure. Further, the practices of the church she was attending at the time in 
which she became ill constructed her as being to blame and at fault for not receiving 
healing from God after she had been prayed for. In response to these deficit 
narratives, Jan began to review the assumptions that had guided her life. She said, 
1 don '/ have to do everything for everybody else. 1 don't have /0 fix 
everybody else's problems. Being a good mother constitutes more 
than just doing everything for your child and 1 wasn '/ allowing 
(name of husband) to be a good father cause 1 was so bwy doing it 
all which was really not good. 
Illness became the catalyst for Jan reviewing her family of origin beliefs. She said 
prior to her illness "I was too scared to say no if anyone asked me to do anything so 1 
would do it. I was probably in some ways killing myself, you know, to serve 
everybody else". In her illness forcing her to take up a different discursive practice in 
relation to how she performed as a woman, wife and mother, Jan came to the 
conclusion that it was sad that other women in her family had not had the chance to 
expelience this also. Jan was of the view that her illness had contributed toward 
improving her marriage. She said, "I actually wonder where our marriage would be, I 
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think we would still be together but how strong would it be?" In inquiring what ideas 
might have supported the shift to no longer require that she serve others in the way 
she had been, Jan talked about a different church she began attending once she felt 
blamed by her old church for no longer receiving healing. In the new church, Jan 
said the husband and wife ministered equally and she thought that the combination of 
that faith environment, along with "a lot of prayer" gave her "the freedom to 
experiment a little bit more I guess with who [she] was." She came to the "realisation 
that it was God's prerogative whether or not [she] was healed." In the new church, 
Jan said, women were not treated as "second class citizens." 
The dominant story for Carole, J an and Ron was that illness and impairment meant 
they took up subject positions of disadvantage. However, within these stories of 
deficit and loss they called on known and helpful narrative story-lines and took up 
new subject positions so as to be able to recognise and contest those subject positions 
which disadvantaged them. 
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THE COMPLEXITY OF DISABLEMENT AND AGENTIC 8 ACTION: A CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL STORIES TO THEORY, 
RESEARCH AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 
This study began as a response to Corker and Shakespeare's (2002) contention that 
"disability is the ultimate postmodern concept. .. [because 1 it is too complex to be 
rendered within one unitary model or set of ideas" (p.15). Corker and Shakespeare 
argued that disabled people are not a minority like other minority groups because 
impairment and illness would still cause disablement even if discrimination on the 
basis of impairment and illness were to be completely erased. Moreover, they 
contended that the range of impainnents and illnesses people can have is extremely 
diverse, creating a much greater degree of variance between disabled people's 
expeliences than the diversity experienced within other minority groups. In making 
this statement about the complexity of disablement, Shakespeare and Corker are 
claiming that the disability experience can not be reduced to a single nnderlying and 
essential structure or model. Instead, they are taking a more postrnodern stance in 
which experience is viewed as pluralist, multiple and fi'agmented (Bun', 2002). This 
postrnodern position was one with which J was already familiar and committed to at 
the time of reading Corker and Shakespeare's thesis about the complexity of 
disablement. Indeed, an important aspect of discourse theory is that people's lives are 
constituted by multiple discourses. Hence, irrespective of whet bel' disability is 
claimed to be too complex for one unitary model or set of ideas, discourse theory 
would suggest that all people's experiences are too complex to be completely 
understood or represented by any single theoretical reductionist analysis. 
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In relating discourse theory to disability, I held two assumptions prior to commencing 
this study; firstly, that (some) discourses were not beneficial but would work to the 
detriment of those persons who are viewed as having an illness or impainnent, and 
secondly, that while the participants' lives would demonstrate disadvantage and 
discrimination because of the presence of illness and impainnent, their lives would 
also demonstrate resistance to those position calls that produced such effects on them. 
Hence, one of my aims for this study was to explore how existing theories within 
Disability Studies relate to the lives of people with impainnent and illness, with 
partieular attention being paid to what various discourses meant for how the 
participants were able to live their lives. Critical to this inquiry was the extent to 
which the participants had access to and consciously took up preferred subject 
positions, as well as what proeesses occurred that enabled them to negotiate and 
experience moments of agency and what discourses they called on as they took up 
preferred narratives. 
However, in addition to my purpose of relating the post-structural concepts of 
discourse, narrative and agency to the experience of disablement, a secondary interest 
arose for me in the course of this study, namely, how nan'ative therapy ideas and 
practices might relate to and infonn narrative research methods and discourse 
analysis. These questions arose because my background as a nan'ative therapist 
influenced the way I undertook this research project. The details of how I combined 
aspects of narrative research and discourse analysis in this study have already been 
discussed in Chapter Four. In addition to theorising the particularity of the narrative-
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discourse methodology undertaken in this study, several of the participants spoke 
directly about or alluded to how, through the process of being involved in the study, 
they had come to new understandings about their experiences which had been helpful 
for them. In many respects, this outcome is not very different from that which 
nalTative therapists might seek to facilitate for their clients: people (clients) having an 
increased sense of agency as a result of participating in the process of nanative 
therapy. In light of this finding, nalTative research with a discursive agenda does 
have much to offer disabled people (Smith & Sparkes, 2008) and certainly avoids 
Oliver's (1993,1996) and others' (Bury, 1996; Scotch, 2002) concerns that 
researching disability only serves the purpose of the researcher(s) while fuliher 
positioning disabled people to expelience disadvantage and disempowennent. 
Given these two foci (disabled people's experiences of discourse and their 
con'esponding actions of agency, plus the advantages of combining naITative research 
with a discursive analysis), my focus in this final chapter is to explore the potential 
contribution of this study for Disability Studies. The chapter begins with a discussion 
of the dominance of medical discourse, and the advantages and limitations of 
disability rights' discourses. The chapter continues by highlighting aspects of the 
participants' processes of agency, noting the intersection between power relations, 
language, subject positions and agency in the accounts given by the participants. In 
this eXa!l1ination, suggestions are made concerning future directions and foci for 
disability research, theory and professional practice. 
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The dominance of medical discourse 
The accounts given by the participants in this study SUppOlt the Disability Studies 
literature in which it has been argued that disabled people are viewed negatively on 
account of their having an impainnent and/or illness (Hunt, 1966; MOlTis, 1991; 
Shakespeare,2006). David, John, Fay, Carole, Jan and Ron's stories were particular 
to each of their respective life experiences but taken as a group, their stories illustrate 
how people with impainnent and/or illness have experiences in which they are told or 
feel that they are different from non-disabled people. Their stOlies, for the most part, 
suggest that when disabled people are constructed as being different from non-
disabled people then, typically, they experience disadvantage and discrimination. 
The ways in whieh the participants of this study took up deficit subject positions have 
been detailed earlier in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. David, John, Fay, Carole, Jan 
and Ron's accounts encompassed a number of contexts, induding experiences at 
school, in the workforce, at church, in health settings, in sport and at home. David 
shared how when he was ten years of age, his peers at school said that he did not 
belong with them. When he was eleven years of age, another boy told him that he 
should have been aborted. John said when he initially becanle blind he was "known 
as the blind man" who stood out. He was not "one of the crowd" as when he 
subsequently became involved with other blind people at the Royal New Zealand 
Foundation of the Blind (RNZFB). As "the blind man" who was "unusual and 
different", John said he was "led by his blindness". His preference he said was to 
"assimilate" alongside others, which he described as "walk[ingJ alongside his 
blindness". Fay said she was advised she was making it personal when she advocated 
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· for her disabled clients in meetings at her work. Fay's colleagues considered her 
personal experience of impairment and illness was unduly biasing her professional 
opinion. It was not viewed as legitimate for Fay to have her experiences of disability 
infonn her ideas about people in the realm of her profession. Personal knowledge 
about disability was not viewed as helpful for or equivalent to professional 
knowledge. Fay, Carole and Jan each spoke of how they were initially invited into 
ideas about failing and/or feeling guilty as a parent because of the limitations their 
imp ailment and/or illness placed on them for what they could no longer physically do 
in their role as a mother. Carole also said her illness meant she was given less 
challenging work to do in her job and that she had not found a way to disclose her 
illness without denigrating herself. Jan talked about her experiences within a church 
where it was expected that she ask for prayer to be healed of her illnesses but was 
then blamed by people in her church when she did not receive healing. Ron spoke of 
being picked on and treated unfairly by teachers when he was at school on account of 
his having hearing and speech impairments. Later, when he had left school and was 
undertaking tertiary study, Ron said his classmates assumed he had an intellectual 
disability because of how he spoke as a person with a speech impairment. 
Medical discourse constructs impairment and illness as the absence of health. When 
people are classified as having an impairment or illness, then in effect they are 
subjected to the idea that they have something wrong with them. Medical discourse 
on these terms is broader and more encompassing that just medical practice. David's 
story illustrates this point. His first memory of being involved in any kind of medical 
practice, was physiotherapy at fifteen years of age. David's parents did not take up 
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medical discourse in how they related to David. He had no memory of them ever 
speaking about him having an impairment, being disabled or having any kind of 
disability. However, well before David remembered visiting the physiotherapist, he 
was subjected to discrimination at his school. His peers called him "spastic" and 
"retard". At the time in which this occurred, David had not engaged with medical 
discourse but his friends and peers at school had and in his interaction with them he 
was objectified as being different from and not belonging with them. 
The problem for disabled people concerning medical discourse is that any 
classification of impairment and illness is a construction that implies abnormality. 
This construction occurred when medicine shifted its focus "from' dis-ease' [in the 
eighteenth century] to diseases" (Porter, 2006, p.83) in the nineteenth century. In 
"Birth of the Clinic" (1963), Foucault noted that in comparison to eighteenth century 
medicine, nineteenth century medical practice was "regulated more in accordance 
with normality than health; it fonned its concepts and prescribed its interventions in 
relation to a standard of functioning and organic structure" (Foucault, 1963, p.35). 
Medicine focuses on the diagnosis and treatment of pathology for the purpose of 
curing and alleviating illness and impainnent. It is an ambitious and somewhat never 
ending project. Despite the many technological advances in medicine over the years, 
recovery from all impairment and illness continues to elude medical science. The 
result therefore, at this point in time, is that medicine is not completely successful on 
the terms of its own agenda. Irrespective of a contradiction between the agenda of 
medicine and the degree of success achieved by medical practice relative to its 
agenda, health in the Western world has remained unchallenged as "the duty of each 
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and the objective of all" (Foucault, 1980, p. 170). This assumed legitimacy, within 
medical discourse, to prioritise health as an obvious objective for all people, has 
produced medicine to become "a world power [with 1 social privilege, economic 
power, and political influence" (Starr, 1982, p.4-5). Unfortunately, people with 
impainnents and illness are not well-positioned within medical discourse to benefit 
from such privilege, power or influence. Instead, they encapsulate and depict 
abnonnality, providing a contrast with which people can favourably compare 
themselves, thereby being able to take up the privileged subject position ofnonnality 
or being nonnal. 
However, to state that medical discourse only constructs deficit positions for people 
with impainnents and/or illness does not present the entire story concerning how 
medical discourse constituted the lives of the participants. With the exception of 
David, all the participants gave accounts of how they had been subjected to medical 
discourse's agenda of rehabilitation and/or medical recovery. In taking up the subject 
position of endeavouring to adapt well to an impainnent or achieve increased levels 
of health, the participants did, at times, experience an increased sense of mastery on 
the terms of medical discourse. For example, Ron's speech impainnent lessened 
when he attended a speech therapy intensive, which proved to be very helpful by 
enabling him to communicate more freely. Ron said that as his speech improved, it 
"started to change the way I viewed myself. I was probably more comfortable in 
talking to people. I could hide my problem. There was quite a wacky personality 
starting to emerge." By experiencing a reduction in his level of impairment, Ron was 
positioned less in deficit on the ternlS of medical discourse. He was able to take up a 
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subject position in which he had more agency because his impaim1ent was less. Fay, 
also, very intentionally engaged with medical practice in regard to exploring 
medications that reduced the progression of her RA. She said, "long term ifit's 
(rheumatoid arthritis) not treated properly or quickly enough then you can get a 
reasonable amount of being out of control 'cause it's an auto-immune disorder." 
Hence, Fay participated in and experienced the medical progress that could be 
achieved through phannacology. 
Jolm did not speak about his own joumey of blindness rehabilitation but did speak as 
someone with knowledge and experience of blindness rehabilitation. For example, he 
made comments about how an orientation and mobility instructor should have 
responded in their role of supporting a blind person ride on a bus. Indeed, John's life 
was a kind of demonstration that he had achieved the goals of blindness rehabilitaion. 
Much of John's narrative storyline, of blindness being an opportunity for him, had 
been enabled by rehabilitation discourse. Like Ron, as John succeeded on the tenns 
of rehabilitation and medical discourse, he became less constructed in deficit by those 
discourses. Jan's story was that her illnesses had not progressed to the extent that 
medical specialists had predicted. As the subject who was doing better than 
expected, Jan was experiencing some improvement in relation to how she was able to 
measure herself against the expectations of medical discourse. Carole's joumey of 
success within the terms of medical discourse was different than Jan's. Carole had 
not experienced any improvement through medical practice and was very much aware 
of how quickly her illness was progressing. However, tln'ough noticing that she did 
not like the effect on her offeeling sad and thinking negative thoughts, she had 
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decided to very intentionally position herself to collect good news about her body. 
As she began achieving some physical milestones she had set for herself, she was 
indeed generating good news about her body. This enabled her to engage with her 
familiar narrative storyline of "being determined" and "never being a giver-upperer". 
As a fonner sportswoman, this was a subject position that Carole had always enjoyed 
and preferred. 
In describing some of the participants' accounts about the respective gains each had 
made in regard to reducing the disabling impact of their impainnents and/or illnesses 
on their lives, it is worth noting that researching the process, effects and relative 
merits of medical and rehabilitation practice has always been the domain of medicine, 
rehabilitation and perhaps medical sociology. Academic scholars within Disability 
Stndies have taken up a counter position to medical discourse. Advocates of the 
social model of disability have referred to the medical model as the individual tragedy 
theory of disability (Oliver, 1983, 1990, 1996). Their argument is that disability is a 
socially created phenomenon, produced by a society which does not accommodate 
the needs of people with impainnent (Barnes, 1992; Oliver, 1990, 1996). 
The advantages and limitations of disability rights' discourses 
Disability rights' discourses have provided alternative subject positions for people 
with impairment and/or illness. Indeed, Jolm and Fay's accounts were conspicuous 
by the relative absence of deficit descriptions. John spoke positively about his life, 
claiming "it's never been better for me ... as a person, ain't ever been better". The 
life that John was referring to was his life after becoming blind: working as a blind 
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professional, representing his country in sport, becoming married, and enabling his 
children to have the option to attend university when no previous generations in his 
family had ever been given this opportunity. Fay's account of having an impairment 
and illness was similar to Jolm's, in that she described her rheumatoid arthritis (RA), 
"as a gift given to me." She said RA was the catalyst for her living differently, 
including relating to her family differently, understanding her body differently, 
thinking about her faith and spirituality differently, and undertaking training and 
beginning a new career. David's account of his life was not like Fay and John's, in 
that, for many years the only subject position available to him was a deficit position. 
However, in telling his story, David was no longer caught in the subject position of 
his teenage years as the boy who felt "disdained". He was able to reflect on those 
years as having been defining experiences for him. He told his account from the 
position of someone who had traveled through the years of marginalisation and 
discrimination to become the subject who could identify and speak against disablism. 
He challenged the deficit subject position of medical discourse by becoming the 
"spastic with attitude" who "owned the [spastic] label now ... it didn't own me, I 
owned it!" As the disabled but proud subject, David had committed himself to 
working with and improving life for other disabled people. By these actions, David 
refused the subject position of privilege and opportunity offered to him by his father 
in being mentored into the family business. Instead of continuing to take up this 
entrepreneurial agenda of striving for wealth and competing successfully in the 
market place, David shifted his orientation to prioritise an ethic of care and justice for 
other disabled people. 
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David and John's careers, in the field of disability rights and education, suggest that 
impainnent was not necessarily a disability for them but most likely served them 
well. John described himself as someone who was "having a crack at changing 
society." He said only another blind person could "do the job the way I have done 
it." Jolm's involvement with the RNZFB had not only assisted him to develop skills 
of orientation, independence and mobility as a blind person but had also provided the 
means by which he developed a career in blindness awareness and advocacy. This 
was a role that was not prohibited to him because he was blind but perhaps even the 
inverse, since being blind gave John a unique credibility when he was "on the 
soapbox" campaigning for the needs and rights of blind people. The same could be 
argued for David, as authenticity is invoked when a disabled person is advocating for 
and supporting other disabled people. In their jobs, David and John were the subjects 
who had 'insider' or 'local' knowledge (Foucault, 1980; Geertz, 1983) about the 
experience of disablement. In their careers, David and John took up and embodi.ed 
the cause of the disability movement, which was to "mobilise for equal citizenship ... 
[resisting] a demeaning reliance on charity, [and] demand[ing] their rights" 
(Shakespeare, 2006, p.30). 
Disability rights' discourses have provided the cultural-political context whereby 
disabled people, like John and David, have become valued for the knowledge and 
understanding they have of the disability experience. Jolm and David's experiences 
in the world of disability politics needs to be understood in tenns of how they had 
been positioned within the history of the disability movement in New Zealand. 
Within recent years, due to the work of disability rights, a strategic shift has occurred 
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in the Western world, in which disabled people have become re-positioned from 
being recipients of help to becoming their own advocates of change. Here in New 
Zealand, the 'New Zealand Council for the Disabled Incorporated' changed its name 
in 1983 to the 'Disabled Persons Assembly (New Zealand) Incorporated'. The 
organisation shifted from having an agenda of helping disabled people to being the 
vehicle by which disabled people campaigned for their own rights. Similarly, the 
Royal New Zealand Foundation of the Blind Act became law in 2002, which 
mandated that the governing board ofRNZFB was voted in by the Foundation 
members, most of whom were legally blind. The RNZFB changed its name from the 
'Royal New Zealand Foundation/or the Blind' to the 'Royal New Zealand 
Foundation a/the Blind' [my italics}. lohn's involvement with blind awareness and 
advocacy occurred throughout this period. He well understood the intersection 
between his life as a blind person and the era of blindness and disability politics of 
which he was a part. He said, "It's never been better for blind people than it is right 
now ... it's the blind man that gets the opportunity, it's because I'm blind that I've 
had that opportunity." 
In contrast to David and John, the other participants were not directly involved in 
disability awareness, education and support of disabled people in such specific ways. 
Nonetheless, Fay, Carole, Jan and Ron's accOlmts showed how they had, at different 
times, taken up ideas and practices that prioritised a disability rights' perspective. 
Ron, for example, spoke about his bearing being fifty percent which was "normal" for 
him, indicating how he refused to story his heating loss in deficit terms. Jan argued 
how it was unfair that she was denied home help because of being too young for the 
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illnesses she had. Carole had refused to be storied as someone who was less able to 
do challenging work on account of having an illness. She also resisted the invitation 
to only collect bad news about her body. Fay, when she first became ill, had 
difficulty understanding why her family was not helping her more with the work in 
the home, stating she expected her family to assist with the impact of her illness on 
her. Later, Fay had come to learn about the social model of disability and she said 
she had come to see how both the medical and social models inforn1ed how she made 
sense of, and responded to, experiences. Carole also discussed the medical model, 
and spoke respectfully and appreciatively of people who she described as having 
difficulties with their bodies. Ron spoke of how attitudes towards disabled people 
had changed, with society in recent years having become more accommodating of 
disabled people. 
Given these examples of how the pmticipants called on disability rights' ideas m1d 
practices to take up positions in which they were either advantaged or they refused 
positions of disadvantage, disability rights' discourses contributed to constructing 
opportunities and alternatives for the participants. However, there were other times 
when the pmiicipants resisted one subject position, preferring another and the process 
they called on to do this was not, for the most pati, overtly infonned by disability 
rights' discourses. Their actions of agency at the time of intersection between their 
narrative accounts of themselves and the social experiences they encountered, 
appeared to often be quite a new construction of meaning-making for them, one that 
was not necessarily identifiable to a disability rights' discourse. Hence, agency for 
the participants appeared to be less straightforward than conjecturing, for example, 
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that the ideas ofnonnalisation and social role valorization helped David train, have a 
career and be financially independent just like non-disabled people. Another example 
would be assuming that Carole refused to be given less challenging work in her job 
because she knew she was being discriminated against on the basis of her illness, at 
which point she took a stand against the way societal attitudes, not her illness, was 
disabling her. This action would be an example of Carole accepting the position call 
of disability rights discourse. However, there was no indication from Carole's 
account that she had taken up disability rights ideas when she resisted against her 
workplace practice of no longer being given challenging work since having an illness. 
Instead, Carole named and critically questioned how people's actions of "kindness" 
meant she had been treated differently and disadvantaged on account of her having an 
illness. 
Often, the negotiation of agency in the lives of the participants seemed more complex 
than my theoretical example of the disabled swimmer that I discussed earlier in 
Chapters Three and Four. In this illustration, the disabled swimmer either accepted 
the position call of medical discourse or refused it by calling on social model 
discourse, or even simultaneously accepted both position calls at the same time. 
However, in light of the participants' accounts, the subject positions they took up 
when acting with agency more reflected Davies et al. 's (2006, p. 93) view that a 
person is "constituted by multiple discourses, a subject who is in process, a verb 
rather than a noun." Potentially, the narrative and discursive resources available to 
people is multiple but at the same time very limited. They are multiple, because 
people would always have had experiences of and exposure to many discursive 
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resources by which to respond to a deficit position call in a way that might enable 
them to have agency, but limited because the power relation involved in the subject 
position produced by the dominant discourse is likely to colonise a person's meaning-
making unless they have a well rehearsed counter discursive reply available to call 
on. An example of this was when Fay insisted that her rheumatologist work 
collaboratively with her and she actively resisted when he prescribed h'eatment 
without consulting her. She called on some negative experiences in hospital as a 
child to resist medical discourse's subject position of the patient who complies with 
the doctor. However, there were other times when the participants' expressions of 
agency represented them taking up a new subject position, such as when David 
decided he would like to make the world a better place for the person with an 
intellectual disability to whom he had just delivered a television. In that moment, he 
changed subject positions from being the young businessmen following in his father's 
footsteps to the disability advocate, and yet there is no evidence that he was 
consciously calling on disability rights' discourse when he did this. Indeed, it may 
have been his mother's ethic of compassion, care and solidarity in refusing to treat 
David as disabled, that David was taking up when he decided he wanted to help a 
man with an intellectual disability have "a better life." 
What I have found interesting about the participants' actions of agency, therefore is 
that when they took up a new subject position, it often did not appear to represent an 
obvious reproduction of any disability rights' discourse. If this be so, then one 
implication for Disability Studies is that theorising of disablement has been useful for 
offering counter discourses to medical discourse and helpful for promoting the 
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disability rights' agenda in institutional matters, (such as the law, social policy, 
professional practice), but that the journey to equal rights and removal of social 
barriers for disabled people will not only be on the terms of the global political 
actions but will often be negotiated at a local level within the discursive complexity 
of individual's lives. In regard to the relevance of individual actions of resistance, 
Peters, Gabel and Symeonidou (2009) have noted that: 
The disabled people's movement has frequently relied on tactics of 
contestation or 'single issue pressure group activity targeted at political 
decisionmakers' (Oliver 1990, p. 113), rather than on strategies of 
resistance that educate, 'conscientization' and take political action 
aimed at underlying sources of discrimination in the broader society ... 
Understanding resistance globally at both the individual and collective 
level, and using it strategically, opens up a space for improved 
opportunities to create societies that are more just and equitable and 
fi'eer from oppression. (p.546) 
Researching people's processes of negotiating agency does, in my opinion, 
acknowledge and seek to learn how resistance to the subjugation of people with 
impainnent andJor illness is both a local practice, as well as a global action. 
Moreover, it is through local actions of agency that new and alternative discourses 
emerge. For example, Paul Hunt met with other disabled people in the UK, which led 
to the fonnation of UPIAS, which in turn re-defined disability that then became the 
cornerstone of the disability movement and Disability Studies. Hence, it is important 
to research what Foucault (1980) referred to as "popular knowledges" from across the 
spectrum of those who have been disadvantaged on account of having an impairment 
and illness so as to discover the kinds of discursive and narrative resources that 
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people call on when they refuse those position calls that have been problematic for 
them. It is for this very reason that I have viewed the different illness and impainnent 
experiences of the participants of this study as a strength of the research. For 
example, David and Ron were bom with impairments. David has a clearly visible 
physical and speech impainnent and Ron experiences speech and hearing 
impainnents. Carole and Fay have progressive illnesses that impact their health and 
body abilities. John is blind. Jan has different illnesses, is hearing impaired and 
experiences medical fragility as a daily aspect of her life. 
In theorising aspects of David, John, Fay, Carole, Jan and Ron's accounts in earlier 
chapters, tln'ee distinct narrative themes emerged: David's 'into, through and beyond 
deficit discourse', John and Fay's 'politics of difference and non-deficit identity 
claims', and Carole, Jan and Ron's 'actions of agency within deficit discourse'. The 
differences between the thematic nmratives I have constructed in my telling of the 
participants' stories are quite considerable, which I would argue relates in part to the 
dissimilarity between the kinds of impail111ents and illnesses the pm·ticipants had. 
That is, the kind of impainnent and/or illness a person has is likely to impact what 
subject positions are available to them. For example, I would argue that Jan and 
Carole, with their chronic but largely invisible illnesses, were probably less able to 
take up the social model of disability discourse than David and John, both of whom 
had very visible impainnents. Interestingly, the social model of disability makes no 
allowance for levels or types of disablement varying depending on the nature of a 
person's impairment mld/or illness. Disability rights' discourses would typically be 
attributed to constructing John and Fay's narratives of 'politics of difference and 11011-
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deficit identity claims' and yet as discussed, all the participants had at different times 
taken up disability rights' discourses. Carole, .Tan and Ron tended to take up different 
discursive constmctions than disability lights in their actions of agency. David and 
John were involved in public relations and disability rights and education roles and 
therefore it might be anticipated that disability rights' discourses would be 
constmcting their actions of agency. However, in contrast to this expectation, their 
actions of agency and indeed all the participants' processes of agency, were unique to 
each person's respective nan·ative and discursive journey, which inevitably involved 
engagement with more social contexts than just medical and disability rights' 
discourses. 
Hence, I would argue that disability rights' discourses are not the unequivocal and 
only answer for disabled people. As Shakespeare (2006, p.198) has claimed, 
"disability studies should be pluralist, valuing analytical rigour and debate. Disability 
researchers should look outwards and engage with medical sociology, bioethics and 
other areas of academia." In this study, with its emphasis on discourse and narrative, 
with a particular focus on agency, I have sought to take up this invitation. 
Processes of agency 
Ron's narrative story line of being "a fighter" who overcame the odds as a person with 
hearing and speech problems, arose through his identification with the detective hero 
in Agatha Christie novels. During his teenage years, Ron said he indulged in these 
novels as an excursion into "a world that seemed simple and easier". He liked the 
way the novels invariably had a twist in the end, where the "detective surprised 
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everyone and cracked the case." This idea became so much a metaphor for Ron's life 
that he stated he preferred being second to first because in second place you "could 
always come from behind." Ron's life was a testimony to him engaging in this 
underdog subjectivity. For example, he surprised his classmates with how well he 
did in his studies after school. He counted down a stock car race, which was a very 
significant achievement given his speech impainnent. He drove taxis which involved 
him having to communicate frequently and fluently using a two-way radio, and he 
trained in a profession that required him to be an excellent communicator. It would 
appear that Ron's story of himself was how he succeeded in doing those activities 
which were difficult for him to do on account of his impainnent. This story could be 
viewed as an account that had been solely constituted by rehabilitation and medical 
discourse, where Ron adapted to and reduced the degree by which his impainnents 
disabled him. At the same time, it could be argued that Ron's detennination to not 
have his impainnents prevent him from engaging in activities suggests he had taken 
up the 'disabled and proud' mantra of disability rights discourse. However, 
according to Ron's account, what produced him to take up a subject position that 
provided him with a sense of success was his identification with the detective in 
crime fiction, a discourse that is beyond the tenns of reference discussed in Disability 
Studies. 
Fay and Jan's accounts could be referred to as stories that are unique to the subject 
positions into which women are called. Their experience of impainnent or illness 
meant they could no longer sustain the narratives they had been engaged in as women 
plior to having an impainnent or illness, especially in relation to how they practised 
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being wives and mothers. Impain11ent and illness became the experience which 
enabled them to review the subject positions they had taken up as women. Pay came 
to realize she could pursue a different career and she could still support her husband 
by what she could offer emotionally and spiritually. Feminist discourses, more than 
disability rights' discourses, informed Fay when she shifted her position in relation to 
what she could commit to as a woman. Similarly, Jan gave up the practice learned 
within her family of origin of "having to do everything for everybody else [and] fix 
everybody else's problems." She came to realise that "being a good mother 
constitutes more than just doing everything for your child [and] because of the illness 
I've listened to people, especially to my daughter." Jan credited her illness with 
enabling her to have made this change and for having an improved relationship with 
her husband and daughter. She said, "I think we, [my husband and I], have a stronger 
friendship because we have taken the time to sit down and talk, we enjoy each other's 
company more and we appreciate the time we spend together." In this example, Jan 
has privileged relationship and communication discourse over working class women 
and puritan work ethic discourses. 
Jan said she had been examining her family of origin as part of the study she had been 
doing and had come to realise she had "grown up in an abusive family [in which] I 
could tind no strengths". In contrast to relationships based on abuse, Jan said she was 
seeing examples of "good relationships in the [new] church" she was attending, in 
which the "pastor and his wife ministered equally together, his wife was respected as 
a pastor. .. [and] he publicly claimed her to be equal with him and it was ... teaching 
that women weren't second class citizens." Jan also credited her relationship with 
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God as helping her "change and grow". She viewed her illness as "God's way of 
slowing me down" and that without her illness, her marriage "would not be as strong 
as it is now ... [and she] wouldn't trade the world for that". Hence, in response to the 
experience of illness, Jan's nanatives changed as she experimented and engaged with 
different subject positions. These changes were infonned by communication and 
relationship discourses, feminist discourses, and faith discourses. 
In contrast to Jan's experiences of taking up new narratives in adulthood, Carole's 
pre-illness nanatives sustained and enabled her to take up agency through the 
difficult experience of having an illness. She drew on her sense of identity as a 
sportswoman and her analysis of power learned through her profession, to re-position 
herself when she felt positioned in deficit and not heard. She said "I would notice 
what it is that connects me with feelings of grief or different power hierarchies. I 
would review that and think about what I might need to do to talk to myself kindly 
about that or do something differently about that." Carole also had an historical story 
of herself as "qnite a happy sort of a person. I'm not an anxious person so it's not 
natural for me to have worries" [and she was used to] "consciously connecting myself 
to different sorts of feelings. I would be an agent in that, rather than just thinking 
negative thoughts. I feel I have control and I act on it." Hence, Carole brought 
considerable awareness and skills to her experience of having an illness. These 
nmTatives had been constituted prior to Carole becoming ill, infonned by a range of 
discursive experiences, including but perhaps not restricted to feminist ideas and 
sport discourses. Carole's experience of illness was relatively new for her, several 
years at the time I interviewed her. Her understanding of how her illness had 
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impacted her life was different from some of the other participants, in that she 
considered "it [the illness] has not added to my life in any way." 
John's experiences, of course, were very different from Carole's in that he viewed his 
blindness as having created an opportunity for him to have a better life. John's 
subject positions changed after he became blind as he learned additional skills and 
took up a career in promoting blindness awareness and advocacy. However, John's 
life as a blind person was still very much informed by his working class, poor, single 
parent family narrative in which he had storied himself as a "hard nut." As John told 
his story, he took pride in the way he could challenge people, refusing to do what was 
asked of him ifhe so chose, commanding attention, and making an impact on a crowd 
of people. The "hard nut" subjectivity had not been passed over for other ways of 
being a man. He knew himself as the man who on the sports field, whether boyhood 
rugby or goal ball for blind people, would be extremely competitive. He said, when 
playing sport, "I don't give an inch, not one bloody inch". Even though John, by his 
very actions, was at the forefront of human rights and minority group politics, his 
childhood and yonth narrative storylines continued to constitute how he perforn1ed as 
the blind professional. Hence, while John embodied the subject position of disability 
rights' ideas and practices, he was also simultaneously taking up working class, 
dominant masculine, and sport competition discourses. 
Ron and David were the two participants who had no pre-impainnent narratives for 
they had always known life as people who had impainnents. Much of their narratives 
were shaped by the discriminatory subject positions they experienced at school. 
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David found subject positions that afforded him a greater sense of belonging within 
marginalised groups, such as the rebel group at school and later visiting sex workers. 
The combination of mastering the terms of these particular discursive practices, along 
with some key moments in which he was able to take up agency, enabled David over 
time to re-write his nanatives from deficit descriptions to narratives where he was the 
advocate of change for other disabled people. Such subject positions, while being 
representative of disability rights discourse, were not, according to David's aecount, 
entirely the production of disability rights' ideas and practices. A key aspect of 
David's journey to agency was the re-description of what the word "spastic" meant 
for him, from a label that denigrated him to a word that he owned and wore with 
pride. The shift for David in his relationship with the word "spastic" did not occur at 
a disability rights' meeting or rally or through reading Disability Studies literature but 
through love-making when his partner called him a "spastic" as a positive term when 
they were having sex. In being called the very word that had claimed his entry into 
disablism but during the time that he was taking up and enjoying sex discourse, 
David was able re-construct what the word meant for him. It was an experience 
generated through the conflation of discourses, when a possibility arises for the 
meanings held within one discourse to be exchanged for prefened meanings within 
another discourse. Indeed, this is the process of agency as defined by Davies, "when 
a person ... having a sense of oneself that can go beyond the meanings in anyone 
discourse ... [can] forge something new ... through imagining not what is but what 
might be" (Davies, 1991, p. 51). By re-describing the meaning of the word "spastic" 
to himself, David had been able to refuse the deficit subject position of being a 
spastic in a pejorative sense. And while David's account showed that he had taken up 
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disability rights' discourse in his journey of endeavoring to find belonging and 
acceptance again, his commentary indicated that it was sex and relationship 
discourses that provided him with access to a new subject position where he re-
described what "spastic" meant for him. 
In very different circumstances, Ron also found he was able to take up agency in 
respect of re-wliting the subject position he had been subjected to at school, as a boy 
who had been discriminated against by some of his teachers. Ron told how he had 
"got even" when as an adult he had the opportunity to serve a meal to a former 
teacher of his whom he remembered had bullied him when he was at school. Ron no 
longer took up the subject position of the picked on and bullied child but took up a 
subject position that constructed his fonner teacher as the victim by serving him "the 
scungiest meal I could lower my standards to." In this moment of "revenge", Ron 
called on the autonomy and seniority of his role within his place of employment. His 
old teacher was on his discursive domain where Ron was no longer a pupil but a 
person with authority. The context provided the opportunity for Ron to take up 
agency and re-author an old and problematic narrative for himself as someone who 
had struggled to believe that he could succeed: 
One's being shifts with the various discourses through which one is 
spoken into existence. The individual or heroic "1" is understood as a 
discursive construction, not stemming from the particular 
characteristics of that person but fi·om the subject position made 
available to him/her. (Davies, 1991, p.43). 
Whilst the discursive context that enabled Ron to take up agency could have been 
disability rights' discourse, on this occasion it appeared to be more the opportunity 
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presented through employment discourse. Of course, ideas of disability rights may 
well have been infonning Ron at the time he took up the moment of "revenge" but 
even so, his account indicated that this was only one of several discursive ideas that 
prompted him to challenge the deficit subject position from his school years. 
Secret, subjugated and contradictory subject positions 
Carole referred to her daily experience of having an illness as her "secret world." 
Carole's illness was not easily noticeable or visible, which produced a disclosure 
dilemma for her. If she wanted to be heard and understood in her experience of 
illness then she needed to tell people what she was experiencing. However, the 
problem for her was that she had not found people's responses to her disclosure about 
her illness as helpful for her, thereby creating a bigger "secret world." Carole said 
she did not like the "secret world" and found it "quite depressing." Part of Carole's 
"secret world" involved her deciding how to act on contradictory subject positions. 
For example, Carole intentionally told people in her place of employment that "it is 
actually good for me to come to work because it forces me to sit down for a few 
hours every day and that is really good for me." In saying this, Carole was taking up 
a position as a subject who enjoys her work and sees it as an important part of coping 
with her illness. 
Carole was aware that her work was "difficult" for her and that "a lot of people don't 
do paid work with this [illness]." However, she chose to "present a different idea" 
about how she experienced work because she had "genuinely realised over the 
holidays that this was part of the active things that I needed to do". Clearly, Carole 
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was concemed that if she had presented both experiences, that work was good for her 
and it was difficult for her, then people would have responded more to the 
construction that work is difficult for her. She had previously experienced people not 
hearing her and "thinking I don't mean it" when she had said "I am fine to do that 
work". As a result, Carole shared only how work was good for her and the other 
aspect of her experienee, that work was difficult for her, became storied in her "secret 
world". Although Carole was the only participant who talked of having a "secret 
world", the other participants discussed times when their experiences were specific to 
their impain11ent and/or illness, and therefore were beyond other people's 
understanding. 
Jan struggled with the dilemma of whether to have sex with her husband and "risk 
having an angina attack", or not have sex with her husband thereby not risking angina 
but rulming the risk of "him getting his sexual needs met elsewhere." Jan said she 
"struggled" with this problem but eventually talked about it with her husband. In this 
example, Jan was caught between different subject positions. Dominant male sex 
drive and Christian marriage discourses positioned Jan to want to make love to her 
husband but medical discourse positioned her to care for her health by not having sex. 
The risk for disabled people is that when they speak from the subject expeIience of 
their impain11ent and/or illness, it challenges dominant discourses. For example, 
Fay's experiences of what it had been like for her having an impain11cnt, infonned 
how she spoke from "a conswner's perspective" when advocating for a client. She 
was told by a non-disabled colleague, "that is personal for you, isn't it." The 
dilemma for Fay was that if she spoke from her impainnent experience then she 
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served the needs of her clients but jeopardised her standing and conduct as a 
professional. 
Ron said "every time I speak I fear that I will be ridiculed." Ron said he did not 
discuss this fear very often, indicating by implication that he must have lived with 
this fear on his own as a daily part of his life. John also had experiences of being 
caught between subject positions. He said he could be "in the pub ... after a hard 
day's skiing" and people would say "did you see that blind skier up there today?" At 
this moment John is not being constructed as the blind skier because he "is passing as 
a sighted person". However, he is not able to simultaneously take up the subject who 
is a non-blind skier and the subject who is the blind skier. The dominance of medical 
discourse means he either kept silent about his blindness or is constructed in the 
deficit subject position of being blind. 
David's impairment was too visible for him to be viewed as not disabled, which 
meant he was often constructed as being different, even ifhe was not taking up this 
construction for himself. David spoke of how a teacher had tried to educate the class 
about David's impairment, introducing him as being "a spastic." The subject position 
of being a "normal" student is taken from David at this point and he is publicly 
subjugated as the "spastic" student. Later, David redefined what the word "spastic" 
meant for him. He "owned the word" as an identity descriptor that could be positive 
for him when he referred to himself as "a big bad spastic mother fucker" when doing 
weights in the gym. In regards to being catgeorised as a "spastic", David took up a 
preferred subject position about what it meant to him to be a spastic but what was not 
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available to him was a subject position of not being a "spastic". Medical discourse 
was too dominant for David to escape being positioned as a "spastic". David's 
challenge bad been how could he find a desirable subject position within the 
stigmatising label of "spastic", given his prefened subject position of not being a 
spastic was unavailable to him. 
Negotiating the power relation and agency 
Secret, silenced and subjugated subject positions occur for people with impainnents 
and/or illness because they are disadvantaged in power relations with others. Often 
the participants were able to re-position themselves when they were invited into a 
subject position that was problematic for them. These were the times in which they 
had access to subject positions that afforded them agency. John was positioned as a 
valued staff member because of his blindness. Carole took up coaching children so as 
to continue her legacy as a sportswoman. Jan negotiated an improved relationship 
with her husband and daughter. Fay took up a new career, which she preferred. 
David came to understand his negative teenage years were not because he had a 
flawed character but were people's interpretations about him on the basis of his 
impainnent. Ron took up a position as a subject who overcame experiences that he 
found challenging because of his impainnents. 
In agreeing to participate in this study, the participants were also positioned in a 
power relation with me as the researcher. A reflexive approach to my conversations 
with the participants about their lives recognises how "the qualitative research 
interview entails a hierarchical relationship with an asymmetrical power distIibution 
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of interviewer and interviewee" (Kvale, 2006, p.484). The relationships I had with 
the participants prior to the study was varied. Three of the participants were studying 
in my place of work, a small educational institution, where I lecture and they had, 
previous to this study, attended one of the papers that I had taught. Of the other three 
paliicipants, one person 1 knew quite well and two of the pmicipants 1 had met once 
or twice before. Hence, in my relationship with all the paliicipants 1 was taking up a 
dual role. This dual role was discussed at the start of my conversations with the 
participants, considering how being involved in this research project may alter my 
relationship with them or create vulnerability for them. With the three people 
studying at the institution where 1 worked, I took particular care to explore some of 
the potential problems that may arise for them because of participating in the study. 
Not all the paliicipants approached the interviews with me in the same way. Jan, for 
example, said "r trust you to be professional and I trust you as a person". It was 
important for Jan to feel she could trust me and the process and she said that if she 
thought that she couldn't trust me then she would not have paliicipated in the study. 
Whereas John said it was "no problem" to have the interviews and he was "fine with 
it". John took up a position of being happy to participate. Carole, on the other hand, 
positioned herselfto gain something from participating in the study. She said, "I 
think there's quite a bit of potential to hold onto something I've lost and that's why 
I've decided to do it and while it might rub my nose in it a little bit, I think that will 
pass". Fay at the end of the first interview said to me "I think you've done very 
well" and at the conclusion of the second interview commented "Done pretty well, 
haven't we." In making these comments, Fay positioned herself more as all equal to 
me by first encouraging me and then defining the process as a shared task. David 
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made no comments that indicated how he was approaching the interviews or what 
they might mean for him. Ron said he was "used to being in a dual role" and he was 
known for being "open." 
During the second interviews, three of the participants reported that they had found 
the interviews helpful for them. Ron said: 
Something that stood out to me is I get this feeling you were quite 
surprised by the journey that I had been on and upon reflection, 
although I see it as just the way things are, it actually is quite a journey 
and I probably don't honour it enough ... It has probably helped me to 
find a little bit of strength ... I think it helps me to go reminding me how 
far the journey has come I think. 
Jan said: 
Something that I did find interesting was that how strong the family was. 
In fact, a lot of the stuff we talked about 1 hadn't ever really sat down and 
thought about and even talked about the sickness and how 1 changed so 
much. It was really good to be able, for the first time probably to speak 
out and identify it. It was quite amazing, a lot of my past 1 haven't really 
thought about in terms of where things come from ... It was interesting 10 
see how many strengths my fami(v did have. It was reassuring, and 
comforting 1 guess. 1 think it actually did give me a sense of peace within 
myself 
Carole said talking about her secret world had been "helpful" and led to her thinking 
more about "setting some goals for myself." For Ron, Jan and Carole, it appeared 
they had access to a more agentic subject position as result of participating in the 
research. 
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Constructing narrative and discursive change 
A key aspect of this study was exploring how power worked in the lives ofthe 
participants. The power relation within medical discourse constructs a deficit subject 
position for disabled people, where impainnent and/or illness are viewed as a 
problem. In their accounts of resistance to being positioned in deficit, the participants 
while benefiting from the subject positions constructed by disability rights' 
discourses, also clearly called on a broader range of narrative and discursive 
resources than just disability rights ideas and practices. One implication from this 
finding, for futurc research about disability, is the relevance of rescarching further 
what narrative and discursive resources, people with impairments and illnesses call 
on when they resist those subject positions that situate them to experience 
disadvantage, marginalisation and discrimination. 
This study's approach, of inviting the participants to give an account of their lives as 
people who live with impainnents and/or illnesses, was effective for understanding 
how discourse, narrative and agency worked in the participants' lives. Within the 
interview process, a primary aim was to listen carefully for and inquire about how the 
pmiicipants refused or resisted those position calls that disadvantaged them. In 
seeking to understand the complex processes of how the participants called on and 
negotiated agency, it proved very important to explore how the language, especially 
the metaphors, evocative phrases and positioning statements, used by the pmiicipants, 
embodied and were a vehicle of discourse. For example, Fay said she preferred the 
mechmlical metaphor of "not firing on all four or six cylinders" in comparison to the 
medical tenn of being "sick". This metaphor of an engine temporarily not working as 
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well as it might, needing a mechanical service, positioned Fay as a person who has 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA), to have increased agency at her work, in her relationship 
with her medical specialist and within her family. It was a metaphor that contributed 
to her being able to describe RA as a "gift given to me" which is a very different 
position call than the deficit descriptions of "sickness" and "illness" constructed by 
medical discourse. The metaphor allowed for Fay to have the symptoms of illness 
without having to take up the subject position of being an ill or sick person. 
The participants' use of metaphors and respective narrative storylines were not 
identical and the differences, at least in part, were related to the kinds of impairments 
andlor illness each person had. The social model of disability has not explored what 
subject positions are available to people on the basis of the nature of their impainnent 
andlor illness. This would appear problematic because a key factor is being missed 
concerning what contributes to disablement. Any research of the relationship 
between impainnent/illness and disablement would need to be considered carefully 
though because potentially impainnents and illnesses could be compared one against 
another. However, understanding how discursive contexts support or disadvantage 
people with impainnents andlor illness could be very useful. Research of this kind 
could lead to the development of ideas and practices in specific social contexts that 
seek to make alternative subject positions available for people with impainnents 
andlor illness. 
The complexity of the participants' narratives and the existence of secret, subjugated 
and conh'adictory subject positions, is a relevant finding for professional practice. 
Medical discourse positioned the participants to manage aspects of their impainnent 
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and/or illness experiences on their own. If education and health professionals focused 
on recognising and sensitively attending to the possibility of disabled people having a 
"secret world", then it may become safer for people with impairments and illness to 
share their experience without the risk of being constructed in negative terms. On 
this note, Carole's point was that "kindness" had not been helpful for her and David 
was very upset as a child when his teacher, "a magnanimous and kindly man", 
introduced him to the class as "a spastic". In these examples, the intentions of people 
toward Carole and David would appear to be well-meaning but the effects of their 
actions were not helpful. Given this, it might be useful for health professionals and 
those working in the disability field to undertake training in whi ch they explore the 
language they use in their work and how this language, such as well-meaning 
"kindness" positions people with impainnents and/or illness. 
This research has highlighted that negotiating and understanding the subject positions 
a disabled person is taking up in engaging with a professional service is critical. Just 
as the participants positioned themselves in relation to me differently from eaeh other, 
so too will disabled people approach professional practice on different tenns £i'om 
one another. If professionals in the health and disability field had the time and skills 
to explore what subject positions their client/patient is taking up, then that is likely to 
be helpful for establishing positive outcomes for the person with impainnent and/or 
illness. If professionals impose their discipline's discourse on clients/patients rather 
than endeavoring to negotiate some shared meanings about their work together, then 
commitment to and effectiveness of the process is likely to be negatively impacted. 
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The participants' actions of agency were all part of ajourney. In this journey, key 
incidents happened when it became possible for them to take up preferred subject 
positions. Helping professionals could accordingly focus their practice on noticing, 
exploring and supporting these alternative storylines in the lives of people with 
impainnents and/or illness. Given the power of medical discourse to subjugate 
disabled people, the need to develop and make available support that enables disabled 
people to recognise and take up preferred storylines in their lives is, I would argue, a 
political imperative. In other words, although it is critical to develop strategic and 
structural interventions that change the law, social policy and professional practice on 
the tenns of disability rights, the participants' discussions about their lives 
demonstrated how they each engaged with a range of discursive and narrative ideas in 
taking up preferred subject positions. 
Reducing disablement for people with impailments andlor illnesses can be an 
individual as well as a collective process. As disabled people take up agency in their 
lives, then the discursive nnderstandings that have enabled such actions are being 
reproduced, thereby contributing to such discursive subject positions becoming more 
accessible to other disabled people. Inevitably, there is a reciprocal relationship 
between individual and collective action. 
Finally, this stndy has left me very appreciative of the six people who were willing to 
engage in this study. Their actions of agency have illustrated how diverse the process 
is, and how powerful the positioning by medical discourse is in the lives of people 
with impainnent and illness. Moreover, they have illustrated how attention and 
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support at the local level are as relevant as global actions for enabling people with 
impainnents andlor illnesses to experience opportunities for agency in their lives. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Consent Form 
I ................................. have read a letter introducing James Arkwright's research study 
and have had opportunity to discuss his research with either himself, his research supervisor 
or the chair of [name of education institute] research committee. 
I agree to participate in this study on the basis that: 
• As a student at Bethlehem Institute, I will not participate in any data gathering exercise, 
such as being interviewed, whilst James Arkwright is the lecturer for one of my classes or 
a supervisor for my practicum work, unless all evaluations for those papers are 
undertaken by another lecturer. 
• As a student at Bethlehem Institute, I understand that my course grades will not in any 
way be affected by my participation in this research project. 
• IfI wish to withdraw from this study I am free to do so up nntil30 Janu31Y 2005. 
• I have sighted a timetable for the research project and agree to participate in the study on 
the basis of the time-frame outlined. 
• If I have questious or complaints about this research project, I can contact either James 
Arkwright or his research supervisor: Professor Margaret Carr, University ofWaikato, Ph 
(07) 838 4500 extn 7854 
• Initial discussions held prior to the interviews will discuss and negotiate the parameters 
of the research project. The study will not continue nutil there is agreement between 
James Arkwright and all the participauts about the design of the study. 
• I agree to my interviews being taped by James Arkwright 3l1d transcribed by a person 
other than Janles Arkwright, on the basis that the transcriber has signed a confidentiality 
agreement. The confidentiality agreement prohibits the transcriber from discussing my 
iuterviews with anyone othcr than James Arkwright, and then only for the purposes of 
providing accurate transcription. 
• I will sight written transcripts of my interviews before data analysis begins and I will be 
able to have changed or deleted anything that I have previously said. 
• I will receive a copy of the data analysis and will be given an opportunity to comment on 
it, and any comments I make will be acknowledged within James Arkwright's final thesis 
repOli. 
• I am aware that the research report will become either an unpublishcd thesis held in the 
University of Waikato librmy or be published in complete or part form of thc doetoral 
thesis repmi 
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• Up to two years after the completion ofthe research, I will be contacted if the study is 
going to be developed for a paper or presentation, and I will have an opportunity to be 
involved in such processes should I wish to be. 
• I understand that in James Arkwright's thesis report and in any subsequent papers or 
presentations that I will not be able to be identified in any way, thereby remaining 
anonymous. 
Name 
Signed 
Witnessed 
Date .. ! .. ! 2004 
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Appendix 2: First letter to participants 
DeaL ....................... . 
As part of my doctorate in education at the University Waikato, I am undertaking a research 
project that considers how people with impairmentslillness/long-telID health problem make 
sense of and live their lives. It is my hope that this research project will ultimately contribute 
to disability theory and be in the best interest of people with impainnents/illness/long -term 
health problem. 
The study will involve two or three separate one to one interviews and one written reflection 
about the experience of being a participant in the study. 
The time frame for the study is: 
1 August 2004 
15 February 2005 
15 March 2005 
1 August 2005 
30 February 2006 
Research project begins 
Interviews completed 
Participants have submitted written reflection on their experience of 
the research process 
Data analysis completed 
Final thesis report completed 
For the study to be an ethical and a safe project for all concemed, a number of issues have 
been considered: 
1. Participants are able to withdraw from the study up until 30 January 2005, should 
they wish to. 
2. If you are a student at Bethlehem Institute and have me either as a lecturer for one 
(or more) of your papers or I am your practicum co-ordinator, then you will not be 
interviewed until either those learning processes have been completed. 
Altematively, ALL marking and grading related to the respective papers that I am 
either a lecturer or a practicum co-ordinator for, is undertaken by another lecturer 
who is not involved in this research project. 
3. Any reports/papers/presentations produced from the research will not identifY the 
participants of the study in any way. 
4. Each participant will shall sight, sign and retain a copy of the research's consent 
fom1 before participating in the study. 
5. Each pmticipant will have access to her/his verbatim transcripts and will have an 
opportunity to change or have deleted anything that they said during an interview. 
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6. All participants of the study will have an opportunity to read the final data analysis 
and have an opportunity to comment on it, which will be acknowledged within my 
final thesis report. 
7. Following the thesis report, opportunities may exist for the research to be developed 
further in terms of writing papers or giving presentations. In this eventuality, within 
a time frame of two years post completion of the research, all participants will be 
consulted and given an opportunity to be involved in such enterprises should they 
wish to be. 
If you would like to participate in this research project and are in agreement with the terms of 
the study stated in the consent form, then please sign the consent form and return to me by 1 
September 2004 .. 
If you are not sure about this study and would like to know more, please contact either myself 
((07) 579-1747), my principal research supervisor, Professor Margaret Carr (University of 
Waikato, School of Education: (07) 838.4500, extn 7854) or Bevs Norsworthy (Chair of the 
Research Committee, Bethlehem Institute: (07) 579-1712. 
Thank you for your consideration ofthis research project. 
Yours sincerely, 
James Arkwright. 
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Letter of introductiou for participauts NOT from Education institute 
Dear ........................ . 
As part of my doctorate in education at the University Waikato, I am undertaking a research 
project that considers how people with impairments/illness/long-term health problem make 
sense of and live their lives. It is my hope that this research project will ultimately contribute 
to disability theory and be in the best interest of people with impairments/illness/long-tenn 
health problem. 
The study will involve two or three separate one to one interviews and one written reflection 
about the experience of being a participant in the study. 
The time frame for the study is: 
1 Au gust 2004 
15 February 2005 
15 March 2005 
1 August 2005 
30 February 2006 
Research project begins 
Interviews completed 
Participants have submitted written reflection on their experience of 
the research process 
Data analysis completed 
Final thesis report completed 
For the study to be an ethical and a safe project for all concerned, a number of issues have 
been considered: 
1. Participants are able to withdraw fTom the study up nntil 30 January 2005, should 
they wish to. 
2. If you are a student at [name of edncation institute 1 and have me either as a lecturer 
for one (or more) of your papers or I am your practicum co-ordinator, then you will 
not be interviewed until either those learning proccsses have been completed. 
Alternatively, ALL marking and grading related to the respective papers that I am 
either a lecturer or a practicum co-ordinator for, is undertaken by another lecturer 
who is not involved in this research project. 
3. Any reports/papers/presentations produced from the research will not identify the 
participants of the study in any way. 
4. Each participant will shall sight, sign and retain a copy of the research's consent 
form before participating in the study. 
5. Each participant will have access to her/his verbatim transcripts and will have an 
opportunity to change or have deleted anything that they said during an interview. 
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6. All participants of the study will have an opportunity to read the final data analysis 
and have an opportunity to comment on it, which will be acknowledged within my 
final thesis report. 
7. Following the thesis repOli, oppOliunities may exist for the research to be 
developed further in terms of writing papers or giving presentations. In this 
eventuality, within a time frame oftwo years post completion of the research, all 
participants will be consulted and given an opportunity to be involved in such 
enterprises should they wish to be. 
If you would like to participate in this research project and are in agreement with the terms of 
the study stated in the consent form, then please sign the consent form and relum to me by I 
September 2004 .. 
If you are not sure about this study and would like to know more, please contact either myself 
((07) 579-1747), my principal research supervisor, Margaret Carr (University ofWaikato, 
School of Education: (07) 838.4500, extn 7854) or Bevs Norsworthy (Chair of the Research 
Committee, [name of education institute]: (07) 579-1712. 
Thank you for your consideration of this research project. 
Yours sincerely, 
James Arkwright. 
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APPENDIX 3: Practice questions before first interview 
QUestions which may inform the interview enquiry 
• Have you ever been a participant in a research study before? 
• If so, what was that experience like? 
• If it was good, what happened that made it a good experience for you? 
• If it was not good, what do you think contributed to it being a not so good experience? 
What would we need to avoid in this research project so the same problems did not occur 
again? 
• What might be some of the things which are behind you deciding to participate in this 
research project? 
• What might be some of the things that you would want to have happen for this research 
project to be judged as useful and relevant for you? 
• Would you be interested in being a researcher for this research project as well as being a 
research participant for this project? 
• If you are interested in being a researcher for this project, what do you think is contributing 
to your interest in being a researcher as well as a participant in this research project? 
• If so, what are your thoughts about being involved as a participant as well as a researcher in 
this project? 
• It is my idea, to research the concept of agency as it relates to disabled people's lives. What 
do you know about the concept of agency? What would you like to know about the concept 
of agency? 
• If you were to be asked about times when you may negotiate agency in your life, what 
kinds of times come to mind? 
• If you were to be asked about times when you may find it hard to negotiate agency in your 
life, what kinds oftimes come to mind? 
• How will you kn.ow if this research project about agency in the lives of disabled people will 
be worthwhile for you or not? 
• What do you think would have to happen during and/or after this research project in order 
for it to be worthwhile for disabled people? 
• How might you be able t.o contribute to this research project for it to become more 
worthwhile either for yourself or for disabled people in a general sense? 
• What you think might be the advantages and/or the disadvantages in choosing participants 
for the study from Bethlehem Institute [name of education institute], either as current or 
past students, or current staff members? 
• What do you think it will be like for you to be involved in this researeh project with me 
while I am concurrently working as a lecturer at [name of education institute].? 
• What do you think might be some of the good things about my having the dual role of 
lecturer and researcher? 
• What do you think might be some of the not so go.od things about my having the dual role 
of lecturer and researcher? 
• Ifmy being both a lecturer and rcsearcher at [name of educati.on institute] became 
problematic for you in some way, how do you think you and I would know? 
• If my dual role were to become problematic in some way, what steps do you think we 
should take in order to address the difficulties that had arisen? 
• In tenns of accountability for this research project, what do you think I should be 
responsible for and what do you think you should be responsible for? 
• In being part of this research project, what are you l.ooking forward to? 
• Overall, what are your hopes for this research project? 
• Is there anything else that you would like to say? 
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• What is it like being here now about to have this interview? 
• Since our meetings as a group, has anything come to mind for you about this research 
project? If so, what? 
• Have you thought at all about the concept of agency and how it might relate to your life? 
• If so, what? 
• I wondered if I shared a story of agency operating in my life if that would be helpful in 
tenns of orientating us in this discussion? 
• As you have heard that story, has it connected to any stories of your own for you? 
• If so, can you share those stories with me'! 
• As you tell me those stories, what stands out as significant or interesting to you? 
• Why do you think these stories in particular have been chosen by you as the ones to 
mention today? What might they represent about your life, which seems worth noting? 
• Since our last meeting has anything been happening for you in relation to what you shared 
and we discussed last time? If so, what? 
• In the telling and being listened to about the stories you told, has anything else happened for 
you? If so, what? 
• If these reflections you are sharing now, were to represent anything new in your life what 
might that be? 
• Given the reflections you have been having, how important do you think it is to recall and 
discuss experiences of 'agency' and restraints around 'agency'? 
• In our original meetings we discusscd how individual experiences of agency are in fact 
resistances and/or modifications or changes from how a discourse or social story has been 
positioning us. Could we discuss now about some of the ways you have been positioned 
because of your disability? 
• If you are OK to do that, what are some ofthe many ways you have been positioned? 
• What was the effect of that positioning on you? 
• How did the positioning influence what you felt, thought or did? 
• What assumptions or taken for granted facts about life do you think created this 
positioning? 
• What kind of actions or practices have been required to support this type of positiouing? 
• Have you ever fclt yourself be invited or drawn into reproducing the actions or practices 
which support this kind of positioning? 
• What was it like to contribute to a positioning, especially if it was a positioning that you 
didn't like? 
• What does this tell you about discursive positioning or the power of cultural and social 
stories? 
• In regard to positioning which you don't like but may have unconsciously or consciously 
had a hand in keeping alive, what do you think it would take for you to not reproduce the 
practices that support a positioning you don't like? 
• What might support you or has supported you in the past to resist that positioning which 
you don't like? 
• As you think about either the possibility of resisting positioning you don't like or having 
resisted such positioning in the past, what is that like for you? 
• If you were able to do this more often, what difference, if any, do you think it would make 
for how you expelience life? 
• Do you think you would see yourself differently in anyway if you consistently practiced 
resisting, changing or modifying positioning that you did not like? 
• What has stood out as of most value to you today in this interview? 
• What is it about ...... that holds special significance for you? 
• In what way might that relate to the theme of this research project, considering agency in 
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disabled people's lives? 
• This is our last individual interview for you today. What is that like? 
• What kind of things do you want to discuss today? 
• I am interested in what is different for you now, if anything, as a result of having the last 
two interviews? 
• What have the interviews affirmed for you? 
• What have they high lighted for you? 
• What have they raised which is interesting or new for you? 
• What impact have they had on you regarding they way you relate to yourself, other people, 
other disabled people? 
• Who else has been affected because you have taken part in this research project? 
• How have they been impacted by your participation in this study? 
• In these other people being influenced by a study that they were not directly involved in, 
What do you think that might suggest? 
• Is there anything else you want to say before we finish this interview? 
• What has been your experience of participating in this stndy? 
• Is there anything else you would like to say that you feel you have not said during the 
discussions you have had with James or you would like to repeat or emphasise again? 
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APPENDIX 4: Letter to participants after first interview 
Dear 
I very much enjoyed our last conversations together. 
Please find enclosed a copy of the transcripts of our conversation. When you have time 
please read the transcripts, checking that they are an accurate record of our conversations 
together, as you remember it. Also, if you wish to chauge or have anything you said deleted, 
then please let me know and I will amend the original transcript. 
It is my belief that conversations are nevcr neutral or remain in a vacuum but they continue to 
act in our lives both during and after a conversation has occuned. Therefore, I would like to 
suggest that we begin our next conversation by reflecting on any thoughts you have had since 
our last conversations together. For example, perhaps you have considered some aspect of 
our conversation further or maybe some part of the transcript has stood out as interesting or 
significant to you. 
I have also been reflecting about our conversations, especially some of the things that you 
said and in response to my interest and curiosity of wanting to know more, I have composed 
a few questions, which perhaps we cau discuss when we next meet as well: 
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APPENDIX 5: Letter to Carole after first interview 
Dear Carole 
I really enjoyed our last conversation together. It was so nice to catch-up again. And from a 
research point of view, what you had to say was very relevant and invaluable for my research 
study. My supervisors felt there was a whole paper in the way you conceptualised kind1'\ess 
and its consequential positioning effects. They found this particularly revealing about how 
disability is storied in well meaning but problematic ways for people living with 
impairment/illness. The dilemma around disclosure and ways of disclosing 
impairment/illness we have discussed before but it was no less interesting for that and 
certainly is a pervasive part of the tenitory of disability, especially when the impairment is 
invisible. The secret world you discussed was something I very much identify with and one 
that I am kcen to ask the other participants in the study about as well. 
I am now hoping we can meet again for the follow-up and concluding conversation. If you 
can find time before we next meet, would you please check that the transcript of our first 
conversation is an accurate record of our conversation together, as you remember it. Also, if 
you wish to change or have anything you said deletcd, then please let me know and I will 
amend the original transcript. 
It is my belief that conversations are never neutral or remain in a vacuum but they continue to 
act in our lives both during and after a conversation has occurred. Therefore, I would like to 
suggest that we begin our next conversation by reflecting on any thoughts you have had since 
our last conversation together. I know we've already talked a little about how you found it 
helpful to talk about the 'secret world', which you likened to 'lancing a boil'. Perhaps you 
have been reflecting on this further or maybe some other parte s) of the transcript has stood 
out as interesting or significant to you. 
I have also been reflecting about our conversation, especially some of things you said and in 
response to my interest and curiosity of wanting to know more, I have wlitten a few thoughts 
and questions, which I'm hoping we might also discuss when we next meet. 
1. J felt that we could have spoken 1110re about how you've "been shocked about the amount 
of grief and it's so intense". You also described the grief as "sobering ... exhausting .... 
staggered by it. ... distressing ... just terrible." These are descriptively strong words and J 
am interested in knowing more about them, regarding the window they might provide for 
understanding more about some of the experiences you have had. 
2. On a number of occasions you said you "were working on it" or "it's a work in progress" 
in relation to finding ways of disclosing the effects of illness in your life without being 
positioned as 'less than". The word 'work' indicates intentionality to me as in being 
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proactive rather than reactive and I'm wondering if the word 'work/working' has the 
same meaning for you? I am interested in uncovering the thinking and activities that go 
along with the word 'work' for you, such as the history and effects of 'working at things' 
or things being 'a work in progress' in your life. And of course, I'm interested in what 
the thinking and activities of 'work' have meant for how you have responded to the 
effects of illness in your life. 
3. You described 'sports' as "a big part of my identity" and that you "loved it" and "loved 
the feeling", all of which you said has now "gone completely" (although you do draw on 
that knowledge and experience for the coaching that you do). Clearly, yon have resisted 
other aspects of your identity disappearing from you as well due to the effects of illness, 
such as your identities as a counsellor and mother, although you have spoken about both 
of those areas not being easy for you either. I am interested in your thoughts about the 
impact of illness on a person's identity and in particular what illness has meant for your 
sense of self/selves. In what ways do you think you might you be similar and/or different 
from the person you were before illness entered your life? 
4. Finally, Carole, what probably most stood out for me was your ability to take-up a 
position of authority or agency in your life and in so doing cope with and minimise the 
effects of physical difficulties (as in "my body feels so bad nearly all the time") and 
socia-cultural losses (such as being positioned "less than"). In this vein, you said "I need 
to be very active in making sure my life is good" and "feeling good is something I have 
to work at." Often this meant that you are able to help/benefit others aswell, and you 
gave examples of using your ahilities to contribute to the lives of others within your 
work, community and home environments. This deliberate position-taking and ability of 
making sure your life is good (which includes helpingibenefiting others) seems to have 
been informed by your counselling training/experiences, your nursing experienees, your 
family of origin beliefs/values, your eommitment to and receiving from your own family, 
and your love of sport/athleties. Is there anything else that you would like to say about 
how these dimensions of experience (and any others not yet mentioned) stand behind 
your daily practices of being "very active in making sure my life is good"? 
Thank you Carole for taking the time to read and reflect on the transcript and consider 
the above thoughts and questions. I look forward to our next conversation together. . 
Wannest regards, 
James. 
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APPENDIX 6: Letter to Ron, after first interview 
Dear Ron 
[ very much enjoyed and am appreciative of our last conversation together, which has been 
very relevant for my research study. 
[ am hoping you can find time to read the transcript of our first conversation together. Please 
check that the transcript is an accurate record of our conversation together, as you remember 
it. Also, if you wish to change or have anything you said deleted, then please let me know 
and [ will amend the original transcript. 
It is my belief that conversations are never neutral or remain in a vacuum but they continue to 
act in our lives both dming and after a conversation has occurred. Therefore, [would like to 
suggest that we begin our next conversation by reflecting on any thoughts you have had since 
our last conversations together. For example, perhaps you have considered some aspect of 
our conversation further or maybe some part of the transcript has stood out as interesting or 
significant to you. 
[have also been reflecting about our conversation. [have written a blief summary of the 
conversation and included some questions for us to discuss when we next meet. 
Snmmary 
In reflecting on the transclipt, medical treatment was clearly a significant feature of your 
childhood years. The memolies that you relayed to me of these times did not seem to evoke 
any emotional difficulties for you today; indeed yon described the experiences as simply 
'how it is'. A number of stigmatising and disabling experiences did happen to you though on 
account of you having a speech impainnent, especially during school and at catering school. 
Fighting, rather than taking flight, appears to have generally been your response, aided very 
interestingly by your ability to absorb and identify with the detective hero in Agatha 
Christie's crime fiction. And a number of incidents stand out, in which you have had to 
either overcome bal1iers or the fear of barriers. For example, being cast as having an 
intellectual disability by your fellow students at catering school and the issue of losing your 
hair in your early twenties, meaning your re-constructed ear becanle visible. Further, you 
state that even now, every time you speak 'there is a hesitation', wondering 'is this going to 
sound understandable?' 
Two areas which we did not discuss were the place that your cunent family (wife and 
children) and spirituality / faith has played in your joumey of living with the affects of 
hearing loss, ear reconstmction and speech impairroent. [fthese areas interest you, then 
perhaps we could discuss them in our upcoming conversation together. 
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Questions 
1. What do you think Dr. [name of Dr} words 'whose is that?' might indicate 
about how children were positioned within pediatric hospital wards prior to 
1969? 
2. Would you refer to a child as 'whose is that? ' now that you are an adult? If 
so, why? If not, why not? 
3. What do you think might have been some of the experiences and spoken or 
unspoken messages that led you to having 'an issue' because at 20 years of 
age (due to losing your hair) you were no longer able to hide your ear with 
your hair? 
4. You say it took you 'some time to come to terms' with not being able to hide 
your ear with your hair. What do you think were some of 'the terms' you came 
to in response to no longer being able to hide your ear? 
5. You said you got 'even' with the teacher who was 'a bully'. What did it mean 
for you that many years later you were able to 'get even' with a teacher who 
ridiculed and picked-on you when you were at school? 
6. At catering college it was assumed by some of your peers that you had an 
intellectual disability because of your speech impairment. You recalled saying 
to a class-mate at the time 'I don't think so!' and you spoke of another 
experience when you said, 'I'll show you buggers, I'm not stupid.' How do 
you account for how you knew you weren't stupid and refused to be seen in 
such a light? 
7. In referring to people's prejudices, you have stated that you are' a lot happier 
where 1 am now' and '1 get to the stage where I can't be blimmin bothered'. 
What has changed for you so that you are happier now and are no longer so 
bothered by other people's prejudices? 
8. The hero in Agatha Christie's novels has been a point of identification for you, 
in particular 'their ahility to keep going after being ridiculed, after getting to a 
dead-end, after seeing things that don't add up.' Can you say a bit more 
about how the hero in Christie's novels might have informed the expectations 
and hopes you have held fiJI' your own life? 
9. You have also said that 'you have to .. you have to .. you have to go on despite 
the odds or .. regardless that you know it's going to be a bad outcome'. 1 was 
wondering if there was anything other than the Agatha Christie stories that 
might have contributed to this stance of 'having to go on?' If so, could you 
say a bit more about this please. 
10. The difficulty of living with a speech impairment is evident when you say 'I 
still deal with the issue that every time I speak, even at 40, I still have this 
hesitation: is this going to sound understandable?' Can you say more about 
what this is like? And how you manage to move past the 'hesitation' into 
speaking despite the question in your mind of 'is this going to sound 
understandable? ' 
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11. You have described yourself as tending 'to be a fighter' as opposed to taking 
the flight stance. How significant do you think this image of seeing yourself as 
'a fighter' has been for you? What do you think has contributed towards you 
having this image of yourself? And what impact do you think this image of 
being 'afighter' has had on the decisions and choices you have made? 
12. Can you explain how 'Ian Grant' has made a difference to how you have 
viewed and lived your life? 
Thank you Ron for taking the time to read and reflect on the transcript and consider 
the above questions. I look forward to our next conversation together. . 
Kind regards, 
James. 
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APPENDIX 7; First coding analysis guide 
NARRATIVE CODES 
KEY; 
Nnmbers 
Letters 
= Narrative practices of participants /1}zs'fllii:stfYiIfltiijiJiJ'ii'ni:1I£t,;1l 
= Narrative experiences 
1 Receiving medical treatment/expertise / MedicalMOI!el 
a) medical treatment taken for granted as 'right / Jiormal1 necessary' 
b) grateful/fortunate for medical treatment 
c) experienced discrimination / de-personalisation through medical treatment 
d) medical treatment makes life busy / challenging 
2 Rehabilitation (physical and/or mental) helps / Medical A!otleltRehiJbM'odels;. 
Socia/R()Ie Vlllorisation;PsyCllOlogy/psychotherapy . 
a) impairments effects are reduced 
b) reduction of impairment effects improves quality of life 
3 Are 'less than' / Medical MOdel; PsYcl1()/ogy; ChariijJ Model 
a) assumed to have other impairments as well 
b) impairment equates with being not nomlal 
c) grief due to impairment effects and disabling experiences 
d) fear about being stigmatised 
e) pathologised / discriminated against due to, or in relation to, impairment 
f) fear in relation to social contexts where discrimination occurred 
g) discrimination not attributed to disablism 
h) lifestyle / choices constrained due to impairment / disabling experiences 
4 Society is more accommodating of people with impairments / HunianRigltts / 
S()cipl Motf:ei 
a) difference due to impairment is accepted / proud of 
b) impaimlent produces a new 'norm' - what's the norm for me 
c) disability is caused by society, not impairment 
d) identity is relative to and influenced by impainnent and disabling experiences 
5 I am not 'less than' and I stand/fight against that / Human Rlglzts;Social .. 
Model; l'rojessioIlOi(heiqing) practices; ()Nler discursi;'~i"'eid/Pfqf(ices . 
a) identifies / names and takes action against discrimination 
b) challenges self to overcome disabling experiences 
c) makes new (less pathologising) meaning around impainnent 
d) resistance to discrimination attributed to characteristics of self 
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e) resistances to discrimination attributed to beliefs / practices learnt in social 
contexts 
6 = I want to be normal or what was normal for me / Medie(ll Model 
a) self as failure 
b) doubts about self 
c) desire to be nonnal 
d) achievements minimised 
7 I am pleased / comfortable with who I am / have become / UtilnanRlghis; 
>.", ,,_,,\ " " , ,:'>:,:"':,,,» \-<': :<,:, ""6:,':("',:><"'·-'»"<>""',"">"':><)t'-":",,:\,':"<,:">';,:,«',,«< .. ,,'; 
Sj,cial ~odel;.·SocialRoleValf!r!~ation; Spirifil.41ity fram~~orks; ~~ofl!~sioltal 
("e/pinJJ}pr~ctices;fajniIype4tt1ce~;~ff'~r*is~ul';iv~.~~f~(p;(J~t1de$· 
a) has faced implications of impailment effects / disabling experiences 
b) less bothered by discrimination 
c) has found ways of enabling self 
d) has taken actions to produce changes for self / others 
e) has an appreciation of self 
t) recognises personal strengths 
g) has a sense of understanding and negotiating between subjectivities 
h) recognition of competencies 
8 = Relationships are important / fWIJ~ly ut::(!flSIPf~cf!l(,!s 
a) family supports person with impainnent 
b) person with impainnent supports family 
c) impainnent influences family / other relationships 
9 My job / vocation is very important / how I do it is unique to me in some way / 
Sociaiiloie· Va!oris(ltion;SiJcWModeltllmpioyment jdeaslpt:actites 
a) career/worki~v~ryi;";;ort';;li 
b) impainnent & disabling experiences improve competency injob 
c) impainnent & disabling experiences challenge competency injob 
10 I want to or am making a difference I SocialModeli}i'enlillist it/eas/practices; 
Human ilights;SpirituaUtji jramewo:"irs· . . 
a) making· ifeasie}/bette;for others witlii;"paiiment 
b) educating non-disabled 
11 Faith/spirituality is relevant I Christian i!ieas/practlces;BlIddhis( 
ideas/practices; otiter spi/'ituai i4Fas@raCtices 
a) interested in faith/spirituality 
b) faith/spirituality has impacted the effects of impainnent & disabling 
expenences 
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APPENDIX 8: Second analysis guide 
PAR TIeIP ANT INTERVIEWS: DATA AND ANALYSIS 
1. DISCURIVE POSITIONING 
What are the position calls that the participants are invited into? How are they called into 
existence for the different paJiicipants? What are the effects of these position calls on 
participants in terms of the participant's (and their friends / family) concrete actions and 
meaning making? To what extent do discourses / discursive practices position 
participants in contradictory ways? To what extent do participants experience conflict as 
alternative discourses vie for attention and ascendancy? 
2. RESPONSES TO DISCURSIVE POSITIONING 
What are the paJiicipants' responses to these position calls? How do the participants' 
manage/cope with contradictory discursive positionings? To what extent are the 
participants' responses to position calls, examples of acting agenticly? What snppOlis 
these actions of agency? 
3. PARTICIPANTS'SUBJECTIVITIES 
What were critical moments or sites of resistance to discursive position calls: examples of 
refusing to take them up as a singnlar disabled identity? To what extent are the refusals to 
take-up a singular disabled identity incorporated/orchestrated as part of multiple 
subjectivities, as in having multiple positions as a discourse user? What narrative / 
discursive practices have enabled these subjectivities to be reified, supported aJld held on 
to? 
4. EFFECTS OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
What are the effects of the research process on making visible the practices of agency? 
To what extent is the research process, itself a discursive practice, acting as an agent of 
change for participants thereby enabling them to move into practices of agency? What 
are the participants' experiences of the research process? If participants have 
experienced more agency as a result of the research process, then what is this experience 
and what is it effects on each respective paJiicipant? 
5. NARRATIVE THERAPY - NARRATIVE RESEARCH 
What have been the similarities and differences between the respective positioning of 
being a counsellor and bcing a researcher? What have bcen the discoveries in developing 
a narrative research praxis regarding interview process and data analysis? 
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APPENDIX 9: Third analysis guide 
DECONSTRUCTING THE PARTICIPANT INTERVIEWS 
1. DISCURIVE POSITIONING 
• What might the pm1icipants' storieslresponses say/indicate about the discursive position 
calls they have heen historically invited into? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses saylindicate about the particular ways in 
which they have experienced how the position calls are called into existence, operate and 
engage them? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the effects ofthese 
position calls on their (and their friends / family) concrete actions and meaning making? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the position calls they 
are experiencing within the current research interview/relationship? What 
discourses/discursive practices have created the position calls operating within the 
research interview/relationship and what particular participant stories/responses might be 
generated/invited in response to those position calls? 
• What might the pm1icipants' stories/responses say/indicate about the extent to which 
discourses / discursive practices position participants in contradictory ways? What might 
the participants' stories/responses saylindicate about the extent to which paI1icipants 
experience conflict as alternative discourses vie for attention and ascendancy? 
2. RESPONSES TO DISCURSIVE POSITIONING 
• What might the paI1icipants stories/responses say/indicate about what they are selecting 
and evaluating as worth telling? What might be some of the purposes behind those 
selections and evaluations? 
• What might the pm1icipants' selections and evaluations, as indicated through their 
stories/responses, indicate about the particular an-angement/combinations of 
discourses/discursive practices that have been taken up by the paI1icipants? In tenus of 
the particular an-angement/combination of discourses/discursive practices that have 
contributed to the paI1icipants selections and evaluations, what might be the background 
context or web of meanings which enable the participants statements to be meaningful? 
And what might be the opposite or antithesis (discursive practice) which enables the 
pm1icipants' distinctive meanings to be called into existence? And what might the 
participants' selections and evaluations suggest about the constitutions/influences on the 
participants lives that are typically hidden or invisible? 
• What might the paI1icipants' selections and evaluations saylindicate about the kind of 
relationships they are creating with themselves and with others? In tenus of the kind of 
relationships - with self and others, which are generated through the pm1icipants' 
selections and evaluations, how might the pm1icipants' language position them in relation 
to themselves and others? What actions and who is being privileged tln'ough the 
participants' language? And what background contexts or web of meanings might call 
into existence such position calls/privileging? 
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• To what extent have the participants' stories/responses been unanticipated by myself as 
researcher? What in particular has been unanticipated or unexpected by me in the 
participants stories/responses? What might my unexpected responses as researcher 
saylindieate about the partieipants' narratives? What might my unexpected responses 
saylindicate about the discourses and associated position calls embedded within the 
research praxis and my own narratives as researcher? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the ehanges that have 
taken place over time regarding their narratives and associated discursive responses to 
position calls? What might the partieipants' stories/responses saylindicate about what has 
contributed to the changes which have occurred in the pm1icipants' narratives and 
associated discursive responses to position calls? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the extent to which they 
have experienced eontradictory and/or different discursive positionings? What might the 
participants' stories/responses say/indicate about how they reJate to contradictory and/or 
different discursive positionings? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the extent to which 
their responses to position calls are examples of re-positioning themselves so as to take 
up a position of agency in their own lives? What might the participants stories/responses 
say/indicate about what narratives have supported these actions of agency? What might 
the pm1icipants' stories/responses say/indicate about what background contexts/web of 
meanings such narratives are embedded in? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indieate about what were the critical 
moments or sites of resistance to discursive position calls: examples of refusing to take 
them up as a singular disabled identity? And what background coutexts/web of meanings 
might sit behind these critical moments and sites of resistance? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about the exteut to which the 
refusals to take-up a singular disabled identity are incorporated / orchestrated as part of 
multiple subjectivities, as in having multiple positions as a discourse user? What might 
the participants' stories/responses say/indicate about what background contexts/web of 
meanings have perhaps enabled these subjectivities to be reified, supported and held on 
to? 
3. EFFECTS OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 
• What might the paliicipants' stories/responses after beginning their participation in the 
research study say/indicate about what the effects are ofthe research process on making 
visible the practices of agency? What might the pm1icipants' stories/responses after 
beginning their participation in the research study say/indicate about the extent to which 
the research process, itself a discursive practice, has acted as an agent of chmlge for 
participants thereby further supporting practices of agency? 
• What might the participants' stories/responses, after beginning their participation in the 
research study, say/indicate about what their experiences are of the research process? 
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• If the participants' stories/responses, after beginning their participation in the research 
study, suggests/indicates that they have experienced more agency as a result of the 
research process, then what is this experience and what is it effects on each respective 
participant? 
4. NARRATIVE THERAPY - NARRATIVE RESEARCH 
• From the researcher's experience, what have been the similarities and differences 
between the respective positioning of being a counsellor and being a researcher? What 
might these similarities and differences suggest about the position calls the researcher has 
taken up, respectively as researcher and counsellor? From the researcher's experience, 
what might have contributed to the researcher taking up such counsellor and researcher 
position calls? 
• From the researcher's experience, what have been the discovelies in undertaking research 
interviewing aimed at discovering 'what agency means for disabled people and what 
enables disabled people to negotiate agency in their lives' (and associated questions)? 
From the researcher's experience, what have been the discoveries in deconstructing the 
research interview transcripts, when such deconstruction was aimed at 'what agency 
means for disabled people and what enables disabled people to negotiate agency in their 
lives' (and associated questions)? 
• From the researcher's experience, what might be some of the possible implications for 
narrative research and discourse analysis methodologies? 
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APPENDIX 10: 2 examples of a discursive map 
(?) = not sure if belongs in this discour~ 
Blind Professional 
(social model/human rig Services Field (medical model / SYitJilll15~Ii!:Vq'(rriia(ilm) 
Making a difference I advocacy making a difference I advocacy 
Blindness is a disability (?) blindness is an impairment 
The job is me - sighted person couldn't finding solutions to problems 
Wearing different hats wearing different hats 
A lot more awareness and acceptance a lot more awareness and acceptance 
One of the crowd one of the crowd 
Blind person wants a cig - will find a r Respecting sighted professionals 
Had good managers - been lucky Walking alongside the blind~ 
Life has never been so good . dness is a big - ... 
fortable in own skin: assimil 
Micr one in hand - "",,",kin,, 5."::Z~,;'. Developmeutal 
(Psych. & Ed. Discourses) 
be disciplined 
Male Gender DisC<!ursesi 
Ski instructor: a spunky fliril\'~ 
beginnings are hard 
Spunky bird singing 
(Women objectified) 
One of the boys 
On the piss 
Play rugby to the 
The tough school of hard Id!\oc'k~ 
{Poor I Working Class dis:cOlJrS,eS" 
An ordinary bloke I one of the boys \':::,:;'(i;.).<"('U:'\·;·i'i'~,.;·'ii:;f~~·~!i.(;( 
A hard nut I on the piss;: 
Hate writing 
Life is what you make of it 
Play rugby to the death 
You fall over, hard work - get cnnfirl"nc,l 
~""",""'.' "Get a bloody life" (to rehab Bloodyminded I determined 
.' .;;i. YOU won't (to manager) 
me) 
matured through aging -less angry now 
what I've made of life I this job 
children go to university 
you fall over, hard work - get confidence LS;,:, ,'" 
blindness is a characteristic (?) 
personality can be separate from blir;PliEl's§, Y:-
APPENDIX 10: 2 examples ofa discursive map 
Positioning self 'as able' 
and as 'an agent' in own life 
difficulties in body doesn't mean less mentally 
My body might be sore but my mind is Ok 
ility/illness can be a big opportunity to grow enormously 
Ispeaking directly about what she can do & what she wants to 
respects (not pathologises) desperation 
It's 'good for me to work' evidence of doing work better 
needed to be very active in making sure my life is good 
feeling good is now something I have to work at 
presenting a different idea (about ability to work) 
flexibility to say something different everyday 
it's a work in progress II'm working on it 
getting stronger and stronger at creating a space of 
I am very direct: educating 
'I. m~n~np it; I do quite a lot of things to keep it at an 
co ciously connect myself to different types of fp2flnns 
Be a ent: feel [ have control & 
flooring kindness.---
needle in my side 
~ 
..... parenting responsibiliy Family (roles) 
(support) 
Coaching 
Nursing 
Family of Origin 
I values) 
